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I. INTRODUCTION
Despite occasional sharp divisions within the United States Supreme Court,
since Everson v. Board of Education' the Court unwaveringly has construed
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.S., 1971, Iowa State
University; J.D., 1974, Cornell University. The author would like to acknowledge the research
assistance of Ronald Conway in the preparation of this article.
1. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (5-4 decision upholding reimbursement to parents of fares paid for
transportation of their children to parochial schools).
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the establishment clause2 to place a formidable obstacle before religious groups
who seek to use the offices of government to advance their cause. In placing
distance between the agencies of government and religious entities, however,
the establishment clause also protects these same religious organizations from
undue interference by government. The establishment clause should not only
check encroachment by the church, but in the seventeenth century perception
of Roger Williams, the establishment clause should prevent "worldly corrup-
tions [that] might consume the churches if sturdy fences against the [govern-
ment] were not maintained." 3
In this article it will be argued that the establishment clause, properly
viewed, functions as a structural provision regimenting the nature and degree
of involvement between government and religious associations." The degree
of involvement should be a limited one, although it is clear that the interrela-
tionship need not nor cannot be eliminated altogether.5 Although the degree
of desired separation has proven to be a continuing controversy, the goal of
separation is not so divisive. The aim of separation of church and government
is for each to give the other sufficient breathing space.6 The ordering principle
is reciprocity in which "both religion and government can best work to achieve
their lofty aims if each is left free from the other within its respective sphere."
7
Those who were influential in our nation's history envisioned the churches
and the state in a kind of parallelism, with neither subordinate to the other.'
Each should be guarded from being co-opted by the other, and each required
to forbear from undue entanglement with the instrumentalities of the other.,
Importantly, if the clause's structural ordering of these two circles of influence
in society is reciprocal, then religious organizations are afforded a high level
of protection from governmental interference.
The principle inherent in the establishment clause has come to be called
the separation of church and state. The familiar metaphor, "wall of
2. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The establishment and free exercise clauses together read: "Con-
gress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof .... ." Id.
3. M. HowE, Tim GARDEN AND THE NVIDERNEss: RELIGION AND GovERNmET IN AmElICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL HIsToRY 6 (1965). See infra text accompanying notes 70, 74-77 (discussion of
Roger Williams (1603-1683) and his contribution to religious liberty).
4. R. LEE, A LAWYER LOOKS AT THE CoNsTrrUTION 129, 135 (1981); see J. ELY, DEMOCRACY
AND DISTRUST 94 (1980).
5. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971); School Dist. of Abington Township
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 213, 225 (1963); id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 315 (1952).
6. J. ELY, supra note 4, at 94.
7. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (disallowing religious instruction
in public schools); cf. L. TRIE, AMERICAN CONSTrruTiONAL LAW §14-3, at 817 (1978).
8. Derr, The First Amendment As A Guide to Church-State Relations: Theological Illusions,
Cultural Fantasies, and Legal Practicalities, CHURCH, STATE AND PoLrics 75, 82 (J. Hensel ed.
1981).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 166-70 (manner in which religious organizations are
harmed by too close an embrace by government).
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separation,' ' I however, is a little misleading." Separation severs the formal
link between church and government, but it does not disassociate religion from
government.' 2 In some instances, considerable interaction is not only permit-
ted but constitutionally protected. For example, religious organizations may
seek to influence the government's policies through use of speech, press, and
petition.' 3 A more apt description of the American arrangement is a limita-
tion on any mutual dependence, "both as the Church might seek to control
the organic action of the state, and as the state might affect to interfere with
the faith and function of the church.""' Nevertheless, the separation
terminology describing this ideal is so entrenched in the literature and the case
law that its use will be continued here.
Although the lower courts are construing the establishment clause as
protecting religious groups,' 5 the Supreme Court has been timid and has
not frontally addressed and developed the protection for religious groups in-
tended by the clause.' 6 To be sure, the Court's aggressiveness in preventing
10. The "wall of separation" metaphor is that of Thomas Jefferson appearing in a letter
to the Danbury Baptist Association (Jan. 1, 1802), reprinted in S. PADOVER, THE CoMPLEa JEF-
FERSON 518-19 (2d ed. 1969). It was first adopted by the Supreme Court in Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878), and was carried into the modern era by Justice Black in Everson
v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947), and McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S.
203, 311, 212 (1948). See generally Comment, Jefferson and the Church-State Wall: A Historical
Examination of the Man and the Metaphor, 1978 B.Y.U.L. Rv. 645.
11. Miller, The American Theory of Religious Liberty, FREEDoM OF RELIGION IN AmERICA:
HISTORICAl. RooTs, PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEIS 137, 138 (H. Clark
ed. 1981). The Supreme Court has not held to the notion of an impregnable wall of separation: "Our
prior holdings do not call for total separation between church and state; total separation is not
possible in an absolute sense.... [T]he line of separation, far from being a "wall," is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship."
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
12. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) ("We agree
of course that the state may not establish 'a religion of secularism' in the sense of affirmatively
opposing or showing hostility to religion, thus 'preferring those who believe in no religion over
those who do believe.' "); id. at 306 (Goldberg, J., concurring); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306, 315 (1952) ("We cannot read into the Bill of Rights ... a philosophy of hostility to religion.").
See M. BATES, RELIGIOuS LIBERTY: AN INQuiRY 321 (1945) ("It is often observed that entire separa-
tion does not exist, if religion has any vitality or respect in the community and if the state is
favorable to the development of the higher interests of its citizens."); Smith, Is the Separation
of Church and State an Illusion?, 8 CHRISTENDOMt 317 (1943) ("A church separated from the
state is not a church removed from society."). See generally H. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF
LAW AND RELIGION 77-105 (1974). Professor Berman develops the thesis that all religions have
a concern for social order and social justice which causes them to be concerned with government
and law.
13. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (state university cannot, consistent with
rights of speech and association, deny student religious groups access to facilities provided to
other student groups); Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970) (dicta) (churches have
right to take strong positions on public issues). See Miller, Organized Religion and Political Affairs,
RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 190 (Giannella ed. 1965).
14. S. COBB, THE RISE OF REGIous LIBERTY IN AMERICA 12 (1902).
15. See infra text accompanying notes 308-431 (analysis of several lower court cases).
16. See infra notes 188-96, 337-40, 348 and accompanying text.
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governmental sponsorship of or aid to religion has been important and largely
correct, at least in result if not always in rationale, but that is only half the
story. If the Supreme Court fails to apprehend the role of the establishment
clause in shielding religious communities from governmental excursions, these
religious bodies will be deprived of their full First Amendment inheritance.
Cases in which the central issue is the extent to which a church-related
agency can forestall governmental intervention are multiplying. After noting
that over "the past several years a recurring pattern of U.S. church-state rela-
tions has been one of government intrusion into the life of the churches,"
one observer sees this trend as the "most crucial single issue facing the churches
in public affairs" and one which promises to be with them "throughout the
1980s. '"17 Another commentator dubbed recent church-government conflicts
as "Caesar's Revenge" and lists several disputes between church agencies and
federal regulators involving Equal Employment Opportunity Commission en-
forcement of civil rights legislation, Department of Labor imposition of an
unemployment compensation tax and enforcement of minimum wage and hour
requirements, Internal Revenue Service determinations of tax exempt status,
National Labor Relations Board issuance of bargaining orders on behalf of
unions, and Federal Trade Commission oversight of the advertising practices
of colleges. 8 Other ongoing disputes include those between churches or their
related agencies such as schools and social welfare ministries, and state and
local bodies such as municipal zoning authorities, 9 departments of education,20
and bureaus of health and social welfare.2' The current situation portends
only increasing litigation.
The growing number of church-government conflicts appears to rise from
two forces. First, growth in both government and religious agencies has resulted
in an overlap of their spheres of influence. 22 Simply put, the modern welfare
state and the social-conscious church are more than chafing at their jurisdictional
boundaries. Second, the winds of a radical individualism,2 3 already present
17. J. WOOD, GOVERNMENT INTRUSION INTO RELIGIOUS AFFAIs 1 (Staff Report No. 1, Mar.
1980).
18. Carlson, Regulations and Religion: Caesar's Revenge, REGuLATioN 27-28 (May - June
1979). See infra notes 319-80 and accompanying text (cases involving these federal agencies).
19. Comment, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct, and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 786 (1981). See also infra note 309.
20. W. BALL, LmrATiON IN EDUCATION: IN DEFENSE OF FREEDOM (Inst. for Humane Studies
in Educ. No. 5, 1977); Note, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools and the State's Interest
in Education, 25 Axuz. L. REV. 123 (1983); Note, State Regulation of Private Religious Schools
in North Carolina - A Model Approach, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 405 (1980); Comment, The
State and Sectarian Education: Regulation to Deregulation, 1980 DUKE L. J. 801. See infra note 311.
21. Esbeck, State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious Organizations, 16
VAL. U.L. REV. 1 (1981); Pickrell & Horwich, "'Religion AsAn Engine of Civil Policy": A Com-
ment on the First Amendment Limitations on the Church-State Partnership on the Social Welfare
Field, 44(2) LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111 (1981). See infra notes 381-402 and accompanying
text (cases involving state regulation of social welfare ministries).
22. See infra text accompanying notes 124-45.
23. The term, radical individualism, is that of sociologist Robert N. Bellah. Bellah, Cultural
Pluralism and Religious Particularism, FREEDOM OF RELIGION IN AMERICA: HIsToRIcAL ROOTS,
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in many corners of society, have provided litigation pressures for the law's
growth. Individuals increasingly are demanding recognition by government,
generally in the courts, of autonomy from all institutions and the authority
they represent, including the church and church-related agencies.2 4 In the course
of establishment clause analysis, the protection of religious liberty is not served
simply by considering the power and responsibility of the state and the claims
of individuals. Instead, the courts must regard a third factor: the interests
of religious organizations. 21 Religious organizations should be regarded, not
simply as important value-generating and sustairing structures in society,
26
but primarily as institutions susceptible of harm to their essential religious
character and mission if sullied by a government's heavy handedness.27
Although no bright line can be drawn between the purview of religious
organizations and government, reasonably precise distinctions can be made
that respect the historical origin of the establishment clause,2 8 the American
experience since the ratification of the clause in 1791,29 and our present cir-
cumstances. To this end, the establishment clause concepts -of
nonentanglement 3° and noninterference in intrafaith disputes 3' should be unified
and interpreted toward a general theory permitting only a limited role for
PHILOSOPHICAL CONCEPTS AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 33, 42-46 (H. Clark ed. 1981). Pro-
fessor Bellah defines radical individualism as a marked, utilitarian insistence on individual rights,
while neglecting the social or communal context which makes such rights possible. Id.
24. See, e.g., P. BERGER & R. NEUHAus, To EMPOWER PEOPLE: THE ROLE OF MEDIATING
STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC POLCY 5 (1977).
The concrete particularities of mediating structures [family, church, neighborhood] find
an inhospitable soil in the liberal garden. There the great concern is for the individual
("The rights of man") and for a just public order, but anything "in between" is viewed
as irrelevant, or even an obstacle, to the rational ordering of society. What lies between
is dismissed, to the extent it can be, as superstition, bigotry, or (more recently) cultural lag.
American liberalism has been vigorous in the defense of the private rights of in-
dividuals, and has tended to dismiss the argument that private behavior can have public
consequences. Private rights are frequently defended against mediating structures -
children's right against the family, the rights of sexual deviants against neighborhood
or small-town sentiment, and so forth. Similarly, American liberals are vitually faultless
in their commitment to the religious liberty of individuals. But the liberty to be defend-
ed is always that of privatized religion. Supported by a narrow understanding of the
separation of church and state, liberals are typically hostile to the claim that institu-
tional religion might have public rights and public functions.
Id.
Religious organizations do not have authority over individuals enforced by the state, which in
itself would violate the establishment clause. Rather, the relationship between a church and one
of its members is voluntary and should be immune from government regulation. For example,
private law actions in tort or breach of contract by individuals against a religious organization
essentially concerning religious authority are matters that the civil courts must not entertain. See,
e.g., infra notes 403-31 and accompanying text.
25. See infra text accompanying notes 153-65.
26. See infra text accompanying notes 149-50.
27. See infra text accompanying notes 166-70 (nature of harm and how it comes about).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 96-123.
29. See infra text accompanying notes 124-45.
30. See infra text accompanying notes 205-50.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 251-307.
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government in the affairs of religious entities. Establishment clause protec-
tion necessarily is stated as one of degree because of the virtually unlimited
nature of governmental actions and the many types of religious agencies with
which government comes into contact. The factors to be examined in implemen-
ting the establishment clause, however, are the character of the religious body
concerned, the nature and adverse consequences of the government's intru-
sion, and the resulting relationship between the religious entity and
government.2 In applying these factors, the state must avoid becoming em-
broiled in the resolution of questions concerning religious doctrine.
3 3
Part II of this article will review the historical setting of the establishment
clause in order to identify objectives and fears which led to its inclusion in
the First Amendment, and to discern shifts in American society which underlie
current problems to the extent the situation has changed since 1791. Part III
will address the theoretical arguments for protecting the identity and integrity
of religious organizations from undue governmental interference. Part IV will
analyze Supreme Court cases which relate to the question of governmental
involvement with religious societies. Attention will be given to the develop-
ment of the concepts of nonentanglement and the avoidance of civil resolu-
tion of intrafaith disputes. Parallels will be drawn between these two concepts
and the Court's reluctance to define religion or to probe the centrality of an
individual's religious belief. It will be proposed that these somewhat scattered
doctrines should be unified into a general theory under the establishment clause
limiting the regulation of religious groups by government. Finally, Part V will
examine selected church-government litigation in the lower courts with ap-
plication and eventual defense of the suggested thesis.
II. HISTORY AS AN AID TO UNDERSTANDING
By definition, religious beliefs are the most deeply held by humankind. 4
Therefore, the resolution of disputes concerning religion by any authoritative
body which necessarily yields "winners" and "losers", is bound to stir emo-
32. See infra text accompanying notes 208-10.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 251-301.
34. In the lower federal courts, a consensus is developing that "religion", at least for First
Amendment purposes, is defined by considering the following factors:
a. The nature of the ideas should address matters of ultimate concern, such as the
meaning of life and death, the origin of humankind, man's role in the universe, and
a moral code of what is right and wrong.
b. The nature of the ideas should comprise a comprehensive belief system, as con-
trasted with the provision of only isolated answers to ultimate questions.
c. The claimed religion will often evidence itself by formal, external, or surface signs
that may be analogized to recognized religions, e.g., formal services, ceremonial func-
tions, the existence of clergy, structure and organization, efforts at propagation, and
observation of holidays.
Africa v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025 (3d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S.
908 (1982). See International Soc'y. for Krishna v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 438-41 (2d Cir. 1981);
Malnak v. Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208-09 (3d Cir. 1979) (Adams, J., concurring); Founding Church
of Scientology v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969).
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tions and create sharp debate. The cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court concerning the establishment clause have fully attracted the expected
outpouring of attention and controversy.
The amendment's terse language, "Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion," affords little help in resolving particular,
contemporary conflicts almost two hundred years after its adoption and ratifica-
tion. At best, the clause yields only the broad outline of a desired structure
regulating affairs between government and organized religion. The language
"no law" is absolute, but that construction is unworkable when applied to
religiously motivated conduct, as contrasted with abstract belief, 3' in a nation
populated by occasional fanatics such as the Reverend Jimmy Jones. 36 Much
has been made of the use of the peculiar word "respecting" in the clause
37
and the choice of "an" over "the" to preceed "establishment" in the amend-
ment's wording. 8 Finally, a narrow or broad definition of the critical term
"religion", governs the sweep of the clause's injunction. 9
Chief Justice Burger observed that the purpose of the establishment clause
"was to state an objective, not to write a statute." 40 Justice Brennan also
has counselled against "too literal [a] quest for the advice of the Founding
Fathers." 4 ' In Brennan's view, the more fruitful inquiry is "whether the prac-
tices .. .challenged threaten those consequences which the Framers deeply
feared." 4 But what are these objectives and fears and their underlying prin-
ciples which are so sufficiently enduring and so highly prized that we desire
to carry them forward for application in today's controversies?
35. Early cases formulated the belief-conduct dichotomy in the extreme, holding that
religiously based conduct could be prohibited or significantly constrained in the face of the govern-
ment's police power. See Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1 (1890) (upholding federal statute which abrogated the territorial charter of the Morman Church
and appropriated some of its property because it employed funds for the unlawful practice of
polygamy). The Supreme Court began to shore up the right to practice one's religious beliefs
in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (unsuccessful challenge by Sabbatarian merchants
to Sunday-closing laws), and gave religiously motivated conduct full status as a fundamental
right in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (Sabbatarian could not be refused unemploy-
ment compensation for refusal to accept employment requiring Saturday work). Nevertheless,
the belief-conduct distinction is retained by the Court, with the freedom of thought as absolute,
but the freedom of action qualified by compelling governmental interests. Bob Jones University.
v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2034-35 (1983); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982).
36. Rev. Jimmy Jones, the leader of a cultish schism from his former Christian Church
(Disciples of Christ), led over 900 followers from California to suicide in Guyana. N.Y. Times,
Nov. 21, 1978, at 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Nov. 27, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
37. Compare Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) ("respecting" means "tending
to") with M. MALBIN, RELIGION AND PoLmcs: THE INTENTIONS OF THE AUTHORS OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT 15 (1978) ("respecting" also intended to prohibit Congress from passing laws affecting
state churches).
38. M. MALBIN, supra note 37, at 14-15.
39. See supra note 34; infra notes 130, 307.
40. Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
41. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 237 (1963) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
42. Id. at 236.
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A. Colonial Beginnings
The American theory of religious liberty combines the principle of separa-
tion, entailing independent churches in a secular state,"3 with an accommoda-
tion by government of the role of conscience in the individual believer. 4
America is unique because it was the first country to experiment beyond mere
toleration of diverse creeds by placing the principle of separation into its organic
law.
45
This American contribution to freedom did not, of course, spring from
any originality of thought by the First Congress assembled in Federal Hall,
New York City in 1789, whose deliberations produced the Bill of Rights with
its twin religion clauses in the First Amendment.46 Like all profound changes
in political theory, the concept of separation emerged over several years. In
his exhaustive treatment of church-state relations, historian Anson Phelps
Stokes spends a considerable portion of his study examining the struggles for
separation in the early American states. 47 The forty to fifty years beginning
with the American Revolution were particularly intense. For the "fact is that
outside of Rhode Island, where two groups of Independents-Baptist and
Quakers-were powerful and where Roger Williams and John Clarke proved
great leaders in behalf of entire separation of Church and State, very little
was accomplished in the way of religious freedom as distinct from toleration
until the period of the American Revolution.""
Tangible changes in the positive law of most of the states disestablishing
churches were not consummated until during and after the Revolution. 9
Moreover, ratification of the First Amendment in 1791 had little influence
on the ascendancy and ultimate triumph of the separation ideal.5 0 Rather, the
43. P. SCHAFr, CHURCH AiD STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 9 (1888) ("free church in a
free state"); see 1 A. STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE N TiE UNITED STATES 37 (1950).
44. The free exercise clause presently protects the religiously informed conscience of the
individual, see infra note 90, whereas the establishment clause embodies the separation command
and the consequences which flow from severing the link between church and state, see infra notes
201-202.
45. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 34-39, 47; Miller, supra note 11, at 137; S. COBB, supra
note 14, at 1-3.
46. See infra text accompanying notes 96-97.
47. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 153-257, 358-446. See generally S. COBB, supra note 14;
E. GREENE, RELIGION AND THE STATE: THE MAING AND TESTING OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION
47-69 (1941).
48. A. STOKES & L. PFEER, CHURCH AND STATE N Ta UNITED STATES 6 (rev. one vol.
ed. 1964).
49. At the outbreak of the American Revolution in 1775, there were nine colonies with
established churches. A. STOKES & L. PiF-FR, supra note 48, at 36-37. The Anglican Church
was disestablished in New York and North Carolina during the War. Tan ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
AMERICAN HISTORY 824 (Morris ed. 6th ed. 1982).
50. In 1791, when the First Amendment was ratified, two states had established churches:
Connecticut and Massachusetts. Tan ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AmERUcAN HISTORY 824 (Morris ed. 6th
ed. 1982). See STOKES, supra note 43, at 358-446; W. MARNEL, T FIRsT AmENDmENTr: THE
HISTORY OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AMERICA xii, 111-13 (1964).
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seeds of the modern theory of religious freedom were planted well before the
period of harvesting from the 1770's to the 1820's.s '
The roots of the separation principle go back to Europe at least as far
as the seventeenth century." Those who presently fear for the free church
should recall that through much of Western Civilization, institutionalized
religion and individual civil liberties have not been natural allies." Before the
rise of democratic states, it was thought that unity in religious matters and
thus one national church was necessary for two reasons. First, unity was
thought necessary to legitimize the state which claimed a divine commission
to rule. Second, unity was believed necessary to ensure the essential common-
ality of values for identity as one people and one nation."' Painful as it may
be for those who today defend the free church, the older tradition was that
churches were often a privileged and entrenched institution, standing for the
status quo in opposition to a free society.
55
It is now generally acknowledged that separation was the result of an
alliance between two quite diverse schools of thought: one philosophical and
the other theological.56 The philosophical influence was rationalism which was
characterized by the deism and skepticism of the Enlightenment. The religious
view arose from new theological perceptions of the church and the necessity
to ensure its vitality and integrity by shunning ties with the state.
Certainly Enlightenment rationalism, best epitomized by the writings of
John Locke, was a century later a heavy influence on American statesmen
such as James Madison, Thomas Jefferson and George Mason." Locke's A
Letter Concerning Toleration (1689)"8 is a classic on religious freedom as a
natural or inalienable right of humankind. Locke's arguments were not original
for his time but were more of a restatement of the period's thought and an
apology for the toleration of some religious diversity in an England weary
of sectarian strife.5 9 Locke reasoned that religious belief was a matter of opin-
51. A. STosS, supra note 43, at 364-65. See generally S. COBB, supra note 14, at 301-454.
52. Bellah, supra note 23, at 36. See G. RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM
395-97 (1927) (tracing separation to long delayed but eventual result of Reformation).
53. J. WOOD, supra note 17, at 3.
54. Bellah, supra note 23, at 33-34; Derr, supra note 8, at 77.
55. J. WOOD, supra note 17, at 3-4. See generally R. BAINTON, THE TRAvAiL OF RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY (1950) (biographical studies on religious persecutions).
56. L. PFEFFER, CHURcH, STATE AND FREEDOM 103-104 (rev. ed. 1967); E. GREENE, supra
note 47, at 65; Miller, supra note 11, at 138-39; Bellah, supra note 23, at 36; Derr, supra note
8, at 76-78; Whitson, American Pluralism: Toleration and Persecution, 37 THOUGHT 492, 506-509
(1962). The alliance was not an overt agreement. Rather, the two schools of thought agreed on
the desirability of separation, but for different reasons.
57. Miller, supra note 11, at 138; A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 141; W. SwEET, RELIGION
IN Co ONrAL AMERICA 338 (1942); see Sandier, Lockean Ideas in Jefferson's Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom, 21 J. OF TIM HIST. OF IDEAS 110 (1960).
58. LocKE, A LETTER CONCENINO ToLERATioN (Crowder ed. London 1800) (1st ed. Gouda
1689).
59. R. BAINTON, supra note 55, at 237. Locke wrote his letter immediately following the
Glorious Revolution and the ascendancy of William and Mary to the English throne. The English
Act of Toleration is dated to 1689. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 131.
19841
WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
ion, by nature consigned to the inward persuasion of the mind.6" In Locke's
words, "the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate"', because
in striking the social compact, the people never conceded religious matters
to the state. Locke's argument leads to the recognition of religiously-based
conscience as a civil right, requiring toleration by the state.
Locke's writings were influential among the Founding Fathers, but there
were differences in how his ideas were received. In part, the differences were
due to the extension of Locke's ideas beyond toleration to the goal of
disestablishment. For example, Jefferson's view of the separation ideal
represents the rationalist's ideas in its purest form.62 Although Jefferson sought
to disestablish any single church, he did not seek "to divorce religion-in-general
from public life. ' 6 3 In Jefferson's view, common religious beliefs were useful
because they unified the body politic around norms essential for the smooth
functioning of the nation. According to rationalist thinking, religion established
codes of moral conduct and thus fostered the elements of good citizenship.
In short, a people who are self-disciplined out of moral persuasion rather than
legal compulsion are the glue that unify free society and enable democratic
self-government. Religion so viewed by the rationalists became an expediency
and its essence became morality or the human search for the immutable prin-
ciples of right and wrong. 64 Jefferson's rationalism, however, bred a certain
hostility to vying religious sects, for he believed sectarianism impeded human
reason. 65 Jefferson viewed the separation of church and state as a safeguard
for the state "against ecclesiastical depredations and incursions." '66
In the years during the American Revolution and later union, rationalists
were few in number,6 7 albeit well-placed, compared to a religious public which
sought separation out of quite a different premise. The American story of
growing sentiment for a secular state and independent churches is not found
in the philosophy of the Enlightenment, but grounded in religion.6 The sheer
dominance on the American scene of the religiously based push for separa-
tion, which transformed this ideal from theory to political reality, made the
theological school of thought the stronger partner in its alliance with the
rationalists.
69
60. LocKE, supra note 58, at 14-15, 18.
61. Id. at 13.
62. Derr, supra note 8, at 78.
63. Id. See H. BERMAN, supra note 12, at 68; W. SwEET, supra note 57, at 336-37.
64. See Derr, supra note 8, at 78-79.
65. Id. at 79-81; see L. TRIBE, supra note 7, at 816-17.
66. M. HowE, supra note 3, at 2.
67. Id. at 19; Miller, supra note 11, at 138; A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 243-44; Derr,
supra note 8, at 78.
68. W. MARNELL, supra note 50, at 99, 101, 102.
69. S. COBB, supra note 14, at 484-89.
[In this period just preceding the Revolution, a] most powerful influence on the whole
question of Church and State had been making itself felt. This was the influence of
Jonathan Edwards, [one of the leaders of the Awakening,] who, more than any other
man, settled the principle which fully justified to the American mind the complete
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Separatist thinking began in the seventeenth century, when, under the
press of religious persecution, the argument developed for a theology of church-
state separation to honor the right of human conscience in religious matters.
This movement often is identified with Roger Williams, the founder of Rhode
Island,1 and to a lesser extent with the Quakers in Pennsylvania7 ' and the
early efforts by Lord Baltimore in Maryland.7" The separation movement's
successes initially were confined to these select colonies. Later in the eigh-
teenth century, the mass of American opinion throughout all the colonies was
shaped by the Great Awakening of 1720-1750.11
Roger Williams' The Bloudy Tenet of Persecution for cause of Conscience
(1644)1" is an early expression of the sectarian spirit. For dissenters such as
Williams, the case for separation was two-fold. First, it was best for the state
because conformity in religious matters was impossible due to its personal
severance of the state from ecclesiastical functions or concern. . . While Edwards
remained silent on the relation of the civil law to the Church, his trumpet gave no
uncertain sound as to the divine character of the Church and the absolute necessity
for its purity ....
.. . It is only in the understanding that the principles of Edwards had profoundly
affected the minds of his generation, that we can account for the ready and almost
universal acceptance of the measures of disestablishment in America.
Id.
Edwards, perhaps far beyond any other man of his time, smote the staggering blow
which made ecclesiastical establishments impossible to America ...
A. STOKES & L. PEFFER, supra note 48, at 26.
70. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 194-202; R. BAINTON, supra note 55, at 214-28; E. GRENE,
supra note 47, at 47-52; W. SWEET, supra note 57, at 326-27; Whitson, supra note 56, at 493-500.
71. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 206-208; L. PFEFFER, supra note 56, at 88-90; E. GREENE,
supra note 47, at 56-59; W. SWEET, supra note 57, at 326-31.
72. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 189-94; L. PFEFFER, supra note 56, at 81-84; E. GREENE,
supra note 47, at 52-56; W. SvEET, supra note 57, at 328-30.
73. See supra notes 68, 69; infra notes 78, 84. Although the colonial awakenings are broadly
viewed as "one great religious contagion sweeping over the colonies like a tidal wave," W. SWEET,
supra note 57, at 291-92, this historical event is best understood as three movements, each with
its own peculiar leaders and characteristics. Professor Sweet describes each as follows:
The New England awakening was confined almost exclusively to established Con-
gregationalism, though the Baptists and Episcopalians profited indirectly. But it gave
birth to no new permanent religious force, for Congregationalism continued to be the
dominant religious body. The Middle Colony revival was predominantly Scotch-Irish
Presbyterian, though others contributed to it, particularly in its beginnings. But here
too the old pattern prevailed.
The Southern awakening differed from the Middle Colony and New England
awakenings in several respects. In the first place it was more interdenominational in
character and requires for its understanding separate treatment in its several denomina-
tional aspects. As a whole it bore the stamp of the frontier to a greater degree than
did either of the others and more closely presaged the great trans-Allegheny revivals
of a generation and a half later. It also forged new and aggressive religious forces
in the Baptists and Methodists and started them on their amazing development, which
was soon to make them the most numerous religious bodies in the new nation. In other
words, it marks the real beginning of the democratizing of religion in America.
W. SWEET, supra note 57, at 292.
74. 3 THm COMPLETE VrrN op RoGER Wnjus (Bartlett ed. 1963). See A. STOKES, supra
note 43, at 196-97 (summary of essay written by Williams).
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nature, and state attempts to compel conformity would lead only to repres-
sion and civil discord. Second, separation was best for religion because it sealed
the church from co-optation by the state and left it free to pursue its mission,
however perceived." Williams believed that the civil government should deal
only with temporal affairs, and that the government operated through the
consent of the people. Civil government, therefore, must not meddle in church
affairs. 76 Williams' views are most noted for the theological imperative of
separation as a means of protecting the religiously informed conscience of
the individual and for opening the door to a secular state.
7 7
Historians of the pre-Revolutionary period have cited the profound in-
fluence of the widespread pietistic revival, the Great Awakening, in several
of the colonies as having prepared the American soil for disestablishment."
The leaders of the movement insisted "that the Church should be exalted as
a spiritual and not a political institution. '" 9 Revivalism produced a religion
which was "individualistic, voluntaristic, enthusiastic: the act of faith was a
quite particular matter for each individual."8 The religion of the Awakening
"challenged all notions of hierarchical society and exalted the voluntary church.
75. E. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: Tim CHURCH AND Tim STATE 115, 118 (1967). Noting
that Williams' "principal concern in the separation of church and state was to preserve the church
from worldly contamination," Morgan summarizes Williams' view of the church and the state
as follows:
The question was not really whether the church of Christ ought to be separated
from the state: by its very nature the church was separate and ceased to be a church
when it accepted state support. Similarly it was not a question whether a state could
exist and exercise authority without supporting God's true religion: the fact was that
states did exist, did exercise authority, and did prosper where the name of Christ was
unknown.
Id. (emphasis in original).
76. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 199.
77. R. BAINTON, supra note 55, at 220-23, 226-27; P. MILLER, ROGER WILLIAMs: His CON-
TRIBUTION TO Tim AMERIcAN TRADITION 255-57 (1953).
78. W. SWEET, supra note 57, at viii:
The eighteenth century saw American religion more and more democratized and, in
the Great Colonial Revivals, for the first time religion reached down to the masses.
In the process the old European Church-State relationship was gradually changed, and
with independence came the opportunity to a successful completion the century-and-a-
half struggle for religious freedom and the separation of the Church and State.
How this, the greatest of all of American contributions both in the realm of religion
and politics, was achieved cannot be understood unless the course of colonial religious
development is carefully followed.
See also A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 240-44; W. GEwEHR, Tim GREAT AWAKENING IN VIRGINIA,
1740-1790, 167-218 (1930); S. COBB, supra note 14, at 484-89; Littell, The Basis of Religious
Liberty in Christian Belief, 6 J. CmURCi- & ST. 132, 136 (1964); see generally W. SwEar, supra
note 57, at 271-339; T. HALL, Tim REUGIOUS BACKGROUND OF AMERicAN CULTURE 147-60 (1930);
S. MEAD, Tim LIVELY EXPERIMENT: THE SHAPING OF CHRISTIANrY IN AMERICA 16-37 (1963);
F. LITTELL, FROM STATE CHURCH TO PLuRALIsM 12-28 (1962).
79. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 241.
80. Miller, supra note 11, at 139. See T. HALL, supra note 78, at 154, 159.
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Establishment of religion, even a 'general' one, would have been quite anti-
thetical to its spirit." 8'
Churches formed as a result of the Awakening quickly acted as a counter-
point to the established churches, and inevitable struggles ensued, first for
toleration and later disestablishment.82 Importantly, these pietistic churches
did not seek establishment themselves, because they believed that union with
the state debased the church. These churches saw true religion and the church
as thriving only under conditions of free choice, eschewing any compromising
liaison with government.83
The Great Awakening and its resulting concern for the purity of religious
societies has been trumpeted by several historians as a principal reason that
separation was achieved.8" The resulting separation was even more amazing
because it was completed "without any dead bodies, or any imprisonments,
81. Derr, supra note 8, at 76. See W. GEwEHR, supra note 78, at 187 ("The alliance of
Church and State, the identification of religious with civil institutions, was found to be detrimen-
tal to the cause of religion."); T. HALL, supra note 78, at 156.
82. W. MARNELL, supra note 50, at 93-104; A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 241-44.
83. Miller, supra note 11, at 139; S. COBB, supra note 14, at 487-88. Isaac Backus, a minister
profoundly influenced by the Great Awakening into taking a strong and successful advocacy
for separation (A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 306), asserted quite simply, "True religion is a voluntary
obedience unto God." Pamphlet entitled To The Public (1778), reprinted in ISAAC BACKUS ON
CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM 350, 351 (W. McLoughlin ed. 1968).
James Madison, in a letter written in 1822, observed how the American churches had benefited
from separation:
The examples of the colonies, now States, which rejected religious establishments
altogether, proved that all sects might be safely and advantageously put on a footing
of equal and entire freedom.... It is impossible to deny that in Virginia religion prevails
with more zeal and a more exemplary priesthood than it ever did when established
and patronized by public authority. We are teaching the world the great truth that
governments do better without kings and nobles than with them. The merit will be
doubled by the other lesson: that religion flourishes in greater purity without than with
the aid of government.
Letter from James Madison to Edward Livingston (July 10, 1822), 3 LETTrrS AND OTHER WRrINs
OF JAms MADISON, FOURTH PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 273, 275-76 (Philadelphia 1865).
A decade later, another keen observer of the American scene noted the same phenomena
of separation heightening the "religious atmosphere of the country." 1 A. DE TOCQuEVILLE,
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 337 (Langley 4th ed. 1841). See also Marsh v. Chambers, 51 U.S.L.W.
5162, 5172-73 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (authorities collected).
84. W. MARNELL, supra note 50, at xi-xiii, 91-104; W. GEWEHR, supra note 78, at 187-88;
S. COBB, supra note 14, at 484-89; A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 240-44; see generally W. SWEET,
THE AMERICAN CHURCES: AN INTERPRETATION 17-33 (1947); W. SwEET, supra note 57, at 301-306,
322-33.
If a study of the rise of dissent in the eighteenth century shows anything, it is
the fact that the Great Awakening was one of the secret springs which directed the
actions of men ...
... Perhaps unconsciously, but none the less in reality, the Great Awakening gradually
welded the common people into a democracy which in the end was to change inevitably
the temper, if not the form, of government.
W. GEwEHR, supra note 78, at 187.
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and apparently very little serious inconvenience." 85 No violence occurred
because separation conformed to a redefined notion of religion and the role
of the church which had gained wide acceptance. 86 As Professor Howe sum-
marizes the matter, the separation principle is "generally understood to be
more the expression of Roger Williams' philosophy than that of Jefferson's." ' "
Separation arose from an "American opinion in 1790 [which] accepted the
view that religious truth is identifiable and beneficent." The present view that
separation is peculiarly appropriate to safeguard religious truth "from the rough
and corrupting hand of government" soon followed. 8
B. The Principle is Born
In general terms the thinking developed along a two-step pattern: first
religious toleration and then separation. Moreover, the rate of this evolution
was not uniform in the colonies because of differing religious makeup and
other factors.8 9 Religious toleration recognized the integrity of the individual
conscience and argued for its protection as a natural right. Today the free
exercise clause functions to secure this right of free choice in religious matters.9 8
The later development of the separation principle inextricably was linked
to a definition of religion which presupposed voluntary adherence to a creed.
The natural consequence of religion redefined as voluntaristic was that govern-
ment had no competence in the matter. Most certainly, then, the state should
not become an agent for achieving sectarian propagation and inculcation.
Religious groups were left to attract members by force of persuasion and the
appeal of their doctrine, not by force of law.
Concomitantly, if churches were to operate in a free market environment,
a prerequisite was that churches have independence from governmental con-
trol, not just independence from governmental support. If churches were to
draw upon their own resources and pursue their calling as they understood
it, the government should not unduly impede those efforts. To have volun-
taristic churches meant to be free of both government help and hindrance.
To be an independent church and to be a voluntaristic church was a unitary
concept. One implied the other, and both were derived from the principle of
separation.
85. Derr, supra note 8, at 78.
86. S. COBB, supra note 14, at 489.
87. M. HowE, supra note 3, at 19. See W. MARNELL, supra note 50, at xiii.
88. M. HowE, supra note 3, at 19.
89. L. PFEFFER, supra note 56, 141-42.
90. See P. KURLAND, RELIGION AND Tia LAW OF CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME
COURT 17 (1962). Although the free exercise and establishment clauses both protect religious liberty,
they do so by very different approaches. See infra notes 201-202 and accompanying text. As
construed by the Supreme Court, the free exercise clause, analogous to the First Amendment's
guarantees of expressional freedom, has been utilized to protect individual rights by withdrawing
from the domain of permissible regulation certain matters-here individual acts of conscience
which are religiously based. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713
(1981); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402-403
(1963); R. LEE, supra note 4, at 129, 135.
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Volunteerism went beyond mere religious toleration. Volunteerism required
the state to be neutral in matters of religious doctrine and practice, even when
a nonneutral stance by government did not burden the conscience of individuals
in the practice of their religion. 9' From the rationalist's view, volunteerism
was desirable because it fostered liberal government by lessening sectarian strife
which disrupted the civil peace. The sheer pragmatics of the situation required
it, for early America had many diverse sects. From the theological viewpoint,
however, volunteerism was mandated by the very understanding of what
religion was and the necessity of churches independent of the state to protect
their vitality and soundness. 92
Some may entertain a certain uneasiness with the proposition that the
establishment clause is imbued with theological as well as rationalistic under-
pinnings. Others, anticipating such discomfiture with history, have pointed
to reasons why such uneasiness is unnecessary." First, embracing the theological
view did not mean that government was bound to assume a role which actively
fostered religion. The theological view was to the contrary, because it desired
a government that was not significantly involved with religious organizations,
albeit, one neither indifferent nor hostile to religion.9" Second, the theological
view was consistent with the original nature of the Bill of Rights. None of
the provisions in the first eight amendments were envisioned as sources for
making claims on the government to act. Instead, they were understood as
limits on governmental action. The theological view of the establishment clause
sees the clause as a shield from undue interference by government in religious
affairs and is consistent with the primal character of the Bill of Rights.9 5 A
third reason for lack of concern over theological influences on the separation
principle is that historical accuracy requires taking into account both the
theological and rationalist presuppositions. Should some object that the
establishment clause has no interest in seeing to it that religion succeed, the
rejoinder is that it is not the business of the clause to prevent it either. Rather,
each religious organization should increase or wither on its own merits, unaided
and unhindered by government.
C. The First Congress
Any appeal to historical fidelity must eventually reckon with the plea for
a return to the original intent of the framers. In 1789, the First Congress
debated several amendments to the Constitution introduced by James
Madison. 96 Twelve numbered articles eventually were passed and were pro-
posed to the states for ratification. The first two proposed articles were re-
91. See infra text accompanying notes 201-202.
92. See infra text accompanying notes 162-65 (independence of church is developed in
theoretical context).
93. M. HowE, supra note 3, at 15-16.
94. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
95. M. HowE, supra note 3, at 16-19.
96. R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, 1776-1791, 200-17 (1955).
19841
WASHINGTON AND LEE LA W REVIEW
jected, but the remaining ten were ratified by 1791. The ratified articles in-
cluded the third, now renumbered as the First Amendment with its establish-
ment and free exercise clauses.
9 7
The Supreme Court cases of the 1940's, Everson v. Board of Education9"
and McCollum v. Board of Education," drew heavily upon the efforts of
Thomas Jefferson and James Madison' in Virginia which resulted in the
disestablishment of the Anglican Church in 1785-86.1°' The implicit assump-
tion by the Court was that Jefferson's and Madison's attitudes correctly
reflected the struggle for religious liberty at the level of the national govern-
ment and thereby were codified into the establishment clause.'0 2 Recent scholar-
ship has mounted a forceful case that the Supreme Court was wrong. Moreover,
it is said that the historical account is reasonably clear,'0 3 at least if one accepts
that the relevant set of framers are the members of the First Congress. There
is simplistic, but nevertheless strong appeal to the argument that the establish-
ment clause should mean what those in Congress who drafted it believed it
meant, at least to the extent that the matter can be resolved by reference to
the congressional debates and conferences.I 4 A second, less satisfactory argu-
ment is to give the clause meaning according to how it was applied by the first
generation of federal officials bound by it.1°5
The dominant view in the First Congress emerging from the debates and
conferences is that the establishment clause was meant to accomplish two pur-
poses. First, the clause worked to prevent the national government from
establishing any one church or providing aid or preferential treatment to a
particular denomination. Second, the clause accounted for the concerns of
97. Id. at 214-17.
98. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
99. 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
100. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948) (majority opinion by Black, J.);
id. at 214, 216 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 245-48 (Reed, J., dissenting); Everson v. Board
of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1947) (majority opinion by Black, J.); id. at 28-29, 31, 33-39 (Rutledge,
J., dissenting). See also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-104 (1968); School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 214, 225 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 428, 431
nn. 13 & 14, 432 nn. 15 & 16 (1962); id. at 444 (Douglas, J., concurring); McGowan v. Maryland,
366 U.S. 420, 430, 437-41 (1961).
101. See W. GEWEHR, supra note 78, at 167-218 (the role of Great Awakening in assisting
disestablishment efforts in Virginia).
102. See Kauper, Everson v. Board of Educ.; A Product of The Judicial Will, 15 ARIZ.
L. REv. 307, 318-19 (1973) (criticizing exclusive reliance on Madison and Jefferson); Beth, The
Wall of Separation and the Supreme Court, 38 MINN. L. REV. 215, 218 (1954) (view of First
Amendment as embodying Jefferson's view is unprovable, controversial, and poor basis for deci-
sion if used exclusively).
103. See, e.g., R. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CUR-
RENT FICTION (1982); M. MALBIN, supra note 37.
104. See C. ANTIEAU, A DOWNEY & E. ROBERTS, FREEDOM FROM FEDERAL ESTABLISHMENT
123-42 (1964) (conclusion that it is impossible to give dogmatic interpretation based on congres-
sional history).
105. Id. at 159-88.
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federalism so dominant during this period by reserving to the states the
authority to deal with established churches and the matter of religion as they
saw fit.'
06
It can be deduced that the First Congress did not envision the establish-
ment clause as prohibiting nondiscriminatory aid to all religions, assuming
the aid was incident to one of the government's powers delegated elsewhere
in the Constitution. 07 If this is an accurate reading of the congressional history,
the resolution of the matter by the First Congress was consistent with the older
notion of church-state relations. The older view held that "because state govern-
ments have a responsibility to secure happiness by promoting morality they
cannot escape the obligation to aid religion and its enterprises."'' 08
Although this view of congressional history is not free from dissent,'0 9
if correct, one still must ask if the members of the First Congress should control
the construction of the establishment clause. Of course, the Supreme Court's
incorporation of the First Amendment through the Fourteenth to apply to
state and local governments" has erased the federalism feature of the establish-
ment clause."' The construction seemingly permitting nondiscriminatory aid
to all religions, however, remains.
It is helpful at this point to juxtapose the two conflicting views in 1789
on the separation principle. The alliance between the rationalists such as
Jefferson and those of the theological view stood in opposition to the older
tradition. In many states, variations on the older tradition were still predomi-
nant; that is, many believed that aid to religion was an appropriate role for
the state. ' 2 In the floor and conference debates of the First Congress, the
106. M. MALBiN, supra note 37, at 16; R. CORD, supra note 103, at iB.
107. M. MLatIN, supra note 37, at 39-40; R. CORD, supra note 103, at 15.
108. M. HowE, supra note 3, at 27.
109. School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 254-55 (1963) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring); L. PFEFFER, supra note 56, at 149-74; Summers, The Sources and Limits
of Religious Freedom, 41 ILL. L. REv. 53, 55-58 (1946).
110. The free exercise clause was incorporated into the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), and the establishment clause incor-
porated in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
111. Because the establishment clause does more than protect individual liberties through
its principles of separation and volunteerism, see infra note 202, Professor Howe has argued
that the Supreme Court was mistaken in applying the establishment clause with equal force to
the national and state governments. Howe, The Constitutional Question, RELIGION AND THE FREE
Socirm 49, 50-55 (1958).
112. At the time of the adoption of the federal Constitution, the state constitutions revealed
the following:
Two out of thirteen, Virginia and Rhode Island, conceded full freedom;
One, New York, gave full freedom except for requiring naturalized citizens to ab-
jure foreign allegiance and subjection in all matters ecclesiastical as well as civil;
Six, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, North and South Carolina,
adhered to religious establishments;
Two, Delaware and Maryland, demanded Christianity;
Four, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North and South Carolina, required assent to the
divine inspiration of the Bible;
Two, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, imposed a belief in heaven and hell;
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ever-present concerns of federalism were of considerable practical importance."1 3
In 1789, several states still had established churches, and all states except Rhode
Island and Virginia maintained a plethora of religious privileges and
discriminations. 114 An amendment that erased all religious dispensations and
disabilities would have met sure defeat. To leave the thorny matter of religion
to each state, and at the same time to clearly guarantee no jurisdiction in
the matter by the national government, was the expedient compromise. The
alliance between the rationalists and those of the theological view was left
to advocate the logic of separation in those states still retaining established
churches. Indeed, this is exactly what did happen. Importantly, disestablish-
ment triumphed without any resort to the First Amendment, since the First
Amendment was a restraint on only the national government."15 Although the
compromise in Congress left open the possibility that the national govern-
ment might aid religion on a nondiscriminatory basis, any significant aid was
a theoretical possibility at best. The national government as conceived was
quite limited in its powers to act in such domestic matters.
Despite the current pressure mounted for the nondiscriminatory-aid view
of the establishment clause, in its modern cases the Supreme Court has
evidenced little interest in departing from its no-aid view of history. " 6 Perhaps
Justice Brennan has been the most forthright in acknowledging this intran-
sigence. In his extensive concurring opinion in School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp," 7 Justice Brennan explained his counsel against "too
literal a quest for the advice of the Founding Fathers""' 8 as follows:
A more fruitful inquiry ... is whether the practices here challenged
• . .tend to promote the type of interdependence between religion
and state which the First Amendment was designed to prevent. Our
Three, New York, Delaware, and South Carolina, excluded ministers from civil
office;
Four, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, excluded ministers from
the legislature;
Two, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, emphasized belief in one eternal God;
One, Delaware, required assent to the doctrine of the Trinity;
Five, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland and South Carolina,
insisted on Protestantism;
One, South Carolina, still referred to religious "toleration".
L. PFEMR, supra note 56, at 118-19.
113. M. MALBIN, supra note 37, at 15-16; Howe, supra note 111, at 52.
114. See supra note 112.
115. L. PFEFFER, supra note 56, at 142; see Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
561, 563 (1844) ("The constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of the respec-
tive States in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions and laws; nor is there
any inhibition imposed by the constitution of the United States in this respect on the States.")
116. But cf. Mueller v. Allen, 51 U.S.L.W. 5050 (1983) (5-4 decision upholding state tax
deduction to parents for costs of tuition, textbooks and transportation to public or private schools,
including parochial schools).
117. 374 U.S. 203, 230-304 (1963). See Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3070-71 (1983)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
118. 374 U.S. at 237.
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task is to translate "the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights,
conceived as part of the pattern of liberal government in the eigh-
teenth century, into concrete restraints on officials dealing with the
problems of the twentieth century . . . ,,.19
The Supreme Court's cases since Everson v. Board of Education2 '
demonstrate that the Court does not consider the deliberations of the First
Congress the determinative history. 21 In its search for the objectives thaf
underlie the separation principle, the Court instead harks back to the struggle
for religious freedom in the States, a development that spans over a hundred
years up to the final disestablishment by Massachusetts in 1833.122 As Justice
Brennan said, to the modem Court the relevant "pattern of liberal government
in the eighteenth century" is not the political expediencies of the 1789 Con-
gress, which, concededly, are a mere snapshot of a longer and richer history.
Rather, the Court finds the pertinent history to be the slow but steady accep-
tance of the separation principle in the States. This long span of history has
been gathered by the Court and compressed into the establishment clause.' 23
If the Court has adopted the separation theory held by the rationalists and
those of the theological view, logic and consistency entails adopting the presup-
positions of both. If the separation of church and state was to inure to their
mutual benefit, then governmental regulation of religious organizations should
be given the same strict scrutiny as governmental aid to religion.
An interesting inquiry remains. In Schempp, Justice Brennan asks what
has transpired since the late eighteenth century that presently is troubling the
courts in adapting the establishment clause with its separation principle to
the "problems of the twentieth century?"
D. Changing Times
Nearly two hundred years of constitutional government have witnessed
fundamental shifts in American society which underlie the relatively recent
church-government clashes. This litigation may be viewed in the context of
socioreligious and political developments. Changes in how we view religion,
combined with a more embracing role for government in regulating domestic
affairs, have complicated the relations between religious organizations and
government.
The changes in American religious life have been two-fold: the emergence
119. 374 U.S. at 236.
120. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
121. Even in the recent legislative chaplain case, Marsh v. Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983),
which upheld the practice because the "unique history" of the First Congress established a prece-
dent for invocational prayer, the majority took care not to rest its justification on the historical
pattern alone. Id. at 3071 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
122. L. PFEFFER, supra note 56, at 141.
123. No judgment is made here concerning whether this revisionist .view of history is an
appropriate use of the Supreme Court's power of judicial review. For present purposes, suffice
it to acknowledge what the Supreme Court has done, and proceed from there.
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of contemporary religious pluralism 2 ' and a broadening of the realm of
religious ministry into social and economic circles.' 25 On a national level, the
United States has always been religiously diverse, initially composed of
numerous Christian denominations. ,26 The prospect of establishing one national
church was as remote in 1791 when the establishment clause was ratified as
it is inconceivable today. Until the first half of the twentieth century, however,
there existed a cultural consensus which subscribed to a Judeo-Christian world
view, even by those who had made no personal commitment to a Jewish, Pro-
testant, or Roman Catholic faith.' 27 Although the denominations comprised
multiple branches, they all claimed a common root.'28 This is no longer true,
and the shift has been both recent and rapid.
Even a cursory sampling of present-day American culture reveals a
smorgasbord of religions vying for attention: Theistic, nontheistic, and
polytheistic; and with origins both ancient and modem, Eastern and in America
itself. 29 This new religious pluralism has propelled a Supreme Court sensitive
toward the religious persuasions of all citizens to adopt a more neutral and
thus secular posture. 30 Occasionally, this secularizing tendency in public in-
stitutions such as schools has taken place more quickly than large segments
124. P. KAUPER, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION 6-9 (1964); Buzzard, America Today,
Shaking Foundations, FREEDOM AND FAITH: THE IMPACT OF LAW ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 11, 17-18
(1982).
125. Buzzard, supra note 124, at 16-17; Carlson, supra note 18, at 29-30.
126. A. STOKES, supra note 43, at 272-76.
127. Miller, supra note 11, at 140; Eastland, In Defense of Religious America, COMMENTARY
39, 39-42 (June 1981); TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 83, at 331 ("[AlImost all the sects of the United
States are comprised within the great unity of Christianity, and Christian morality is everywhere
the same.").
128. Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44(2) LAW & CONTEMP. PRoas. 23, 24-25 (1981).
129. Religions include, for example, Islam, which now claims over 2 million members in
the United States. YEARBOOK OF AMECAN AND CANADIAN CHURcHEs 71 (Jacquet ed. 1983).
A recent book reports "more than 600 unconventional alternative religious bodies" which com-
pete with nearly 800 Christian denominations for the allegiance of Americans. J. MELTON & R.
MOORE, THE CULT EXPERIENCE: RESPONDING TO THE NEw RELIGIOUS PLURALISM 7 (1982). The
Native American Church claimed 225,000 members in 1977, the Church of the Tree of Life which
uses drugs as sacraments consisted of 1,500 members in 1972, and the National Spiritualist Associa-
tion of Churches which believes in reincarnation and the after-life was comprised of 160 churches
in 1974. 2 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS 98, 196-98 (Melton ed. 1978). See general-
ly, G. PARRINDER, DICTIONARY OF NoN-CRsTIAN RELIGIONS (2d ed. 1981). The YEARBOOK OF
AMERICAN AND CANADIAN CnuRCHEs (Jacquet ed. 1983) lists 339,053 denominations with member-
ship of over 138 million representing 59.7% of the United States population. CH-RcHES AND CHURCH
MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES (National Council of Churches, 1980) lists 231,708 denomina-
tions with membership of over 112 million representing 49.7% of the population.
130. P. KAUPER, supra note 124, at 6-7. Increasing religious pluralism is evident in the Supreme
Court's definitional struggle with the meaning of religion in the Constitution. More traditional
perceptions of religion in earlier days grounded in theism (see United States v. Macintosh, 283
U.S. 605, 633-34 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890))
have given way to the pluralistic view defining a religious faith as "sincere religious beliefs which
are based upon a power or being, or upon a faith, to which all else is subordinate or upon which
all else is ultimately dependent." United States v. Seeger, 300 U.S. 163, 176 (1965). See also
Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n. 11 (1961).
[Vol. 41:347
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE LIMITS
of the public were ready to accept.' 3' Moreover, neutrality has become less
possible because the present multitude of creeds no longer share a common
source for moral codes and ultimate values.'
32
The second change in American religious life is the expansion of religious
associations into new arenas. Alexis de Tocqueville, in his chronicle of the
United States in the 1830's, observed that compared with Europe, religion
in America was more confined to the private side of life, but there its in-
fluence was intense. Tocqueville remarked, "It restricts itself to its own
resources, but of these none can deprive it; its circle is limited, but it pervades
it and holds it under undisputed control." 33 Today the circle of religious
activity has ballooned."' The types of ministries are myriad and their organiza-
tional structures vary widely. 35 Examples run from the familiar charities, mis-
sion societies, schools, and child-care agencies to the recently-formed prison
ministries, family-counseling centers, broadcasting networks, and even a few
legal-aid clinics. 36 In this larger community, the religious beliefs of many are
expressed and cultivated and find further meaning in corporate acts of service. 31
These ministries are not simply welfare agencies, distinguishable from
nonreligious agencies only because the staff acts out of religious motivation.
Many of the ministries combine service with the underlying purpose to pro-
131. Consider, for example, the proposals of the Reagan Administration to permit volun-
tary prayer in public schools, S.J. Res. 73, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983), contrary to Engle v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Senator Hatfield's proposal to allow religiously-oriented meetings
in high school facilities during noninstructional periods, S. 815, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983),
contrary to Lubbock Civil Liberties Union v. Lubbock Indep. School Dist., 669 F.2d 1038 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3533 (U.S. Jan. 17, 1983) (No. 82-805). Cf. Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980) (per curiam) (striking Kentucky statute requiring posting of Ten Command-
ments in public school classrooms).
132. Canavan, supra note 128, at 24-25.
133. 1 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 83, at 341.
134. Religious groups opened schools, charities and other social welfare agencies long ago.
In social action endeavors, they preceded the government by many years. See Pickrell & Hor-
wich, supra note 21, at 112-13. Of course, there has been a general tendency in mid-twentieth
century for the state to take over social services which were once the province of the churches.
This, however, has been the pattern only within main line Protestantism. Conservative churches
are just awakening to social needs. Thus, social welfare activities by all churches have expanded
greatly since the beginning of our nation.
135. See Morgan, The Significance of Church Organizational Structure in Litigation and
Government Action, 16 VAL. U.L. REv. 145 (1981); R. ToMs, WHAT IS A CHURCH? THE DILEMMA
OF THE PARACHURCH (1979) (practical introduction to definition of "church" as it relates to
church-affiliated organizations and related issues).
136. Social welfare ministries, both new and old, are not to be criticized, indeed, many are
commendable. One must, however, acknowledge that their existence and expansion into areas
which overlap with the Welfare State create unanticipated problems in church-government rela-
tions. For examples of religious broadcasting, see Faith Center-WHCT Channel 18 v. Local
Union 42, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 261 N.L.R.B. 11, 1982 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) 18,888
(1982), and Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, - F.2d
(D.C. Cir. 1983). For an example of a church-operated legal aid clinic, see J. HEFLEY, THE CHURCH
THAT TAKES O, TROUBLE 165-73 (1976).
137. See Pickrell & Horwich, supra note 21, at 112 nn. 6-8 (authorities collected).
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pagate their particular faith. 3 ' With religion expanding into new endeavors,
the frequent contact and occasional clash with government, local, state and
federal, seems inevitable.
Despite its increase, organized religion has been surpassed by government
as the premier growth industry. 3 9 If not constraihed by limited tax resources,
the "Great Society" had aimed to displace much of the private voluntary sector.
Not only has tension between big government and religious institutions resulted,
but government also has tended to compromise many of those institutions.I"
Because of their own shrinking financial resources and a marked decline in
volunteer workers limiting their personnel resources, some religious associa-
tions sought and received government aid and services. 4' But the proverbial
governmental "strings" exacted a price. As one author observed, "[T]he will-
o'-the-wisp attractions of governmental money have lured elements of the
church community deeper into the bureaucratic quagmire."' 2 Ministerial pro-
grams have been tailored to fit the parameters of available public grants.
4
1
Even religious organizations which shunned public aid have not avoided
regulation.' 4 4 Under such elastic doctrines as police power for promoting the
general welfare and matters affecting interstate commerce, government often
has regulated, licensed, and generally sought to do its version of "good".
138. See R. NEUHAUS, CHRISTIAN FAITH & PUBLIC POLICY 125-26 (1977).
139. P. KAuPER, supra note 124, at 10-12; Buzzard, supra note 124, at 15-16 (1982); Carlson,
supra note 18, at 30-33. See C. DAWSON, RELIGION AND Tim MODERN STATE 45-46 (1940). Dawson
states that:
ITihe modern State is daily extending its control over a wider area of social life and
is taking over functions that were formerly regarded as the province of independent
social units, such as the family and the church, or as a sphere for the voluntary activities
of private individuals. It is not merely that the State is becoming more centralized but
that society and culture are becoming politicized. In the old days the statesman was
responsible for the preservation of internal order and the defence of the State against
its enemies. [Today] he is called upon to deal more and more with questions of a purely
sociological character and he may even be expected to transform the whole structure
of society and re-fashion the cultural traditions of the people. The abolition of war,
the destruction of poverty, the control of the birth-rate, the elimination of the unfit-
these are questions which the statesman of the past would no more have dared to med-
dle with than the course of the seasons or the movements of the stars: yet they are
all vital political issues to-day and some of them figure on the agenda of our political
parties.
Id.
140. Carlson, supra note 18, at 31.
141. Id.; see generally WEBER & GILBERT, PRIVATE CHURCHES AND PUBLIC MONEY (1981);
LARSON & LOWELL, THE REUGIOUS EMPnIRE (1976). See Pickrell & Horwich, supra note 21, at
111 (recent article that focuses on federal funding and concomitant regulation of church activities
in social welfare).
142. Carlson, supra note 18, at 30.
143. Id. at 31. See R. NEUHAUs, supra note 138, at 125-26 (strong statements urging resistance
to situations where government sets agenda for which societal needs are responded to by religious
community); J. WALTER, SACRED COWS: EXPLORING CoNTEMPORARY IDOLATRY 167-68 (1979) (same).
144. See Esbeck, supra note 21.
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Government action has tended to homogenize the mediating structures of
society and threatens to absorb them as quasi-governmental agencies.145
III. INDEPENDENT, VOLUNTARISTIC CHURCHES IN A SECULAR STATE
We have seen that th separation principle, with its attendant implica-
tions of independent, voluntaristic churches and a secular state, developed
at a time when religion was more narrowly defined and the circle of activity
by religious agencies smaller and well understood. The present circumstances
demonstrate that much has changed, complicating the work of the courts.
Before turning to the particulars of the case law, it is beneficial to examine
the problem from a more general perspective. The current arguments for pro-
tecting the integrity of religious organizations from undue governmental in-
terference fall into two theories: one sociopolitical and the other based on
natural rights.
The sociopolitical view reasons that the ongoing development of a liberal
society can thrive only in responsible freedom. Since much of the life of a culture
is shaped by its nonpolitical institutions and organizations, a rich source of duty,
authority and discipline, government would overly control society if it directed
the lives of these associations.146 Liberal democratic theory, therefore, posits
more than the protection of individual rights."'4 It also recognizes the contribu-
tion to freedom of socializing institutions, such as voluntary associations and
cultural or ethnic subgroups, and thus holds in high regard associational rights.' 4
Churches and other religious organizations are among the mediating structures
in a culture, occupying the space between the individual and government and
serving as loci of responsibility, commitment, and identity for many people. ,49
145. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 24, at 28; Carlson, supra note 18, at 31.
146. M. ABERNATHY, THE RIGHT OF ASSEMBLY AND ASSOCIATION 240, 241 (2d ed. 1981);
D. FELLMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 37, 104 (1963); R. HORN, GROUPS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 18, 155-60 (1968); R. NISBET, COMIUNITY AND POWER 70 (1962); C. RICE,
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION 54 (1962); Howe, Foreward: Political Theory and The Nature of Liberty,
67 HARV. L. REv. 91 (1953); Chafee, The Internal Affairs of Associations Not For Profit, 43
HARV. L. REV. 3, 1021-29 (1930); Note, Developments in The Law: Judicial Control of Actions
of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 986-88, 991, 995, 1055 (1963).
147. M. BATES, supra note 12, at 398-99.
148. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) (college's denial of recognition to student
political group violated First Amendment guarantees of expression and association); Brotherhood
of Ry. Trainmen v. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964) (injunction prohibiting union from advising
members and recommending legal counsel held contrary to First Amendment guarantee of freedom
of association); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled disclosure
of membership list constitutes unlawful restraint on freedom of association). See also M. ABER-
NATHY, THE RIGHT OF AssEmBLY AND ASSOCIATION 239-44 (2d ed. 1981); D. FELLMAN, THE CON-
STITUTIONAL RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION 2, 34, 104 (1963); R. HORN, GROUPS AND THE CONSTITUTION
14-16, 152 (1968); H. LASKI, FOUNDATIONS OF SOVEREIGNTY 245-46 (1921).
149. P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 24, at I-8. Sociologist Peter Berger has identified
such institutions as family, neighborhood and church as the value-generating and value-maintaining
agencies of a society. These structures are poised between the public institutions of modern society
and the solitary individual. These intermediate structures, therefore, are situated to be useful
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Next to the family, religious organizations' ° comprise the largest single group
of societial institutions which generate, mold, and propagate those shared norms
essential to a reasonably cohesive society capable to self-government., The
sociopolitical view argues for the preservation of associational life because of
its social utility. Religious groups, therefore, are treated in parity with all other
voluntary associations.' 2
to both the political order and the individual.
It is a crisis for the individual who most carry on a balancing act between the
demand of the two spheres. It is a political crisis because the megastructures (notably
the state) come to be devoid of personal meaning and are therefore viewed as unreal
or even malignant. Not everyone experiences this crisis in the same way. Many who
handle it more successfully than most have access to insitutions that mediate between
the two spheres. Such insitutions have a private face, giving private life a measure
of stability, and they have a public face, transferring meaning and value to the megastruc-
tures. Thus, mediating structures alleviate each facet of the double crisis of modern
society. Their strategic position derives from their reducing both the anomic
precariousness of individual existence in isolation from society and the threat of aliena-
tion to the public order ...
Without institutionally reliable processes of mediation, the political order becomes
detached from the values and realities of individual life. Deprived of its moral founda-
tion, the political order is "delegitimated." When that happens, the political order
must be secured by coercion rather than by consent. And when that happens, democracy
disappears.
Id. at 3.
150. Id. at 26-30; R. NEUtAUS, supra note 138, at 178; 1 A. DE TOcQUEVILLE, supra note
83, at 333-35. See M. BATES, supra note 12, at 390-407; See supra note 129 (large numbers who
identify with religious organizations in America).
151. Two social scientists have described the "individual in crises" as brought on by modern
society and exacerbated by the deterioration of mediating structures:
The modern individual's sense of isolation, his so-called spiritual homelessness, his
bewilderment in the face of the seemingly impersonal forces of which he feels himself
a helpless victim, his weakening sense of values-all these motifs often recur in modern
sociological writings. This malaise reflects the stresses imposed on the individual by
the profound transformations taking place in our economic and social structure-the
replacement of the class of small independent producers by gigantic industrial
bureaucracies, the decay of the patriatchal family, the breakdown of primary personal
ties between individuals in an increasingly mechanized world, the compartmentaliza-
tion and atomization of group life, and the substitution of mass culture for traditional
pattern.
These objective causes have been operating for a long time with steadily increasing
intensity. They are ubiquitous and apparently permanent, yet they are difficult to grasp
because they are only indirectly related to specific hardships or frustrations. Their
accumulated psychological effect is something akin to a chronic disturbance, an habitual
and not clearly defined malaise which seems to acquire a life of its own and which
the victim cannot trace to any known source.
On the plane of immediate awareness, the malaise seems to originate in the in-
dividual's own depths and is experienced by him as an apparently isolated and purely
psychic or spiritual crisis. It enhances his sense of antagonism to the rest of the world.
L. LOWNTAL & N. GUTERMA, PROPHES OF DEcErr 15 (2d ed. 1970).
152. That is not to say that sociopolitical arguments for independence of religious organiza-
tions should not be made. See, e.g., D. Kuy, WHY CHUrRcsias SHOurLD NOT PAY TAXEs 47-48
(1977). The more compelling case, however, is founded upon theological premises. Cf. A. STOKES,
supra note 43, at 36. The sociopolitical view argues for the preservation of religious societies
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As we have seen, however, the principle of separation arose not from
the prudential reasoning characteristic of the sociopolitical rationale but from
a natural rights view as evidenced in eighteenth century political thought. The
natural rights theory argues from higher ground; namely, there are certain
inalienable rights which cannot legitimately be denied. The theory holds that
religious organizations are different from other communal societies and that
this uniqueness is critical to understanding the First Amendment. For exam-
ple, although the Amendment deals only by implication with associational
rights,'I 3 the establishment clause takes specific account of religious organiza-
tions through the separation requirement. The separation, of course, is of
government and religious organizations, not government and individuals
holding religious beliefs (the latter being an impossibility).' 54 The place of
religious institutions, therefore, has long been recognized as a special problem
for which the establishment clause makes special provision.
Since the principle of separation arose from an alliance between rationalism
and a theological view of the church, it is not surprising that supporters of
the natural rights theory divide into two lines of thought concerning the
because of their social utility. Such a foundation for civil rights will erode should the contem-
porary scene begin to value religion less and less. The danger of relying principally on the
sociopolitical view is quite real and perhaps increasing with time, as suggested by two sociologists:
The prevalence of malaise in recent decades is reflected in growing doubt with
relation to those universal beliefs that bound western society together. Religion, the
central chord of western society, is today often justified even by its most zealous defenders
on grounds of expediency. Religion is proposed not as a transcendent revelation of
the nature of man and the world, but as a means of weathering the storms of life,
or of deepening one's spiritual experience, or of preserving social order, or of warding
off anxiety. Its claim to acceptance is that it offers spiritual comfort ...
As a result, the old beliefs, even when preserved as ritualistic fetishes, have become
so hollow that they cannot serve as spurs to conscience or internalized sources of
authority. Now authority stands openly as a coercive force and against it is arrayed
a phalanx of repressed impulses that storm the gates of the psyche seeking outlets of
gratification.
L. LOWENTHAL & N. GuTrERtANi, supra note 151, at 18. (footnote omitted).
153. See supra note 148 (cases cited).
154. W. MARNELL, supra note 50, at xiii-xiv.
The "wall of separation between Church and State" was not and could not be a Chinese
Wall to separate the eternal and the temporal. The real relationship between Church
and State, in America and in every country where religion is strong, is a thing of the
spirit, the infusion of the spirit of religion into the ordering of the affairs of society.
A wall of separation which would bar that spirit from making itself felt in secular
concerns can never be built, because it would have to bisect the human heart.
Id.
[Als sharply distinct as they may be, the Church and the body politic cannot live and
develop in sheer isolation from and ignorance of one another. This would be simply
antinatural. From the very fact that the same human person is simultaneously a member
of that society which is the Church and a member of the society which is the body
politic, an absolute division between those two societies would mean that the human
person must be cut in two.
J. MARITIt, MAN AND TnE STATE 153-54 (1951). See G. RUcMERO, supra note 52, at 404.
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justification for this position."'5 The rationalists ground their thinking solely
in the preeminence of individual conscience. 56 Those of the theological posi-
tion hold to both the sanctity of conscience and the divine nature of the
church.'" Theologian Thomas Derr expresses the theological view:
Virtually all the historic faiths of the West, Protestant, Catholic, and
Jewish, understand themselves as communities of response, called into
being by an initiative from the divine.' 58
In a most helpful series of lectures, the French philosopher Jacques Mari-
tain approaches this division from the perspective of both the "unbeliever"
and the "believer".' 59 From the skeptic's view, Maritain explains, there should
be independence for religious organizations, not simply on an associational basis
at a level with other voluntary organizations, but because of the superior human
right of conscience to act on ultimate truth, however understood.' 60 The right
of the religiously informed conscience is the exercise of those uniquely human
qualities of inquiry, reason, will, and choice concerning the ultimate ques-
tions of humanity's origin, life's purpose, and its destiny. The exercise of these
qualities consistently has led to the formation of churches. A secular state,
therefore, can recognize freedom for churches without betraying its own
neutrality on matters of ultimate truth. The state must recognize freedom for
155. The division among natural rights theory supporters points out that the alliance be-
tween rationalism and the theological view has its limits. Both views agree on the desirability
of separation, but these two world views are otherwise antithetical. See E. GREENE, supra note
47, at 65.
156. G. RUGGIERO, supra note 52, at 396-97, 404-406.
157. J. MARITAIN, supra note 154, at 151-54, 161-65, 177-78, 186-87; C. DAvSON, RELIGION
AND THE MODERN STATE 113, 144-45, 149 (1940); D. KELLEY, supra note 152, at 47-49; Action,
Political Thoughts on the Church, THE HISTORY OF FREEDOM AND OTHER ESSAYS 188, 203 (rev.
ed. 1967).
158. Derr, supra note 8, at 84.
159. J. MARnTAiN, supra note 154 at 150-52. Maritan begins by asking rhetorically what
a religious organization is to one professiong no religion:
In the eyes of the unbeliever, the Church is, or the Churches are, organized bodies
or associations especially concerned with the religious needs and creeds of a number
of his fellow-men, that is, with spiritual values to which they have committed themselves,
and to which their moral standards are appendant. These spiritual values are part
. .. of those supra-temporal goods with respect to which, even in the natural order,
the human person transcends . . . political society, and which constitute the moral
heritage of mankind, the spiritual common good of civilization or of the community
of minds. Even though the unbeliever does not believe in these particular spiritual values,
he has to respect them. In his eyes the Church, or the Churches, are in the social com-
munity particular bodies which must enjoy that right to freedom which is but one,
not only with the right to free association naturally belonging to the human person,
but with the right freely to believe the truth recognized by one's conscience, that is,
with the most basic and inalienable of all human rights. Thus, the unbeliever, from
his own point of view ... acknowledges as a normal and necessary thing the freedom
of the Church, or of the churches.
Id. at 150 (emphasis in original). Maritain's "unbeliever", although a skeptic, nonetheless is
democratically minded and not hostile to religion in general. Id.
160. See G. RUGGIERO, supra note 52, at 404-405.
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churches if it minds its duty of nonhostility toward religion and takes into
account the religious propensities of its citizens. 161
For the believer, Maritain sees a different conception of the religious society
of which one is a member. To those professing religious belief, the church
or churches are institutions, both divine and human, with the calling to pro-
fess and teach in accordance with the commands of the truth they claim.'62
To the believer, the freedom of a religious organization is based on its dedica-
tion by a deity. By its nature, the deity calls one to a higher allegiance to
the church than to the state.'
63
In summary, the rationalist enthrones the individual conscience, whereas
the theological view holds that the religious organization represents more that
the derivative rights of all individuals who comprise its membership.' 61 In either
event, whether from the perspective of the believer or the skeptic, there are
three parties to consider in matters of religious liberty: the individual, the state,
and the religious community.1 65 Separation that prevents overreaching by a
161. See supra notes 12-13 and accompanying text.
162. J. MARITAIN, supra note 154, at 151-52.
163. See H. RICHARD NEIBUHR, RADICAL MONTHEISM AND WESTERN CULTURE 70-71 (1960);
Littell, The Basis of Religious Liberty in Christian Belief, 6 J. CHURCH & ST. 132, 140, 145
(1964). Cf. S. COBB, supra note 14, at 485 (teaching of Jonathan Edwards, one of the leaders
of the Great Awakening).
[Edwards] introduced into the question an element entirely new to.the discussion. Until
Edwards' day that discussion [on separation] had known but two parties: the state,
asserting control over religious life; and the mind, asserting liberty of thought. Be-
tween the two the Church was in constant danger of losing either its freedom or its
purity. Edwards lifted up the dignity of the Church itself... divinely founded and
nourished by divine grace.
Id. See also M. BATES, supra note 12, at 300-301.
164. R. NEUHAUS, supra note 138, at 30.
165. Some discern an additional reason for juridical recognition of independence for religious
groups: to offset the power of the state to the benefit of the individual. D. RUGOBIRO, supra
note 52, at 397-98, 406; L. STuRzo, CHURCH AND STATE 550 (Carter translation 1962).
This antagonistic position of Church and State is connected with a basic sociological
principle, that of the limitation of power. There can be no unlimited power; unlimited
power would be not only a social tyranny but an ethical absurdity. The problem raised
by the modern State turns precisely on this point. It has denied any external limitation
by a principle other than its own, or, as the philosophers say, heteronomous, for laic
thought has proclaimed the autonomy of the State. In order to limit its powers, appeal
was made to the freedom of the people, and since all liberty resolves itself into power,
the whole of power was attributed to the people. But the people could not exert its
power actually, possessing it only potentially, by origianl title, while the actual reality
passed to the State as legislative and executive power. Mutual limitation between peo-
ple and State ended by becoming a formal and organic fact, without ethical substance.
This was sought, occasion by occasion, and resolved itself into positivist pragmatism.
This process has been arrested by two forces which were believed extraneous to the
State and reduced to impotency: the Church and the popular conscience. The first as
the perennial voice of a higher morality, often unheard or seemingly unheard, ignored,
despised, contradicted, disparaged by adversaries, falsified or weakened by too com-
promising friends, followed by but a few of the faithful, and yet an insistent and
efficacious voice, for it is the perennial voice of the spirit that is never silent.
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church or other religious organization into the offices of government enhances
the religious liberty of all citizens of that state. This is the "no-aid" rationale
for separation. Additionally, since separation is for the mutual benefit of both
church and state, the state must also be deterred from overreaching into the
agencies of the church.
How are religious associations harmed by too close an embrace by govern-
ment? To answer this question, the state must understand why religious societies
exist and just how they perceive themselves. '66 Only in this way can the govern-
ment know how its actions cause injury to a church. In discussing the establish-
ment clause, therefore, there is simply no evading the theological reasons, in
addition to the political ones, which require separation.
Religious belief nearly always is expressed in some sort of communal
way.' 67 To those who subscribe to a particular creed, religious societies are
indispensable communities which are an integral part of each individual's
expression of faith while in communion with others who are like-minded.
Whether a church, synagogue, temple, or mosque is the house of worship,
the religious movement by very definition rests its claim on divine authority
or ultimate principles which transcend its view of the state.'" If a church or
other religious organization is unduly involved with the agencies of govern-
ment, it may become subverted and redirect its programs to meet ends chosen
by government. Accordingly, the church becomes compromised in its efforts
to act in accord with its higher calling. 169 In the extreme, the church may be
so hobbled that its mission is altogether thwarted. Moreover, when a religious
society believes it is called to speak prophetically and critique the state, its
expression is rendered tepid under the chill of real or apparent threats from
the government. When a religious organization is influenced in this way, its
spontaneity is dulled and the fervor and allegiance of its members wanes."' 0
166. See Derr, supra note 8, at 89.
167. See D. KELLEY, supra note 152, at 49 ("Religion exists as a functioning reality only
to the degree that it is embodied in an ongoing community-a 'church'."); L. TRiBE, supra note
7, at 812.
168. See supra notes 157, 158, 163 (authorities cited).
169. M. BAThS, supra note 12, at 549-50.
Association with the State and aid from the State have usually involved near-political
services to the State, a political coloring of religion, and some measure of subordina-
tion to the State in appointments, organization, and policy.
Id. See supra text accompanying notes 142-45.
170. See D. KELLEY, supra note 152, at 54-56. In the America he observed in the 1830's,
Alexis de Tocqueville noted the separation of church and state causing a measurable increase
on the influence of religion on society, and the pitfalls for the churches in the political union
of the two:
I perceived that these ministers of the gospel eschewed all parties, with the anxiety
attendant upon personal interest. . . . [I]t then became my object to investigate their
causes, and to inquire how it happened that the real authority of religion was increased
by a state of things which diminished its apparent force: these causes did not long
escape my researches. ...
I am aware that at certain times religion may strengthen this influence, which
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At what point has the state so entangled itself with a religious organiza-
tion that its very identity or vitality is endangered? Given the complexity of
our government and religiously pluralistic society, the matter of institutional
jurisdiction is so fraught with ambiguities that precise formulation is not possi-
ble. Nevertheless, reasonable distinctions must be made for the conflicts have
already overtaken us in the form of litigation.' 7' Concededly, religious organiza-
tions alone are competent to define the requirements of fulfilling their calling
or mission. The state cannot dictate the work of the church. 7 2 Every religious
organization, however, views its role differently: some insular from society,
others very interactive with public life. How does a government act in a manner
marked by amicable relations with all religious organizations and carry out
its own public policy goals in a nondiscriminatory fashion?'7 3
originates in itself, by the artificial power of the laws, and by the support of those
temporal institutions which direct society. Religions, intimately united to the govern-
ments of the earth, have been known to exercise a sovereign authority derived from
the twofold source of terror and of faith; but when a religion contracts an alliance
of this nature, I do not hesitate to affirm that it commits the same error, as a man
who should sacrifice his future to his present welfare; and in obtaining a power to
which it has no claim, it risks that authority which is rightfully its own ...
As long as a religion rests upon those sentiments which are the consolation of
all affliction, it may attract the affections of mankind. But if it be mixed up with
the bitter passions of the world, it may be constrained to defend allies whom its in-
terests, and not the principles of love, have given to it; or to repel as antagonists men
who are still attached to its own spirit, however opposed they may be to the powers
to which it is allied. The church cannot share the temporal power of the state, without
being the object of a portion of that animosity which the latter excites ...
The American clergy were the first to perceive this truth, and to act in conformity
with it. They saw that they must renounce their religious influence, if they were to
strive for political power; and they chose to give up the support of the state, rather
than to share its vicissitudes.
I A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 83, at 338-40.
171. See infra notes 309-431 and accompanying text (cases discussed).
172. R. NEUIAUs, supra note 138, at 174.
173. See M. BATES, supra note 12, at 302. Bates stated:
Obviously the individual or the religious body cannot make a private definition of religious
liberty and impose it upon the community. A fortiori, the vast variety of societies,
states, and moral convictions throughout the world inevitably, and rightly, brings a
further relativity into the definition and interpretation of religious liberty.
Id. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 461-62 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., sep. op.). Justice
Frankfurter said:
Religious beliefs pervade, and religious institutions have traditionally regulated, vir-
tually all human activity. It is a postulate of American life, reflected specifically in
the First Amendment to the Constitution but not there alone, that those beliefs and
institutions shall continue, as the needs and longings of the people shall inspire them,
to exist, to function, to grow, to wither, and to exert with whatever innate strength
they may contain their many influences upon men's conduct, free of the dictates and
directions of the state. However, this freedom does not and cannot furnish the adherents
of religious creeds entire insulation from every civic obligation. As the state's interest
in the individual becomes more comprehensive, its concerns and the concerns of religion
perforce overlap. State codes and the dictates of faith touch the same activities. Both
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Until some new consensus is forged in this most sensitive of constitutional
areas, the safer moorings are found in history. Two levels of religious activities
can be discerned, '7 although in practice even they defy exactitude. First, we
know that in times past the churches were principally about the business of
worship and the teaching and propagation of their understanding of ultimate
truth. When the principle of separation required that churches be voluntaristic,
it was these unique activities that were a matter of voluntary adherence and
no government aid. These activities were understood to be central to the very
life of a religious organization, and government should have no control over
or involvement with them whatsoever, absent compelling reasons of the very
highest order.' 75
aim at human good, and in their respective views of what is good for man they may
concur or they may conflict. No constitutional command which leaves religion free
can avoid this quality of interplay.
Id.
174. Cf. R. NEuHAus, supra note 138, at 174-75.
175. Compare the formulation in the text with the following three descriptions of essential
functions of the religious community:
[T]here are those activities which are clearly constitutive of the church's very life. These
involve the right of assembly, public worship, public promulgation of the gospel, witness
on questions of social justice, and the like.
R. NEuHAus, supra note 138, at 174. It is not the function of the State either to dominate
or to control consciences. The creeds which, in the present state of religious disunity,
share souls' allegiance should be free to establish their rights, to preach their teachings,
to shape souls, to exercise their apostolate, without the civil authority's mixing into
their proper province.
In the Face of the World's Crisis, 36 COMMONWEAL 415, 418-19 (1942).
By the term "church" we designate not only a local congregation but also national,
supranational, and ecumenical bodies. With this understanding,
The Religious freedom of the church or congregation includes the following rights:
1. To assemble for unhindered public worship.
2. To organize for the more effective conduct and perpetuation of religious belief,
worship and action.
3. To determine its own constitution, polity, and conditions of membership.
4. To determine its own faith and creed-free from imposition by the state or any
other group.
5. To determine its own forms of worship-free from imposition by the state or any
other group.
6. To encourage and facilitate action by its members in accordance with its belief
and worship.
7. To bear witness, preach, teach, persuade, and seek commitment or conversion.
8. To determine the qualifications of its ministers, and to educate, ordain, and main-
tain an adequate ministry.
9. To educate both children and adults. This affirmation of the right of the church
or congregation to educate does not deny or exclude the right of the state to educate.
10. To hold property and secure support for its work.
11. To cooperate or to unite with other churches or congregations.
12. Finally, the principle of religious freedom requires that these rights of the church
or congregation be similarly the rights of organized groups of unbelievers or atheists.
Religious Freedom, BIENNIAL REP. 1942 (Federal Council of Churches) 33-34. See Note, Govern-
ment Noninvolvement With Religious Institutions, 59 TEX. L. REv. 921, 925 (1981) ("At the
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As an offspring of the first level or core activities, some religious organiza-
tions took on tasks of education and social welfare.' 76 Government today is
engaged heavily in the same tasks, albeit out of notions of general welfare
rather than religiously motivated service. Education and social welfare activities
are in degree more the outgrowth of truths held by religious faiths than they
are centrally dealing with the particulars of one's perception of ultimate truth.' 7
In this second tier of religious ministry, some limited governmental interests
are proper,'7 8 even absent powerful reasons of state. The state is not totally
incompetent concerning education and social welfare. The state can be, and
in America has been, largely a force for positive good in promoting education
and welfare.' 79 For example, a state may legitimately require that parochial
school students perform at minimum achievement levels in math, science or
history to become literate, useful citizens. The Supreme Court has condoned
such requirements, even though the governmental interest cannot fairly be said
to be compelling, only paternalistic.' 80 In contrast, government cannot interact
heart of the concept of impermissible involvement should lie involvement with an institution's
propagation or inculcation of its religious beliefs or values."). See also School Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 244 n. 9 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting a provi-
sion in Constitution of India concerning government nonintervention in affairs of religious in-
stitutions); M. BATES, supra note 12, at 301-303.
176. By designating a second level of religious activity, it is not intended to imply that education
and social welfare by the churches are of lesser priority or value. Cf. R. NEunAUs, supra note
138, at 30. Neuhaus stated:
Inherent in, and not incidental to, this task are such enterprises as education, social
welfare, and witness on public policy. In short, loving service is inseparable from the
church's authentic existence.
Id. The classification also is not an attempt to define for religious organizations what their ministry
is or should be. Cf. Ball, Secularism: Tidal Wave of Repression, FREEDOM AND FAITH: THE IM-
PACT OF LAW O- RELIGIOUs LIBERTY 49, 53 (Buzzard ed. 1982) (beware ploy confining religious
liberty to "religion under the steeple"); P. BERGER & R. NEUHAUS, supra note 24, at 30.
The danger today is not that the churches or any one church will take over the
state. The much more real danger is that the state will take over the functions of the
church, except for the most narrowly construed definition of religion limited to wor-
ship and religious instruction.
Id. Accordingly, wariness must be exercised lest a classification of the activities of religious organiza-
tions into "core" functions and those of education and social welfare facilitate the government
in co-opting the latter. But see infra note 181.
177. Indeed, it is only because education and social welfare are widely held to have large
secular components that government can engage in such activities at all. If education and social
welfare were largely and essentially religious, the establishment clause would prohibit the state
from engaging in them. Additionally, it cannot be argued that separation of church and state
reserves an exclusive role for religious organizations in the education or social welfare fields pro-
tected from competition with government-run programs. This is the case, however, when it comes
to matters of worship or religious propagation, which deal directly with ultimate truth. See Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035 nn. 29 & 32 (1983) (Supreme Court characterized
religious schools as not "purely religious" unlike churches).
178. Cf. R. NEuHAus, supra note 138, at 174-75.
179. Id. at 31-32.
180. Compare Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968) (dicta) ("[A] substan-
tial body of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private
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with the more axial matters of worship or religious inculcation without acting
on the very tenets of ultimate truth. The government has no competence in
such matters.''
Nevertheless, the government should have a healthy sensitivity to the
religious distinctiveness of this second level of ministry. The state cannot simply
treat a religious school or social welfare agency like its secular counterpart.8
A special wariness should characterize the relationship so as not to inhibit
fulfillment of the agencies' purpose. The relationship should avoid
entanglements that in time may tend to absorb these agencies as quasi-
governmental appendages for the promotion of state policies. In addition to
the nature of the religious practices concerned, factors to be weighed are the
substantiality of the entanglements and the duration of the church-state
relationship.' 3 The boundary terminating the government's purview should
be drawn far sooner than the actual denial or coercion of sincerely held religious
convictions. The entanglement with government becomes excessive well before
the religious agency must choose either to obey the state or follow its own
religious tenets.'8I Importantly, the government has no authority over the con-
tent of the program or curriculum of these educational and social welfare
agencies when the content concerns worship and the teaching and propaga-
tion of religious beliefs.
Some object to religious groups being treated differently from others
schools, if it is to satisfy state compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which provide minimum
hours of instruction, employ teachers of specified training, and cover prescribed subjects of in-
struction") and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 402 (1923) (government has strong interest
in literacy of students in English language, but means chosen to accomplish that task violated
due process) with Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (Old Order Amish excluded
from compulsory attendance laws by free exercise clause).
181. Although there is danger to religious freedom in breaking down religious activities into
"core" functions and those which in degree are more their offspring, see supra note 176, there
is greater danger in not doing so. Unless religious organizations are willing to concede the govern-
ment some limited oversight of educational and social welfare activities, sharp and perhaps polarizing
confrontations will follow. The harvest of these clashes may be bitter fruit in the form of legal
precedent permitting governmental intervention into even the very central matters of inculcation
and propagation. Religious bodies must be sensitive to large elements of the public who are
already overly cynical about the role of religion, conditioned by highly publicized frauds and
other excesses by mail-order "ministries" and "mind-control cults". Limited government regula-
tion can curb many of these abuses and thereby yield an environment of public goodwill which
actually enhances the free play for religious beliefs.
182. Cf. Ball, Secularism: Tidal Wave of Repression, FREEDOM AND FAITH: THE IMPACT
OF LAW ON RELiGIOUs LIBERTY 49, 56 (Buzzard ed. 1982); R. NEuss~us, supra note 138, at 126.
Neuhaus stated:
In responding to need, church social agencies should respond to the whole person,
including their spiritual needs. Any exercise of governmental control that limits the
Christian distinctiveness of that response is evil, is to be resisted, and, if possible, changed.
Id.
183. See infra text accompanying notes 209-10 (similar list of factors drawn by Supreme Court).
184. The coercion of conscience is a matter prohibited by the free exercise clause; whereas
excessive entanglements are prohibited by the establishment clause before the point of coercion
of religious beliefs is reached. See infra notes 201-202 and accompanying text.
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because they see it as privilege. That objection is due to an incomplete
understanding. The key principle of social order at work in separation is
reciprocity."8 5 A religious organization may be specially privileged through
exemption from general legislation. Reciprocally, it is specially burdened by
disqualification from general state aid.
Because of their very temporality, churches and other religious organiza-
tions are not immune from wrongdoing. Their activities, as opposed to beliefs,
therefore, cannot be totally autonomous from the state when it comes to matters
of high order, such as health and safety. The state must have the power to
intervene in such exigent matters, even when it means overriding sincerely held
religious beliefs.
8 6
IV. Ti CASE LAW IN THE SuPREME COURT
The wall of separation erected by the establishment clause, although not
impermeable, should exclude interference from both sides. In theory it does.
Supreme Court opinions are replete with statements, albeit obiter dicta, that
the establishment clause filters out improper involvement traveling in either
direction.' 7
185. L. FULULR, THE MoRALr op LAW 19-27 (1964). Professor Fuller has identified reciprocity
as one of the precepts undergirding our view of the nature of law. Id.
186. M. BATES, supra note 12, at 301. Bates stated:
[Ulpon occasion individuals and religious bodies alike have erred grievously against
the moral sense or the felt need of solidarity in the community .... The state as the
authority of the organized community has continually abused the argument of solidarity
and even that of moral standards.... But it is difficult to see how any other authority
than the State, inspired and checked by the convictions and sentiment of the whole
community, can carry this necessary responsibility of guarding society and its other
members against the eccentricities-if they are seriously harmful-of one or a body.
Hence, the right of religious liberty is not absolute in extent but is subject to defini-
tion and interpretation by the community, at costly risk, in the State and its laws.
Id. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983) (racial discrimination in educa-
tion); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child-labor laws); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333 (1890) (Mormon polygamy).
187. Consider, for example:
mo withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative
purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (emphasis added).
[Tihe purposes underlying the Establishment Clause go much further than [preventing
coercive pressure on religious minorities]. Its first and most immediate purpose rested
on the belief that a union of government and religion tends to destroy government
and to degrade religion.
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (emphasis added).
The objective is to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [state or religion]
into the precincts of the other.
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971).
The purposes of the First Amendment guarantees relating to religion were twofold:
to foreclose state interference with the practice of religious faiths, and to foreclose
the establishment of a state religion familiar in other Eighteenth Century systems. Religion
and government each insulated from the other, could then co-exist.
Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 505, 510 (1982) (emphasis added). See also Walz v.
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The Supreme Court has been active in establishment clause cases that
determine impermissible state aid to religion, but seemingly has avoided cases
that have offered the Court the opportunity squarely to hold that the clause
cuts both ways, thus prohibiting governmental intrusion into the concerns of
religious associations as well.188 In NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, ' 9 the
Supreme Court came closest to affording establishment clause protection from
governmental regulation, but the Court dodged a determination of whether or
not the government's actions constituted excessive entanglement. ' 90 Although
the broad language in the National Labor Relations Act clearly included
religious schools within its scope, the Court conceived a new rule of construc-
tion, holding that it would not assume that Congress intended to regulate
parochial schools unless it had expressed so specifically. The constitutional
question, therefore, never was reached. Nevertheless, Catholic Bishop stands
for the proposition that the prospect of National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) jurisdiction over lay parochial school teachers raises "difficult and
sensitive questions" and a "significant risk" that the separation principle would
be infringed. 91 The First Amendment problems the Catholic Bishop Court
anticipated concerned entanglement. The majority opinion discussed two
examples. The first was an unfair labor practice charge defended on the basis
that the practice was required by religious faith. The charge would involve
the NLRB in a determination of the good faith of the defense and its relation-
ship to the religious mission of the school. 92 Second, the National Labor Rela-
tions Act makes all terms and conditions of employment subject to mandatory
collective bargaining. The all-inclusive scope of the Act necessarily "implicate[s]
sensitive issues that open the door to conflicts" between organized religion
and government.193 Since the Roman Catholic schools resisting federal regula-
tion in Catholic Bishop were the very entities the Court deemed too religious
to be proper recipients of state aid in numerous cases from Lemon v.
Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 669-70 (1970) (emphasis added):
[R]igidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure
that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited ...
[W]e will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental in-
terference with religion ... [There is room for ... a benevolent neutrality which will
permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.
Each value judgment ... must ... turn on whether particular acts in question
are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the
effect of doing so. Adherence to the policy of neutrality ... has prevented the kind
of involvement that would tip the balance toward government control of churches or
governmental restraint on religious practices.
188. See infra notes 337-40, 348.
189. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See generally Durso & Brice, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago:
Government Regulation Versus First Amendment Religious Freedom, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 295
(1980); Pfeffer, Unionization of Parochial School Teachers, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 273 (1980).
190. 440 U.S. at 502.
191. Id. at 502, 507.
192. Id. at 502.
193. Id. at 502-503.
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Kurtzman"I" to Byrne v. Public Funds for Public Schools of New Jersey,'95
it is understandable that the Court not be so double-minded as to permit
parochial schools to be regulated by the NLRB. Nevertheless, the hesitancy
to ground the holding squarely on the establishment clause is puzzling.' 96
Although nonentanglement, which first emerged in Walz v. Tax
Commission,"I7 and the avoidance of the civil resolution of intrafaith disputes,
first announced by the Supreme Court in Watson v. Jones,' are often viewed
as distinct doctrinal developments, they spring from the same underlying prin-
ciple: government must avoid any involvement with religious societies that
may touch upon the matters central to their religious identity and mission.
These matters are so highly reactive when placed in contact with public
authority that religious liberty requires any appreciable risk' 99 of involvement
be avoided. The claimant need not demonstrate any showing of prejudice to
the concerns of a religious organization, only a material risk of harm in this
sensitive constitutional area."' This standard of proof is necessary if the Court
remains consistent with its rule that coercion is not a requisite for a violation
of the establishment clause.2 ' The establishment clause, therefore, can be
194. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
195. 590 F.2d 514 (3d Cir.), aff'd, 442 U.S. 907 (1979).
196. The innovation by the slim majority in fashioning a new rule of construction is pointed
out by the four dissenting justices:
[The majority's] construction is plainly wrong in light of the Act's language, its legislative
history, and this Court's precedents. It is justified solely on the basis of a canon of
statutory construction seemingly invented by the Court for the purpose of deciding
this case.
440 U.S. at 508 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also St. Martin Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,
451 U.S. 772, 788 (1981). In St. Martin, a more orthodox canon of construction was utilized
to circumvent the establishment clause questions which would arise if unemployment taxes were
assessed against church-affiliated schools. Id.
197. 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970). See infra text accompanying notes 214-15.
198. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871). See infra notes 254-63 and accompanying text.
199. The term "appreciable risk" was adopted from Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious
Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980), where the Court noted that certain state aid to parochial
schools did not result in any "appreciable risk" of government entanglement in the school's ability
to inculcate its religious values. See infra note 239 (discussion of Regan).
200. The Court has been quite consistent in the rule that the establishment clause is violated
when there is only a risk of church-state conflict. See, e.g., Levitt v. Committee for Pub. Educ.,
413 U.S. 472, 480 (1973) ("the potential for conflict inheres in this situation."). See also Larkin
v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 505, 511 (1982).
201. See, e.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (strik-
ing down Bible reading and recital of Lord's prayer in public schools as violative of establishment
clause even though any coercion was obviated by having individual students excused from attend-
ing). In Schempp, the Supreme Court distinguished the free exercise clause: "
Its purpose is to secure religious liberty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions
thereof by civil authority. Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show
the coercive effect of the enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his
religion. The distinction between the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause is predicated on coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need
not be so attended.
Id. at 223. This distinction was stated by the Court in Schempp because the school authorities
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violated even if the governmental intervention does not press the religious
organization into the "cruel choice" of either violating its tenets or obeying
the government's regulation." 2
In a third line of cases to be reviewed in this part, the Supreme Court
counseled public officials to studiously avoid examining an individual's religious
beliefs beyond the minimal inquiry of sincerity.20 3 This reflects the same at-
tentiveness to reserving a circle of religious practice independent of public
regulation and authority.
The doctrines of nonentanglement and the avoidance of judicial resolu-
tion of intrafaith disputes are best unified, 204 because their separate treatment
simply obscures their common theme. Moreover, their development into a
cardinal rule supportive of the principle of independent, voluntaristic chur-
ches is facilitated by treating these two doctrines as a single concept.
A. The Nonentanglement Requirement
The final element in the tripartite test in Lemon v. Kurtzman215 is the
injunction against excessive entanglement between religious organizations and
challenged the parents' and students' standing to sue. No coercion had been shown as a result
of the Bible reading and prayer. Nevertheless, the Court stated:
[Tihe requirements for standing to challenge state action under the Establishment Clause,
unlike those relating to the Free Exercise Clause, do not include proof that particular
religious freedoms are infringed.
Id. at 244 n. 9 (emphasis added). It was sufficient for standing purposes that the challengers,
students and parents, were assigned to the schools involved if the claim was under the establish-
ment clause-a clause which does more than protect individual religious freedoms. See supra
text accompanying notes 153-65.
202. Since aid to religion is prohibited even apart from any showing of coercion, supra note
201, then, logically, government interference with a religious organization is a violation of the
establishment clause as well. Moreover, the violation may be proven without the church showing
that it is significantly burdened or placed in the position where the "cruel choice" between civil
disobedience and obedience to the law in violation of conscience must be made. The separation
principle of voluntaristic, independent churches, therefore, is violated even absent a violation
of individual religious freedom. See supra notes 182-84 and accompanying text. Accordingly,
the establishment clause goes beyond protection of individual liberty and imposes a disability
upon "government to adopt laws with respect to establishments whether or not their consequence
would be to infringe individual rights of conscience." Howe, supra note 111, at 51.
"[Tihe fact that some legislative enactments ... affect most remotely, if at all, the per-
sonal rights of religious liberty," will not save the law from trespassing upon the establish-
ment clause requirement of separating the two "powers" of church and state.
Howe, supra note 111, at 55. Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (standing to sue based
on establishment clause notwithstanding federal taxpayer's monetary support of religion was minute
and indeterminable).
203. See infra text accompanying notes 302-307.
204. The Supreme Court in two opinions, New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125,
133 (1977), and Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 457-58 (1971), has implicitly acknowledg-
ed the interrelationship between the two doctrines by its reliance on Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969). Further, Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604
(1979), refers to the "promise of nonentanglement" in an intrafaith property dispute.
205. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The entire Lemon test is framed as follows:
Every analysis in this area must begin with consideration of the cumulative criteria
developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests may be gleaned from our
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government."0 6 An entanglement analysis is necessarily a balancing of interests.
As the Supreme Court stated in Roemer v. Board of Public Works:
There is no exact science in gauging the entanglement of church and
state. The wording of the test.., itself makes that clear. The relevant
factors we have identified are to be considered "cumulatively" in judg-
ing the degree of entanglement.2"'
There are three factors to which the Court has directed attention. 20 8 Each
factor was fashioned in public aid cases, but is logically applicable in a claim
of undue interference with religious faith. The first factor concerns the pur-
poses of the organization which is benefitted or inhibited. If the religious
organization is "pervasively religious, ' 20 9 it is unlikely that the governmental
cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal
or primary effect must be one that neither advances not inhibits religion... finally,
the statute must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with religion."
Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). In a recent case, the "unique history" supportive of legislative
invocational prayers caused the Court to depart from the three-part test. Marsh v. Chambers,
103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983).
206. The problem of "political divisiveness" is occasionally combined with nonentangle-
ment principles in the Court's discussion. Assessing "[p]olitical fragmentation ... on religious
lines," Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 623, dictates examining whether the community served
is local or widely dispersed, the intrusion involves primarily religious bodies or those of no religious
affiliation, and the degree of autonomy from the sponsoring church. Roemer v. Board of Pub.
Works, 426 U.S. 736, 765-766 (1976) (plurality opinion); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672,
688-89 (1971). The aim is to avoid what is loosely described by the Court as the "risk of politiciz-
ing religion." Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 254 (1982).
The political divisiveness test has been severely criticized. See, e.g., Gaffney, Political
Divisiveness Along Religious Lines: The Entanglement of the Court in Sloppy History and Bad
Public Policy, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 205 (1980); Ball, What is Religion?, 8 TE CHTUsN LAWYER
7, 12-13 (1979).
If taken literally, the political divisiveness test runs counter to the freedom of speech and other
secular bodies and private citizens, may vigorously assert its ideas in American culture and govern-
ment. As suggested by Walz, religious organizations cannot be excluded from common discourse
where organized religion along with others articulate their values, visions, and hopes. The premise
that religion should be excluded because it is controversial or opinions about religion are not
held mildly is an anomaly. Of course, religion is controversial; so is the economy, so is abortion,
so is nuclear arms control, so is pornography.
Broadly applied, the divisiveness test amounts to censorship by precluding public debate on cer-
tain subjects by the religious community. With the exception of Larson, the Court has applied
the divisiveness test to legislative programs that are subject to periodic renewal and, therefore,
are likely to be of recurring political debate and controversy. The divisiveness test should not
of itself be grounds for invalidation of legislative programs, but perhaps as Justice Powell has
suggested, the test calls for closer judicial scrutiny than otherwise would be appropriate. Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 797-98 (1973); see McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S.
at 641 and n. 25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
207. 426 U.S. 736, 766 (1976) (plurality opinion).
208. Id. at 748; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 615 (1971).
209. Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 758 (1976) (plurality opinion). In Roemer,
the Supreme Court turned back a challenge to the constitutionality of a state funding program
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contact is permissible. Second, courts examine the nature of the aid provided
or the regulations imposed by the government. If the regulation provides the
public official with sufficient discretion to trespass upon sectarian concerns,
the involvement is likely prohibited. Third, the Court has focused on the
resulting relationship between government and the religious authority. If that
relationship is one requiring continued surveillance by public officials, the en-
tanglement is likely excessive.
Concerning all three elements, the overriding principle is to avoid govern-
mental involvement where there is an "appreciable risk" that the aid or regula-
tion will be "used to transmit or teach [or inhibit] religious views." 21 0 The
Supreme Court's entanglement discussions evidence a sensitivity to the harm
that results to religious organizations when (1) government becomes entangled
which afforded noncategorical grants to eligible colleges and universities, including sectarian in-
stitutions that awarded more than just seminarian or theological degrees. In discussion focused
on the fostering of religion, but equally applicable to the inhibition of religion, the Supreme
Court said:
[T]he primary-effect question is the substantive one of what private educational
activities, by whatever procedure, may be supported by state funds. Hunt [v. McNair,
413 U.S. 734 (1973)] requires (1) that no state aid at all go to institutions that are
so "pervasively sectarian" that secular activities cannot be separated from sectarian
ones, and (2) that if secular activities can be separated out, they alone may be funded.
426 U.S. at 755 (emphasis in original).
The Baptist college in Hunt and the Roman Catholic colleges in Roemer were held not to be
"pervasively religious". The record in Roemer supported findings that the institutions employed
chaplains who held worship services on campus, taught mandatory religious classes, and started
some classes with prayer. In addition, there was a high degree of autonomy from the Roman
Catholic Church, the faculty was not hired on a religious basis and had complete academic freedom
except in religious classes, and students were chosen without regard to their religion.
The challenged state aid in Hunt was for the construction of secular college facilities. The legisla-
tion granted the authority to issue revenue bonds. The Court upheld the legislation, commenting
on the primary-effect test:
Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of advancing religion when
it flows to an institution in which religion is so pervasive that a substantial portion
of its functions are subsumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically
religious activity in an otherwise secular setting.
413 U.S. at 743.
A comparison of the colleges in Roemer and Hunt with the elementary and secondary schools
in Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 767-68 (1973), will help to clarify the
term "pervasively religious". The parochial schools in Nyquist, found to be pervasively religious,
conformed to the following profile: the schools placed religious restrictions on student admis-
sions and faculty appointments, they enforced obedience to religious dogma, they required atten-
dance at religious services, they required religious or doctrinal study, the schools were an integral
part of the religious mission of the sponsoring church, they had religious indoctrination as a primary
purpose, and they imposed religious restrictions on how and what the faculty could teach. The
state aid in Nyquist was held to be prohibited by the Court.
Although the foregoing pervasively religious analysis was in the context of the primary-effect
prong of the Lemon test, the primary-effect and nonentanglement tests often require study of
the same facts and relationships. Roemer, supra at 768-69 (White, J., dissenting). The distinction
is that the primary-effect test keys on whether sectarian interests are advanced or inhibited to
a measurable degree. Nonentanglement focuses on the resulting interrelationships or structure
between government and church. Id. at 754-55.
210. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980).
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in difficult classifications of what is or is not "religious," "correct doctrine,"
or "worship," (2) government becomes entangled in a prolonged monitoring,
or oversight of religious personnel, resulting in alteration of or prejudice to
religious duties,"' (3) government officials become entangled in substantive
evaluations of religious programs, prejudicing the teaching or propagation of
religious faith,212 and (4) government becomes entangled in fiscal matters, in-
cluding use of resources by the church or religious organization. With each
of these concerns, the compromise of the religious association is exacerbated
when the government agency has increased discretion.213
The exemption for churches from the payment of real estate taxes was
upheld in Walz v. Tax Commission214 in part because exemption occasioned
a lesser degree of entanglement between government and religion than im-
position of the tax. Elimination of the exemption would necessitate property
valuation, tax liens, and nonpayment foreclosures. Importantly, the Court was
unwilling to justify the exemption on the quid pro quo of the church's pro-
viding social welfare services to the community. The quid pro quo require-
ment would have caused "governmental evaluation and standards as to the
worth of particular social welfare programs, thus producing a continuing day-
to-day relationship" which is undesirable.2"5
Gillette v. United States2"6 presented a classic example of the entangle-
ment concept used to avoid the involvement of government in difficult
classifications of religious concerns. The petitioners in Gillette claimed that
limiting the statutory exemption from conscription to those who objected to
all wars violated the establishment clause because it discriminated against
religious faiths which permitted service in only "just wars". The Court re-
jected the claim, noting that "petitioners ask for greater 'entanglement' by
judicial expansion of the exemption to cover objectors to particular wars."
21 7
" '[T]he more discriminating and complicated the basis of classifica-
tion for an exemption ... the greater the potential for state involve-
ment" in determining the character of persons' beliefs and affilia-
tions, thus "entangl[ing] government in difficult classifications of what
is or is not religious," or what is or is not conscientious.2"8
211. Cf. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1982) (upholding right of
church to employ its minister, including nonresident alien, in face of federal immigration legislation).
212. Cf. First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958) (struck down loyalty
oath requirement for churches to obtain property tax exemption for procedural due process reasons).
The First Unitarian Court did not reach the First Amendment questions. Id.
213. Cf. Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., . . U.S. __ , 103 S. Ct. 505, 511 (1983)
(striking down ordinance giving churches veto power over liquor licenses within the vicinity of
their building, in part because exercise of such power by churches was without guiding standards).
214. 397 U.S. 664, 674-76 (1970).
215. Id. at 674.
216. 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
217. Id. at 450.
218. Id. at 457 (citations omitted). "While the danger of erratic decisionmaking unfortunately
exists in any system of conscription that takes individual differences into account, no doubt the
dangers would be enhanced if a conscientious objection of indeterminate scope were honored
in theory." Id. at 458.
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman,1 9 the Supreme Court first stated the nonentangle-
ment concept as a facet of the Court's establishment clause test separate from
the legislative purpose and primary-effect elements. The state programs to aid
religious schools in Lemon had erected several regulatory controls to ensure
that funds and state services did not aid sectarian activities. The regulatory
bulwark, however, ran afoul of the entanglement test. Lemon involved statutes
of both Rhode Island and Pennsylvania. The Rhode Island program affected
only Roman Catholic schools which were found to engage in substantial
religious activity and to have as a purpose inculcation of the Catholic faith. 2 °0
The legislation supplemented the salaries of teachers who were under religious
authority and control, and who had responsibilities which "hover on the border
between secular and religious orientation" of pupils. 22' No actual advance-
ment of religion was shown; just the presence of this hazard was sufficient.
To prevent aiding religion, Rhode Island had provided for "comprehensive,
discriminating, and continuing state surveillance" over the activities of qualified
teachers. 2 2 The textbooks and other materials had to be those used in the
public schools. In certain events, the statute called for examination of school
records to determine amounts spent on secular as opposed to religious educa-
tion, causing state evaluation of the religious content of a church-related
program. 23 The Pennsylvania statute shared the entanglement problems of
Rhode Island's. Additionally, it provided direct monetary aid to parochial
schools with the attendant postaudit inquiries to ensure that no cash was spent
on "subjects of religion, morals, or forms of worship." 2 4
In Tilton v. Richardson,2 5 decided the same day as Lemon, the Supreme
Court upheld public construction grants for college and university facilities.
Although the colleges assisted by the grants were church-affiliated, the Tilton
Court found no impermissible entanglement. The Court distinguished Tilton
from Lemon, holding that the type of aid, capital improvements, was religiously
neutral, therefore not requiring surveillance to prevent diversion to sectarian
use. Further, the grant was a one-time, single-purpose event, which engendered
219. 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). See generally Ripple, The Entanglement Test of the Religion
Clauses-A Ten Year Assessment, 27 UCLA L. REv. 1195 (1980).
220. 403 U.S. at 615-16.
221. Id. at 618.
222. Id. at 619.
223. Id. at 619-20. The Lemon Court also expressed concern over disagreements that may
arise between teachers and the religious authorities over the meaning of regulatory restrictions. Id.
224. Id. at 620-21. The Pennsylvania statutory scheme again came before the Court in
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973). The issue presented was the retroactive application
of the Court's 1971 decision to expenses already incurred by parochial schools in reliance on
the state legislation. A majority held that the 1971 ruling striking the programs should not be
retroactively applied, thus releasing a payment of some $24 million to church schools. Payment
of the disputed sum would compel no further state oversight of the instructional processes. Only
a single post-audit was required, entailing no continuing relationship, and any payments would
not reoccur. Id. at 201-202.
225. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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no continuing relationship. 226 Finally, the institutions involved were con-
siderably less permeated with sectarian purpose.227
In companion parochial-aid cases, Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education228 and Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist,229 the Supreme
Court invalidated several provisions of New York law. The Levitt Court held
unconstitutional the reimbursement of the costs of state-required testing and
record keeping. No attempt was made in the statute to ensure that the teacher-
prepared tests were free of religious instruction and inculcation of religious
precepts, and none could be constitutionally fashioned which would not become
entangling.2 31 In Nyquist, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the constitutional
validity of loaning secular textbooks, but disallowed state reimbursement for
building maintenance, tuition reimbursement, and income tax benefits to
parents paying tuition. 23' Nothing in the statute in Nyquist barred a school
from using the funds it received for maintenance for a religious purpose, and
no restrictions were possible without violating the entanglement criteria. 232 To
ensure nonsectarian use of the funds, the state would have had to conduct
frequent audits and make other incursions into a church school's financial
matters.
233
226. Id. at 687-88.
227. Id. at 681-82, 685-87.
228. 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
229. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
230. 413 U.S. at 479-80. The Levitt Court made no finding that the funds were actually
used to teach religion, but found a "substantial risk" sufficient. Id. at 480.
In a sequel to Levitt, the case of New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977),
turned back an attempt to reimburse parochial schools for testing and record-keeping expenses
incurred between the time of the enactment of a state-aid statute and the time it was struck down
in Levitt. The prospect of even a one-time audit to determine if the expenditures were utilized
for sectarian purposes would entangle the state and the civil courts in an "essentially religious
dispute." In essence, the audit would compel the state auditors to pry into possible religious
content of classroom examinations written by parochial school teachers. Id. at 132-33.
231. In a recent parochial-aid decision, Mueller v. Allen, 103 S.Ct. 3062 (1983), the Court
upheld a Minnesota tax deduction for parents who incurred expenses for tuition, textbooks, and
transportation on behalf of their children attending elementary or secondary schools. Nyquist
was distinguished on the basis that the Minnesota statute provided the deduction to all parents
whether their children attended public or private schools. Id. at 5053. There was no entanglement
between Minnesota and the religious schools because any benefits to the schools came only as
"a result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-age children." Id. The
Mueller Court also held that the "political divisiveness" aspect of the entanglement test, see supra
note 216, was not violated and "must be regarded as confined to cases where direct financial
subsidies are paid to parochial schools or teachers in parochial schools." Id. at 5054 n.ll.
232. 413 U.S. at 774. In Nyquist, the tuition tax and reimbursement schemes were found
to violate the primary-effect test. Id. at 780, 794.
233. In Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975), a state law providing aid to church-related
schools was again before the Court. The Court continued to uphold the lending of secular text-
books, but it rejected the provison of counseling, remedial classes, and therapy by public school
professional staff on the parochial school campus. Surveillance would be required to ensure that
religious instruction not become part of the professionals' activitiy, and such surveillance would
constitute impermissable entanglement. Id. at 369-72. The Meek Court also noted the potential
for conflict between the public employees and religious authorities. Id. at 372 n. 22.
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The Supreme Court found that South Carolina's program to assist church-
related colleges through the issuance of revenue bonds bordered on excessive
entanglement in Hunt v. McNair.2 3 Since the benefitted institution was a Bap-
tist college, it closely approximated those schools discussed in Tilton. The
Court, however, was concerned that the legislation enabled the administering
agency to "become deeply involved in the day-to-day financial and policy deci-
sions of the college." '23 The South Carolina Supreme Court had defused the
problem by giving the legislation a narrow interpretation restricting the agency's
power unless there was a default on the bonds by the college. 236 The state
administrators, therefore, exercised no discretion over the college's operations
or fiscal policy absent the unlikely event of a default.
In Roemer v. Board of Public Works,237 the Court continued its practice
of permitting aid to church-related colleges, upholding noncategorical grants
in the form of annual subsidies. A plurality of the Court held that the aid
did not foster an entanglement with religion because the colleges in question
performed essentially secular educational functions, the annual payment did
not alone implicate excessive entanglement, and the possibility of occasional
audits was not likely to be more entangling than inspections and audits in-
volved in the course of normal college accreditations by the state.2 38 The case
draws a sharp distinction between the "pervasively sectarian" primary and
secondary schools such as those in Lemon, and the church-affiliated colleges
in Tilton, Hunt, and Roemer.
3
1
The recurring themes of avoiding governmental involvement in the task
of classifying religious practices and of avoiding the monitoring of religious
ministries were brought together in Widmar v. Vincent.24 Although permit-
ting the use of state buildings and other facilities by student groups, the state
university in Widmar sought to justify prohibiting use by student religious
234. 413 U.S. 734 (1973).
235. Id. at 747. The concern of over-involvement was not that it might actually happened,
but that there was a "realistic likelihood" that it could happen. Id.
236. Id. at 747-48.
237. 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (plurality opinion).
238. Id. at 762-65.
239. In more recent pronouncements by the Supreme Court on the continuing parochial-aid
controversy, the church-related schools were more successful. In Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229 (1971), the Court upheld therapeutic, remedial, and guidance counseling held at sites away
from the parochial school campus, diagnostic services provided at the parochial school campus,
and standardized tests and test scoring provided by nearby public schools. The Court rejected
as unconstitutional the financing of field trips and the provision of classroom educational equip-
ment. In Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980), the Court upheld state reim-
bursement of the costs for the administration by parochial schools of state-prepared tests and
the keeping of official records. In Regan, the state had avoided the entanglement pitfalls by directing
its aid to secular services which are "discrete and clearly identifiable" so as to permit straightfor-
ward and routine reimbursement with little danger of excessive entanglement. Id. at 660-61. In
Wolman, the services for which the Court prohibited state aid could be diverted to sectarian
use. Any administrative controls to prevent improper use of the aid would be too entangling.
433 U.S. at 254.
240. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
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groups. On the basis of speech and associational freedoms, the Supreme Court
upheld the right of student groups with religious concerns to use the univer-
sity facilities on an equal basis with all other student groups.24 ' The lone
dissenter, Justice White, argued that the establishment clause permitted the
university to prevent the use of public facilities for "religious worship,"
although he agreed "religious speech" could not be excluded based on the
Court's precedents prohibiting content-based censorship.2 2 The majority re-
jected the suggested distinction between "worship" and "religious speech"
for entanglement reasons. The Court pointed out that the distinction would
(1) compel the state university "to inquire into the significance of words and
practices to different religious faiths, and in varying circumstances by the same
faith,"24 and (2) foster "a continuing need to monitor group meetings to
ensure compliance with the rule." 2 '
In another Supreme Court action concerning the admonition against en-
tanglement, the invalidation of a city's charitable solicitation ordinance was
summarily affirmed in Rusk v. Espinosa.245 The ordinance prohibited solicita-
tion without a permit. An exemption, however, was provided for certain
religious solicitations. The collection of money for religious purposes was de-
fined as solicitation for "evangelical, missionary, or religious but not secular"
ends. A secular purpose was defined as "not spiritual or ecclesiastical, but
rather relating to affairs of the present world, such as providing food, clothing,
and counseling."246 A program by the Seventh-day Adventist Church to solicit
funds for the poor, therefore, required a city permit. Acquiring a permit en-
tailed payment of a fee and completion of an application which required cer-
tain information and documents including a current financial statement.2 "7
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals which con-
demned the ordinance for multiple offenses: (1) it sought to define whether
a church program was religious or secular;24 8 (2) a city official was involved
in the "continuing necessity for making judgments as to what is or is not
religious," using a standard "not susceptible of objective measurement;
249
and (3) compliance would require the church to disgorge extensive informa-
tion about its purposes and finances. 250
241. Id. at 268-69.
242. Id. at 283-84 (White, J., dissenting).
243. Id. at 269 n. 6. See also id. at 271 n. 9, 272 n. 11.
244. Id. at 272 n. 11.
245. 456 U.S. 951 (1982), aff'g, 634 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980).
246. Espinosa v. Rusk, 634 F.2d 477, 479 (10th Cir. 1980).
247. Id. at 479-80 n. 3.
248. Id. at 480-81.
249. Id. at 481-82, quoting Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-604 (1967).
See Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 2017, 2035 n. 30 (1983) ("IT]he uniform
application of the rule [denying tax exemptions] to all religiously operated schools [that racially
discriminate] avoids the necessity for a potentially entangling inquiry into whether a racially restrictive
practice is the result of sincere religious belief.").
250. 634 F.2d at 479 n. 3. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 253 n. 29 (1982) ("The
registration statement required by [the solicitation ordinance] calls for the provision of a substan-
tial amount of information, much of which penetrates deeply into the internal affairs of the
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B. Avoiding Intrafaith Disputes
As with other voluntary associations, occasionally divisions arise within
the membership or employees of churches and other religious associations.
Considering their professed purpose, religious organizations are seldom placed
in a more unfavorable light than when one of the factions files suit in civil
court to resolve a schism. Although the civil courts have little choice but to
accept jurisdiction, their role is constrained by the First Amendment's "pro-
mise of nonentanglement and neutrality""' which compels the avoidance of
questions "made to turn on the resolution ... of controversies over religious
doctrine and practice." '252 Thus, the Supreme Court's cases dealing with in-
trafaith disputes are congeneric with the nonentanglement concerns discussed
earlier: the avoidance of involvement in doctrinal and other religious ques-
tions, the prevention of civil authorities directing religious programs and per-
sonnel, and a reluctance to delve into financial matters of religious
organizations.253
A useful division of the Court's pronouncements is to separate those
religious disputes that concern primarily ecclesiastical matters, such as appoint-
ment of clergy or the discipline of a member for misconduct, from those
disputes that are before the civil courts principally to declare the present owner-
ship of property between two rival factions. Clearly, there is a greater govern-
mental interest in the resolution of matters concerning title to property. Ques-
tions concerning who may hold a church office, the discipline of an allegedly
deviant member, or an alleged departure from doctrine, however, are wholly
outside of civil competence. The contrariety of views within the Supreme Court
exists only concerning the limited role of civil courts in intrafaith disputes
over property. In disputes which do not concern the control of property, the
Court consistently has held that civil authorities have no jurisdiction.
In Watson v. Jones,"5" the Supreme Court established the first broad prin-
registering organization.").
In the unusual situation where governmental power was delegated to religious bodies, an
ordinance giving churches veto authority over the granting of liquor licenses within a 500-foot
radius of the church building was found to be an entanglement which "enmeshes churches in
the process of government." Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 103 S.Ct. 505, 512 (1982). The Larkin
Court struck down the ordinance because (1) the churches' power under the ordinance was without
adequate standards, id. at 511, and (2) even if standards were present to control the decision
making of the churches, for entanglement reasons the legislative body must make licensing deci-
sions, id. at 512, and cannot simply review determinations by the churches, id. at 511 n. 9.
251. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
252. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
253. Government involvement in what are essentially religious disputes or acts of religious
discipline may arise in several ways. For example, governmental involvement may arise in (1) disputes
concerning the terms and conditions of employment, including discrimination; (2) the discipline
or discharge of an employee; (3) the discipline of an individual served by a ministry, including
suspension or withholding of services to the individual; (4) complaints from members of the public
to government officials concerning a ministry's refusal to admit them or otherwise offer its ser-
vices on a nondiscriminatory basis; and (5) disputes within the governing board over a ministry's
policies and direction.
254. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
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ciples of judicial deference to the internal decision-making unit of religious
bodies in intrafaith disputes. The federal court had diversity jurisdiction in
the case, and the rule of decision was based on federal common law.255 Wat-
son involved a struggle between two factions of a local Presbyterian Church
for control of the church building. Title to the property was in the name of
the trustees of the local church. The deed and charter of the local church,
however, "subjected both property and trustees alike to the operation [of the
general church's] fundamental laws." 25 6 The general church was the
Presbyterian Church of the United States. Its governing body was called the
General Assembly. The ecclesiastical rules of the General Assembly stated that
the assembly possessed "the power of deciding in all controversies respecting
doctrine and discipline." '257
Following the Civil War, the General Assembly ordered the members
of all local congregations who believed in the divine character of slavery to
"repent and forsake these sins. ' 26 A majority of the local church was willing
to comply with the directive. A minority faction, however, deemed the resolu-
tion of the assembly a departure from the doctrine held at the time the local
church first joined with the general church. The minority's theory was that the
general church held an interest in the property of the local church, subject
to an implied trust in favor of the doctrine to which the original church was
devoted. Any departure from doctrine by the general church meant a forfeiture
of its interest in the property occupied by the local church. Thus, the minority
faction claimed that the majority relinquished any right to control the prop-
erty when it repudiated the original, pro-slavery doctrine. The minority alleg-
ed that they were the true church, and should control the church grounds. 259
The implied trust theory, with its origin in English law, 26 was rejected
by the Supreme Court because its departure-from-doctrine feature required
the civil resolution of a religious question. The Watson Court gave three
reasons: (1) civil judges are incompetent to resolve questions concerning
religious doctrine;26 (2) members of a hierarchical church have voluntarily
joined the general church body, thus giving implied consent to its internal
governance;2 6 2 and (3) the structure of our political system requires limited
255. Since Watson was decided prior to Erie Ry. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938),
the federal courts in following Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), did not hesitate to
deviate from state substantive law. Further, the First Amendment religion clauses had not yet
been applied to the states. See supra note 110.
256. 80 U.S. at 683.
257. Id. at 682.
258. Id. at 691.
259. Id. at 691-94.
260. Id. at 727-28. Apparently the English cases have their genesis in the acceptance of a
church established by the state.
261. Id. at 729, 730 and 732. For example the Watson Court said:
It is not to be supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in
the ecclesiastical law and religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each
are in reference to their own. It would therefore be an appeal from the more learned
tribunal in the law which should decide the case, to one which is less so.
Id. at 729.
262. Id. at 729.
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involvement by government in the affairs of religious bodies to secure religious
liberty.263
Judicial deference to church authority enunciated in Watson, if strictly
applied in conjunction with the principle of implied consent by church members,
would allow a hierarchical church judicatory almost unlimited power over its
local churches. Reflecting this concern, subsequent decisions of the Court have
wrestled with how best to balance the religious liberty value of governmental
noninterference with concern for individuals arbitrarily or even oppressively
treated by a religious hierarchy. 264 Most important to the inquiry, however,
is that the Court's qualifications of the judicial deference rule have all related
to the civil disposition of property.265 The Watson rule remains uncompromised
on matters of doctrine, church discipline, religious office, religious belief, and
religious practice.
2 66
263. Id. at 728-29, 730. Quoting with approval from John's Island Church Case, 2 Richard-
son's Equity 215, the Court said:
The structure of our government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the
temporal institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured
religious liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.
Id. at 730. The Supreme Court used words which were later to be read into the First Amendment.
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 713-14 (1976); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 113 (1952); cf. Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Church,
393 U.S. 440, 446 (1969). The Watson Court delineated those matters which were not to be
penetrated by secular authority:
[W]henever the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or
law have been decided by the highest of these church judicatories to which the matter
has been carried, the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding
on them, in their application to the case before them....
lIlt is a very different thing where a subject matter of dispute, strictly and purely
ecclesiastical in its character . . . - a matter which concerns theological controversy,
church discipline, ecclesiastical government, or the conformity of the members of the
church to the standard of morals required of them - becomes the subject of its action.
... But it is easy to see that if the civil courts are to inquire into all these matters,
the whole subject of the dcotrinal theology, the usages and customs, the written laws,
and fundamental organization of every religious denomination may, and must, be ex-
amined into with minuteness and care, for they would become, in almost every case,
the criteria by which the validity of the ecclesiastical decree would be determined in
the civil court.
80 U.S. at 727, 733 (emphasis in original). Cf. Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States,
143 U.S. 457 (1892) (holding that religious societies have complete discretion in picking their
own minister, including choice of alien residing outside United States).
264. See L. TRuBE, supra note 7, at 882-93.
265. Kauper, Church Antonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case,
1969 SUP. CT. Rav. 347, 353.
266. In dictum written by Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Archbishop
said that the judicial deference rule would not be binding in instances of "fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness" by a church tribunal. 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929). Gonzales involved an appeal from
the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. The United States Supreme Court affirmed the
lower court which had declined to overturn a decision by a Roman Catholic Archbishop that
the petitioner was not qualified for appointment to an ecclesiastical office. As Justice Brandeis
noted, the petitioner's main interest appeared to be the substantial money from a trust which
accompanied the desired appointment. Id. at 18.
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Watson v. Jones was elevated to a rule of First Amendment stature in
Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral.6 7 The Kedroff Court perceived in Watson
a rule which "radiates... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation-in short, power to decide
for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine."26 8 In Kedroff, the Supreme Court
struck down a New York statute that displaced the control of the Russian
Orthodox Churches from the central governing hierarchy located in Moscow,
U.S.S.R., with a church organization limited to the diocese of North America.
The perceived need to transfer the control of ecclesiastical polity was linked
to the Revolution of 1917 and doubt concerning whether Moscow had "a true
central organization of the Russian Orthodox Church capable of functioning
as the head of a free international religious body. ' 269 Because the statute did
more than just "permit the trustees of the Cathedral [in New York City] to
use it for services consistent with the desires of its members," and transferred
by legislative fiat the entire control over local churches,27 the Court held that
the statute violated the "rule of separation between church and state." 2"'
The Watson Court repudiated the implied trust rule used to sanction the
departure-from-doctrine standard, but only as a matter of federal common
law. A number of states continued to follow the departure-from-doctrine stan-
dard or English rule as a matter of state common law.272 Kedroff, however,
clearly foreshadowed the adoption of Watson as a limitation upon the states
by force of the Fourteenth Amendment. In Presbyterian Church v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Church,"7 3 Watson was applied to the states. Presbyterian
Church presented a hierarchical church dispute between a general church and
two of its local member churches over the right to control the local churches'
property. The controversy began when the local churches claimed that the
general church had violated the organization's constitution and had departed
from accepted doctrine and practice.274 Georgia followed the implied trust doc-
267. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
268. Id. at 116.
269. Id. at 106. The specific dispute in Kedroff concerned which religious body had the
authority to make a clerical appointment to St. Nicholas Cathedral in New York City. The Court's
review, however, necessarily drew into the dispute the entire statutory scheme. Id.
270. Id. at 119.
271. Id. at 110. In Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960) (per curiam),
the decision in Kedroff, invalidating legislative action, was extended to a later state court judg-
ment which sought to accomplish the same transfer of ecclesiastical control.
272. Kauper, Church Antonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case,
1969 Sup. CT. REV. 347, 350-51.
273. 393 U.S. 440 (1969).
274. Id. at 442 n.l. The Presbyterian Church Court quoted from the opinion of the Supreme
Court of Georgia, summarizing the alleged departures from doctrine by the general church:
"ordaining of women as ministers and ruling elders, making pronouncements and recom-
mendations concerning civil, economic, social and political matters, giving support to
the removal of Bible reading and prayers by children in the public schools, adopting
certain Sunday School literature and teaching neo-orthodoxy alien to the Confession
of Faith and Catechisms, as originally adopted by the general church, and causing
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trine with its departure-from-doctrine element. On the basis of a jury finding
that the general church had abandoned its original doctrines, the Georgia courts
entered judgment for the local congregations.
On appeal, the Supreme Court recognized that states have a legitimate
interest in church property disputes, and thus courts properly may take sub-
ject matter jurisdiction.275 The First Amendment, however, does not permit
the departure-from-doctrine standard as a substantive rule of decision. The
"American concept of the relationship between church and state' 276 "leaves
the civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical questions in the process
of resolving property disputes." 277 Notably, without spelling out in detail a
legal standard which would withstand First Amendment scrutiny, the Court
advised that "there are neutral principles of law, developed for use in all pro-
perty disputes, which can be applied '" 2 8 without determining underlying ques-
tions of religious doctrine and practice.2" With these instructions, the Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings.
In a dispute similar to the ecclesiastical differences presented in Kedroff,
the Supreme Court in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivoevich8 ° rejected
a bishop's resistence to the reorganization of the American-Canadian diocese
all members to remain in the National Council of Churches of Christ and willingly
accepting its leadership which advocated named practices, such as the subverting of
parental authority, civil disobedience and intermeddling in civil affairs"; also "that
the general church has ... made pronouncements in matters involving international
issues such as the Vietnam conflict and has disseminated publications denying the Holy
Trinity and violating the moral and ethical standards of the faith."
Id.
275. Id. at 445.
276. Id. at 445-46.
277. Id. at 447 (emphasis in original).
278. Id. at 449. The Presbyterian Church Court recalled the narrower procedural review
suggested by the dictum in Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 16 (1929) (see supra note 266;
infra note 285), that a decision by church authorities could not stand if found to be the result
of "fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness," as possibly meeting the neutral principles requirement.
393 U.S. at 451.
279. The term following Presbyterian Church, the Court dismissed an appeal in a similar
case from a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals for lack of a substantial federal question.
Maryland & Virginia Churches v. Sharpsburg Church, 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam). In the
Court's view, the property dispute was resolved by the Maryland courts without inquiry into
religious doctrine. In a concurring opinion, Justice Brennan stated that the Court's decision in
Presbyterian Church permitted a state to "adopt any one of various approaches for settling church
property disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters, whether the ritual
and liturgy of worship or the tenets of faith." Id. at 368. Brennan then went on to broadly
outline three such approaches. First, is the Watson approach of judicial deference to the decision
of the highest governing church authority. Where the identification of this governing authority
"is a matter of substantial controversey," the civil courts cannot, consistent with the First Amend-
ment, "probe deeply enough into the allocation of power within a church so as to decide where
religious law places control." Id. at 369. Second, is the "formal title" doctrine, used by the
Maryland Court of Appeals, requiring study of the local church deed and the church's organic
law - charter, constitution, and bylaws. Id. at 370. Third, is the enactment of a statutory ap-
proach, carefully drawn to avoid interference in doctrine. Id. at 370.
280. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
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of the Serbian Orthodox Church and his removal from office. Unlike
Presbyterian Church, essentially a suit over the control of church real estate,
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese involved primarily the religious concerns of
church administration and clerical appointments, matters more insulated from
civil review under the First Amendment. 8 '
In Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese, there was no dispute between the parties
that the Serbian Orthodox Church was a hierarchical church and that the sole
power to remove clerics rested with the governing body that had decided the
bishop's case.282 Nor was there any question that the matter at issue was a
religious dispute of ecclesiastical cognizance. 83 The Illinois Supreme Court
agreed with these stipulations. Nevertheless, the court decided in favor of the
defrocked bishop because, in its view, the church's adjudicatory procedures
had been applied in an arbitrary manner. 28 1 On appeal, the Supreme Court
rejected the "arbitrariness" exception to the judicial deference rule of Wat-
son when the question concerns church polity or church administration.2 85 When
the issue is primarily religious, rather than principally over the control of pro-
perty, there may be no examination by civil courts into whether the church
judicatory body properly followed its own rules of procedure.286 The reasons
for this injunction are three-fold. First, civil courts cannot delve into canon
or ecclesiastical law. 287 These matters are too sensitive to permit any civil pro-
bing because inquiry may prove too entangling. Second, civil judges have no
training in canonical law.288 Finally, the "[c]onstitutional concepts of due pro-
cess, involving secular notions of 'fundamental fairness' " cannot be borrow-
ed from civil law and impressed upon internal church governance consistent
with church-government separation.
289
The Supreme Court also reversed the state court's disapproval of the
diocesan reorganization, holding that the Illinois Supreme Court had relied
impermissibly on its "delv[ing] into the various church constitutional provi-
sions" relevant to "a matter of internal church government, an issue at the
core of ecclesiastical affairs."'29' The enforcement of terms in controlling church
documents could not be accomplished "without engaging in a searching and
therefore impermissible inquiry into church polity."1
29 '
Linking its decision to the establishment clause's "promise of nonentangle-
281. Id. at 709, 713, 720, 721. In Serbian E., the resolution of the claim concerning the
clerical office would determine any incidental property questions. Id.
282. Id. at 715.
283. Id. at 709.
284. See Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 60 Ill. 2d 477, 328 N.E.2d 268, 281-82
(1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
285. 426 U.S. at 712-13. The "arbitrariness" exception had been established by the dictum
in Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1, 18 (1929). See supra notes 266, 278.
286. 426 U.S. at 713.
287. Id. at 713.
288. Id. at 714 n. 8.
289. Id. at 714-15.
290. Id. at 721.
291. Id. at 723.
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ment", the Supreme Court in Jones v. Wolf 92 attempted to delineate more
precisely the nature of the neutral-principles-of-law approach suggested in
Presbyterian Church. Jones v. Wolf presented a typical hierarchical church
property dispute between a local church, represented by a majority of its con-
gregation, and the general church allied in the lawsuit with a minority faction
of the local congregation. A majority of the local congregation adopted a
resolution to separate from the general church and then affiliated with a dif-
ferent denomination. The majority faction retained possession of the prop-
erty and assets of the local church and excluded the minority faction from
its affairs. The general church responded by appointing an administrative com-
mission which issued a judgment declaring the minority faction the "true
church". Further, the commission's ruling purported to retract all of the
majority faction's privileges in continued use of the local property. 93
Applying a neutral-principles-of-law approach, the Georgia courts reviewed
the state statutes on implied trusts, the deeds to the disputed property, and
the organic law of the church, the corporate charter to the local church and
the constitution of the general church (Book of Church Order).294 The state
court found nothing implying a trust in favor of the general church. The deeds
gave legal title to the local church and its trustees. Without further analysis,
the state court awarded title to the property to the majority faction, 29" imply-
ing that the Georgia courts presume the majority faction constitutes the "true
local congregation" when there is no evidence to the contrary. 296
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the minority faction challenged the
Georgia presumption in favor of majority rule. The minority faction argued
that at least as to a hierarchical church, the state could not adopt a legal
presumption which contradicted a ruling by the general church commission
concerning the "true congregation". 29 The Supreme Court, however, approved
a majority-rule presumption as part of a neutral-principles-of-law approach,
since a "majority faction can be identified without resolving any question of
religious doctrine or polity. ' 29 The presumption must be rebuttable, however,
in the face of evidence by the minority faction that the relevant documents
and state statutes place title to the property elsewhere. 299
The Jones v. Wolf Court made clear that the neutral-principles approach
was not mandated by the First Amendment, but was an alternative to the
judicial deference rule of Watson.3"' Moreover, when applying the neutral-
292. 443 U.S. 595, 604 (1979).
293. Id. at 598-99.
294. Id. at 601.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 607.
297. Id.
298. Id. The Jones v. Wo/f Court noted that problems may occur when the identity of enrolled
members, presence of a quorum, or the tally on the final vote are disputed. Id.
299. Id. at 607, 608 n. 5. Since the nature of the presumption in Jones v. Wolf was unclear,
id. at 608, and also whether Georgia law instead required application of the Watson judicial
deference rule, id. at 608-609, the Court remanded for further proceedings consistent with its
opinion. Id. at 608-609.
300. Id. at 602.
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principles rule, if a judicial body examines church documents and finds that
they incorporate "religious concepts in the provisions relating to the owner-
ship of property," the courts must defer to the interpretation of the documents
by the authoritative ecclesiastical body.
30'
In short, civil authorities must always forego questions which are essen-
tially religious as a matter of noninterference in the affairs of religious associa-
tions. Included in such matters are doctrine, discipline, appointment of religious
personnel, church polity, internal administration, and religious practice. In
disputes principally over control of property, however, states may adopt a
neutral-principles-of-law approach so long as civil authorities do not become
entangled in questions essentially religious in the course of the rule's application.
C. The "Fervency Test"
A useful parallel may be drawn between the concern that government
not unduly involve itself with organized religion and the Supreme Court's treat-
ment of a matter under the free exercise clause. As a threshold inquiry in
every free exercise case, the claimant must show that his religiously based con-
duct is sincere.302 Some objective evidence of sincerity is required, lest a free
exercise claim become a basis for fraud or an excuse for avoiding many un-
wanted obligations. Nevertheless, the sincerity requirement is necessarily a trun-
cated inquiry because of the injuction against civil authorities testing the truth
of one's faith.30 3 The Court has said that only claims "so bizarre, so clearly
nonreligious in motivation" should be denied free exercise credence. 30 1 Stated
differently, sincerity is not so much a test of what a person believes, but whether
one really believes it, a "fervency test."
The Court has stated that the First Amendment does not permit public
officials to become embroiled in substantive assessments of religious matters.
For example, in United States v. Lee,315 the government conceded that the
claimant, a member of the Old Order Amish sect, objected on religious grounds
to payment of social security taxes on behalf of his employees. No challenge
was made to the sincerity of Mr. Lee's beliefs. The government, however,
sought to challenge the centrality of this conviction, that is, the importance
the Amish faith placed on the belief that they should provide for their own
elderly and needy and, therefore, their opposition to the national social security
system. The Lee Court said:
301. Id. at 604. In Jones v. Wolf the dissenting justices argued that only the Watson judicial
deference rule was permitted by the First Amendment when disputes arose in hierarchical churches.
Id. at 616-18 (Powell, J., dissenting).
302. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972) (compulsory school attendance
claimed "at odds with fundamental tenets of their religious beliefs"); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (not working on Saturday claimed "a cardinal principle of her religious
beliefs").
303. United States v. Seegar, 380 U.S. 163, 185 (1965); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S.
78, 86-87 (1944).
304. Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714-15 (1981).
305. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
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[T]he government [contends] that payment of social security taxes will
not threaten the integrity of the Amish religious belief or observance.
It is not within "the judicial function and judicial competence,"
however, to determine whether [Lee] or the government has the pro-
per interpretation of the Amish faith; "[courts] are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation. "306
The Supreme Court's reluctance to delve into the truth of religious doc-
trine or even its centrality to a claimant's system of belief is further evidence
of the importance the Court places in the separation of government from the
activities of worship, doctrinal teaching, or propagation of the tenets of faith
held by religious associations.3 1
7
V. TBE CASE LAW IN THE LOWER COURTS
This section examines the extent to which the concepts of nonentangle-
ment and the avoidance of intrafaith disputes have been applied in lower
federal and state courts in a manner supportive of the establishment clause
principle of independent, voluntaristic churches .3 0  Generally, government
regulation of zoning 3°9 and other land use controls, such as building and fire
306. Id. at 257 (citations omitted). Until Thomas, it was thought that the Court also re-
quired the claimant to show that his belief was central to his faith. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 218 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); L. TRIE, supra note
7, at 859-65. It is now clear, however, that centrality is not required. United States v. Lee, 455
U.S. 252, 257 (1982); Thomas v. Review Bd., Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981).
With centrality apparently abandoned as a requirement, and sincerity being a truncated inquiry
at best, the threshold for free exercise analysis is minimal. This tends to shift the more searching
judicial analysis to the compelling governmental interest facet of the free exercise test, and arguably
causes a less weighty governmental purpose before overcoming the religious practice. See United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. at 262-63 (Stevens, J., concurring).
307. See generally Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L.F.
579; Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious Institutions" Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPPER-
DnE L. REv. 313 (1980); Ball, What is Religion?, 8 THE CMUsTIAN LAWYER 7 (1979); Whelan,
Governmental Attempts to Define Church and Religion, 446 THE ANNALs, AAPSS 32 (Nov. 1979);
Whelan, "Church" in the Internal Revenue Code: The Definitional Problems, 45 FORDA M L.
REv. 885 (1977).
308. There has been considerable litigation in the lower courts concerning doctrinal and church
property disputes. Since these courts are constrained to follow the Supreme Court's principles
concerning the avoidance of civil resolution of doctrinal controversy and the alternative use of
neutral-principles-of-law for disputes over real estate, the application of these cases in the lower
courts will not be further explicated here. See supra notes 293-301 and accompanying text.
309. Zoning and land use controls have been found to be of sufficient public interest to
deny special use permits to religious retreat centers and youth camps. Holy Spirit Ass'n v. Town
of New Castle, 480 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Christian Retreat Center v. Board of City
Comm'rs, 28 Or. App. 673, 560 P.2d 1100 (1977). Additional cases have sustained the require-
ment that a church obtain a special use permit before operating a school in the church building
during weekdays. Damascus Community Church v. Clackamas County, 45 Or. App. 1065, 610
P.2d 273 (1980), appeal dismissed, 450 U.S. 902 (1981); but see City of Sumner v. First Baptist
Church, 97 Wash. 2d 1, 639 P.2d 1358 (1982) (court reversed and remanded for determination
of whether uncompromising application of city zoning and building code ordinances to church-
school were necessary). See also Lutheran Church in Am. v. City of New York, 35 N.Y. 2d
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codes, 310 have not proven problematic, so long as the ordinances are enforced
in a nondiscriminatory manner. In contrast, there have been several church-
government clashes over state accreditation of religious schools, 31 ' tax
exemptions312 and tax investigations, 313 the regulation of church finances
314
121, 316 N.E.2d 305, 359 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (1974) (landmark preservation law unconstitutional when
applied to church building); American Friends of the Soc'y of St. Pius v. Schwab, No.
(N.Y. Sup. Ct., Nassau Cty.) (unpublished opinion reported in the N.Y.L.J., Feb. 2, 1983, at
15, col. 3) (overturning zoning law requiring site plan conditioned on village approval of who
may attend, when services may be conducted, and church payment for certain public services).
See generally Note, Zoning Ordinances, Private Religious Conduct, and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 76 Nw. U.L. Rav. 786 (1981); Annot., Zoning Regulations as Affecting Churches,
74 A.L.R. 2d 377 (1960).
310. Courts have upheld more stringent building and fire codes for churches using their
facilities for schools during weekdays, in contrast to churches using facilities solely for religious
purposes. See, e.g., Hough v. North Star Baptist Church, 109 Mich. App. 780, 312 N.W.2d
158 (1981); State Fire Marshall v. Lee, 101 Mich. App. 829,300 N.W.2d 748 (1980); Faith Assembly
of God of South Dennis and Hyannis, Inc. v. State Bldg. Code Comm'n, 81 Mass. App. Ct.
297, 416 N.E.2d 228 (1981).
311. State accreditation and regulation of primary and secondary religious schools was suc-
cessfully resisted in State v. Whisner, 47 Ohio St. 2d 181, 351 N.E.2d 750 (1976), and State
ex. rel. Nagle v. Olin, 64 Ohio St. 2d 341, 415 N.E.2d 279 (1980). The states have prevailed
in State ex. rel. Douglas v. Faith Baptist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, appeal dis-
missed, 454 U.S. 803 (1981), and State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980). See supra note
20 (sampling of articles concerning state accreditation). On the post-secondary level, Shelton Col-
lege, a Presbyterian school, unsuccessfully resisted state-mandated regulation in New Jersey State
Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Board of Directors of Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470, 448 A.2d 988 (1982).
312. Holy Spirits Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity v. Tax Comm'n, 55 N.Y.2d
512, 435 N.E.2d 662, 450 N.Y.S. 2d 292 (1982) (holding that church was "primarily religious"
for tax exempt purposes where significant part of its activities were asserted to be religious and
claim for exemption appeared to be "made in good faith and is not a sham").
313. The courts have consistently upheld the authority of the Internal Revenue Service to
investigate church books of account to determine the initial and continuing qualifications of a
religious organization for tax exempt status and to examine taxable unrelated business income.
See United States v. Coates, 692 F.2d 629 (9th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dykema, 666 F.2d
1096 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 983 (1982); United States v. Grayson County State Bank,
656 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 1981) (church records held by third party); United States v. Life Science
Church of Am., 636 F.2d 221 (8th Cir. 1980); United States v. Freedom Church, 613 F.2d 316
(1st Cir. 1979). The courts have been quite supportive of IRS efforts to ferret out mail-order
ministries and other ruses. See Carr Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 698 F. 2d 952 (8th Cir.
1983); United States v. Norcutt, 680 F. 2d 54 (8th Cir. 1982); Loving Saviour Church v. United
States, 556 F. Supp. 688 (D. S.D. 1983); Life Science Church v. Internal Revenue Serv., 525
F. Supp. 399 (N.D. Cal. 1981); but see Baldwin v. Comm'r, 648 F.2d 483 (8th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam) (discovery overbroad); United States v. Holmes, 614 F. 2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980) (per curiam)
(summons overbroad). See generally Beebe, Tax Problems Posed by Pseudo- Religious Movements,
446 THE ANNAs 91 (1979); Weithorn & Turkel, Frontier Issues of Tax Exemption for Religious
Organizations, GOVERNIENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS 64 (Kelley ed. 1982).
314. See Scott v. Rosenberg, 702 F.2d 1263 (9th Cir. 1983) (upholding authority of Federal
Communications Commission to investigate charges that church's television and radio stations
had made fraudulent solicitation requests and committed other fiscal irregularities); Hardy &
Secrest, Religious Freedom and the Federal Communications Commission, 16 VAL. U.L. Rv.
57 (1981) (regulation of religious broadcasting).
See Heffron v. Int'l Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (charitable solicita-
tion legislation affecting religious organizations); Rusk v. Espinosa, 456 U.S. 951 (1982), aff'g, 634
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and activities having commercial consequences, 3 5 and restrictions on lobby-
ing and other political activity. 3 6 Selected principal cases in each of three areas
bearing upon the independence of religious groups from government are ex-
amined here: labor and equal employment legislation, state regulation of social
welfare agencies, and private law actions for religious fraud and other torts.
A. Labor and Equal Employment Laws
Religious organizations have unsuccessfully resisted federal minimum wage
and overtime compensation laws.3" ' Further, they are not exempt from oc-
F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1980) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes 245-50).
Perhaps the most controversy over regulation of church finances concerned an incident in
California when the state Attorney General took over the entire financial operations of the World
Wide Church of God based on allegations of fiscal irregularities by church officials. People v. World
Wide Church of God, No. C 267 607 (Cal. Supr. Ct., filed Jan. 2, 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
883 (1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 987 (1980). The Attorney General asserted authority based upon
the state's interest in charitable trusts, which the Attorney General maintained was the legal status
of a church, thus permitting the use of the provisional remedy of receivership to investigate inter-
nal fraud. Eventually, the legislature passed a law denying the authority to institute such actions
against religious bodies. CAL. CORP. CODE § 9230 (West 1983). See Whelan, Who Owns the
Churches?, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIoUS AFFAIRs 57 (Kelley ed. 1982); Jackson, Social-
ized Religion: California's Public Trust Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REV. 185 (1981); Worthing, Tile
State Takes Over A Church, 446 THE ANNALS 136 (1979); Note, Government Protection of Church
Assets From Fiscal Abuse: The Constitutionality of Attorney General Enforcement Under the
Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 53 S. CAL. L. Rv. 1277 (1980); Note, Receivers, Churches
and Nonprofit Corporations: A First Amendment Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 175 (1980). See generally
Taylor, Diversion of Church Funds to Personal Use: State, Federal and Private Sanctions, 73
J. Cgam. L. & CRuMINOLOGY 1204 (1982); Oaks, Trust Doctrines in Church Controversies, 1981
B.Y.U.L. REv. 805.
315. See Cuesnongle v. Ramos, 713 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1983) (holding that Roman Catholic
university was not so "pervasively sectarian" as to be exempt from regulation by Puerto Rico
Department of Consumer Affairs). Note, Religion-Based Antitrust Exemptions: A Religious Motiva-
tion Test, 57 NOTRE DAME LAW. 828 (1982) (discussion of antitrust implications of acts by religious
bodies); Note, Sherman Act Liability for a Religiously Motivated Boycott, 17 VAL. U.L. REV.
515 (1983) (same).
Federal security law exempts religious, educational, and charitable organizations from disclosure
and registration requirements. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(4) (1976). Quite apart from the registration
requirements, however, it is unlawful for any person during the offer or sale of a security to
employ a fraudulent scheme or device, to obtain money or property by means of an untrue state-
ment of a material fact or any omission of fact, or to engage in any transaction, practice, or
course of business which operates as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1)-(3)
(1976). These provisions apply to all securities, including those issued by religious organizations.
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976) (securities laws applicable to
religious organizations). Cf. SEC v. Knopfler, 658 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (religious
harassment unsuccessfully alleged as defense to SEC subpoena in connection with possible securities
violation).
316. See Caron, Dessinge & Liekweg, Government Restraint on Political Activities of Religious
Bodies, GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN RELIGIous AFPARS 151 (Kelley ed. 1982); Wogaman, The
Churches and Legislative Activity, 446 THE ANNALS 52 (1979); Note, Religion and Political Cam-
paigns: A Proposal to Revise Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code, 49 FORDHm L.
REV. 536 (1981).
317. See Mitchell v. Pilgrim Holiness Church Corp., 210 F.2d 879 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 1013 (1954) (minimum wage and overtime provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act,
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cupational safety and health acts."1 8 Greater discord, however, has occasion-
ed the assertion of jurisdiction by the National Labor Relations Board over
nonclerics and the application of equal employment opportunity laws to non-
pastoral employees of religious organizations. A third area of tension has
been the attempted application of federal unemployment compensation tax
legislation to religious groups.
Since the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago319 rebuff-
ed attempts by the NLRB to assert jurisdiction over lay faculty employed by
parochial schools,3 20 even religious schools that are not controlled directly by
any church or denomination have successfully fended off union organizing
attempts for establishment clause reasons.3 2' The focus has now shifted to
29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., do not violate free exercise rights of religious corporation operating
office building, printing plant, mail order office, book store, and church treasury); Donovan
v. Alamo Foundation, 722 F.2d 397 (8th Cir. 1983), 96 Lab Cas. (CCH) 34,326 (W.D. Ark.
1983) (religious charity is subject to FLSA as to voluntary workers performing commercial work
for profit); Donovan v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, - F. Supp. -, Civ. Act. No.
78-0115 (W.D. Va. 1983) (FLSA applies to church-operated schools); Marshall v. First Baptist
Church, 23 Wage & Hour Cas. 386 (BNA) (D.S.C. 1977) (application of FLSA to church preschool
and kindergarten employees does not violate First Amendment); but cf. Op. Letter of Employ.
Std. Admin., No. 1240, LAB. L. Rap. (CCH) 30,826 (Dec. 27, 1972) (exempting from FLSA
individuals such as nuns, priests, lay brothers, ministers, deacons, and other members of religious
orders who serve pursuant to religious obligations in preschools, schools, hospitals, or other in-
stitutions operated by their church or religious order).
318. The Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651 et seq. (1976), applies to
nonprofit corporations, id. § 652, and to all employers "affecting commerce," id. § 652(5), which
evidences an intent to assert jurisdiction to the fullest extent permitted by the commerce clause.
Presumably, the Act applies to religious organizations that are interstate in the scope of their
ministry.
319. 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See supra text accompanying notes 189-96 (discussion of Catholic
Bishop). See generally Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The Case
of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1373 (1981);
Durso & Brice, NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago: Government Regulation Versus First Amend-
ment Religious Freedoms, 24 ST. Louis U.L.J. 295 (1980). Comment, Labor Relations in Parochial
Schools: Should Lay Teachers Be Denied Protection of the General Laws?, 17 SAN Diao L.
REV. 1093 (1979); Note, Labor Law - Jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board Over
Parochial Schools, 54 TUL. L. REv. 786 (1980).
320. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion affirmed in Catholic Bishop is reported
at 559 F.2d 1112 (1977). Unlike the timidity of the Supreme Court, the circuit court was pointed
when it said that the NLRB's assertion of power "is cruelly whip-sawing [the parochial] schools
by holding that institutions too religious to receive governmental assistance are not religious enough
to be excluded from its regulation." Id. at 1119. The mission of the school integrating religious
and secular education, and the attempted interposition of the union and regulatory board be-
tween teacher and ecclesiastical superior, was held to violate separation of church and state. Id.
at 1119-31. Even before the Supreme Court's decision in Catholic Bishop, other lower courts
had found NLRB jurisdiction over parochial schools incompatable with the establishment clause.
See, e.g., Caulfield v. Hirsch, 95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3164 (E.D. Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
957 (1978).
321. NLRB v. Bishop Ford Central Catholic High School, 623 F.2d 818 (2d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 996 (1981) (control in board of lay trustees rather than Catholic diocese);
Catholic High School Ass'n of Archdioces of New York v. Culvert, __ F. Supp. - ,
No. 82 Civ. 396 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (state labor law's assertion of jurisdiction over association of
parochial schools violated establishment clause).
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NLRB jurisdiction over children's homes, 322 nursing homes for the elderly, 323
hospitals, 324  and even broadcasting stations325  and convention centers
326
operated by religious corporations.
In assessing these cases, the Supreme Court developed criteria that draw
our attention to three factors: the religious character of the organization, the
intensity of the church-state entanglements, and the resulting relationship bet-
ween the religious body and government. 327 Clearly, the greater the involve-
ment of the proposed bargaining unit employees with core religious activities,
such as teaching and propagation of religious beliefs, the greater the likelihood
of prohibitive entanglements. Although a parochial school teacher is directly
and frequently engaged in teaching religious beliefs, 328 a hospital nurse329 and
a nursing home physiotherapy assistant33 are engaged primarily in medical
care. Likewise, the maintenance and storeroom employees of the church-
affiliated residential treatment center for abused children in NLRB v. St. Louis
Christian Home33 were not assigned religious duties, therefore rendering NLRB
oversight inoffensive. However, it would not be unusual for child-care workers
in a church-affiliated children's home to have substantial religious duties
necessary to conduct a rehabilitative program imbued with religious content.
332
Nevertheless, this was not the case with the child-care employees in St. Louis
Christian Home. For example, the home's criteria for employment did not
322. See NLRB v. St. Louis Christian Home, 663 F.2d 60 (8th Cir. 1981) (upholding NLRB
jurisdiction); cf. NLRB v. Children's Baptist Home, Inc., 576 F.2d 256 (9th Cir. 1979) (First
Amendment defenses never raised by children's home).
323. See Tressler Lutheran Home v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1982); Mid American
Health Servs., Inc., 227 N.L.R.B. 752 (1980). Both cases uphold NLRB jurisdiction.
324. See St. Elizabeth Community Hospital v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436 (1983); 626 F.2d 123
(9th Cir. 1980) (affirming NLRB jurisdiction); Bon Secours Hospital, Inc., 448 N.L.R.B. 115
(1980) (affirming jurisdiction over bargaining unit of dietetic assistants).
325. See Faith Center - WHCT Channel 18 v. Local Union 42, Int'l Bhd. Elec. Workers,
LAB L. REP. (CCH) 18,888 (1982) (NLRB refused to assert jurisdiction over church-operated
television station); Lutheran Church, Missouri Synod, 109 N.L.R.B. 859 (1954) (NLRB refused
to assert jurisdiction over religious radio station). Cf. NLRB v. Christian Bd. of Publication,
113 F.2d 678 (8th Cir. 1940) (upholding NLRB jurisdiction over religious publishing house operated
on commercial basis).
326. See NLRB v. World Evangelism, Inc., 656 F.2d 1349 (9th Cir. 1981) (upholding jurisdic-
tion of NLRB over maintenance engineers employed by motel and convention center complex
owned by religious body but operated on commercial basis, and bargaining unit employees engaged
in nonreligious activities).
327. See supra text accompanying notes 208-209.
328. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 501 (1979); Caulfield v. Hirsch,
95 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3164, 3172 (E.D. Pa. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 957 (1978).
329. St. Elizabeth Community Hospital v. NLRB, 708 F.2d 1436, (9th Cir. 1983). Other
employees in the proposed bargaining unit were service and maintenance personnel, three head
nurses, and a supply superintendant.
330. Tressler Lutheran Home v. NLRB, 677 F.2d 302, 304 (3d Cir. 1982). Other employees
in the proposed bargaining unit were service and maintenance personnel, clerks, orderlies, and
dietary, housekeeping, and laundry employees.
331. 663 F.2d. 60 (8th Cir. 1981).
332. See infra notes 389-98 and accompanying text (cases discussed).
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require any religious affiliation or training, and the employee's duties in the
home entailed no religious tasks.
333
The material difference between the overall character of a parochial school
in contrast to a hospital, nursing home, or convention center, all open to the
general public, is that a primary purpose for the school's existence is the pro-
pagation and inculcation of faith.334 Since a parochial school interweaves its
secular and religious functions,3 5 the NLRB cannot avoid excessive en-
tanglements by certifying only a selected bargaining unit of nonclerics. Any
concession of jurisdiction to the government necessarily would entangle the
board in activity that touches the very heart of religious exercise. Although
a religious children's home is often comparable to a parochial school in its
mission, the facility in St. Louis Christian Home was exceptional because it
had become so secularized that the court found that it not longer was a
"religious enterprise", nor did it "devote itself to the propagation of religion,"
and that it received substantial governmental funding and voluntarily submit-
ted to state licensing. 36 The decision in St. Louis Christian Home points out
an important distinction. The test does not turn on whether the regulated
organization is a nursing home, children's home, or school. Rather, in each
case the issue is whether the particular institution in question is in fact operated
on a pervasively religious basis.
In St. Martin Lutheran Church v. South Dakota,337 the Supreme Court
construed the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (FUTA)338 to exempt schools
that are part of the corporate structure of a church or association of churches
(designated Category I schools). 339 The Court did not have before it the issue
of the unemployment compensation tax status of schools separately incor-
porated by a church (Category II) or those religious schools unaffiliated with
any church or denomination (Category III). 3"1 Following the rationale in St.
Martin, the Secretary of Labor ruled that Category II schools were also exempt
by the language of the act.34 ' The Secretary, however, maintains that Category
333. 663 F.2d at 62, 64.
334. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 617 (1971) ("the raison d'etre of public schools
is the propogation of religious faith").
335. See supra note 209.
336. 663 F.2d at 61-64. Contrast the St. Louis Christian Home with the pervasively religious
child-care facilities discussed infra at text accompanying notes 389-98.
337. 451 U.S. 772 (1981).
338. 26 U.S.C. §3301 et seq. (1976).
339. 451 U.S. at 782-83. See also Alabama v. Marshall, 626 F.2d 366 (5th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 452 U.S. 905 (1981) (decided before St. Martin, holding in favor of religious schools).
340. 451 U.S. at 782 n. 12 ("Our holding today concerns only schools that have no legal
identity separate from a church.").
341. Brief for the United States at 8 (decided with California v. Grace Brethren Church,
457 U.S. 393 (1982). In a state court ruling, six church-operated but separately incorporated schools
were entitled to exemption from the unemployment tax. Community Lutheran School v. Iowa
Dep't of Job Serv., 326 N.W.2d 286 (1982). The trial court had held that the schools were not
entitled to exemption because they were operated primarily for educational rather than religious
purposes.
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III schools are subject to the unemployment tax, and the matter currently
is at issue in several ongoing suits.342 Moreover, the litigation has spilled over
into disputes concerning the applicability of the tax to mission societies343 and
youth ministries 44 that are substantially religious but operate independent of
any church or denomination.4 3
Statutory exemptions based on the distinction of whether a religious
organization is church-affiliated or an independent, nondenominational ministry
discriminate in a manner contrary to the establishment clause.346 Clearly, a
FUTA exemption which excludes Category III schools on the basis of cor-
porate organization or religious polity is unconstitutionally discriminatory
because the exemption tends to "establish" Category I and II schools while




342. See, e.g., California v. Grace Brethren Church, No. CV 79-93 MRP (S.D. Cal. Apr.
6, 1981) (unpublished opinion, reproduced at United States Jurisdictional Statement and Appen-
dix A, filed in No. 81-228), remanded on jurisdictional grounds, 457 U.S. 393 (1982); Salem
College & Academy v. Employment Div., 61 Or. App. 616, 659 P.2d 415 (1983); Employment
Sec. Admin. v. Baltimore Lutheran High School Ass'n, 291 Md. 750, 436 A.2d 481 (1981); Chris-
tian School Ass'n v. Commonwealth, 55 Pa. Commw. 555, 423 A.2d 1340 (1980).
343. Christian Jew Found. v. Texas, 653 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983) (mission society
not affiliated with church not subject to tax). Cf. Arkansas Empl. Sec. Div. v. National Baptist
Convention, 275 Ark. 374, 630 S.W.2d 31 (1982) (National Baptist Convention not required to
pay state employment security tax on payroll at convention's hotel and bathhouse).
344. Young Life v. Division of Employment & Training, __ Colo. - , 650
P.2d 515 (1982) (youth ministry not affiliated with church subject to tax).
345. See generally Note, Unemployment Benefits and The Religion Clauses: A Recurring
Conflict, 36 U. ML mi L. REv. 585 (1982); Note, Redemption Through Exemption: Unemploy-
ment Compensation Taxes, 55 N.Y.U.L. Ray. 242 (1980); Comment, Bringing Christian Schools
Within the Scope of the Unemployment Compensation Laws: Statutory and Free Exercise Issues,
25 VILL. L. REv. 69 (1980).
346. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (overturning charitable solicitation law which
had effect of discriminating against new, minority sects); cf. Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437 (1971) (upholding selective service classification for conscientious objection which differen-
tiated on basis of religious belief, not by membership in denomination or sect). See Marsh v.
Chambers, 103 S.Ct. 3062, 3067 n.l1 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Christian Jew Found.
v. Texas, 653 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Civ. App. 1983), the court concluded that a state statutory ex-
emption for "churches" in the unemployment tax act had to be broadly construed to prevent
discrimination enjoined by the establishment clause. The word "churches", therefore, was said
to include "any religious organization which, as the whole of its activities, advocates and teaches
its particular spiritual beliefs before others with a purpose of gaining adherents to those beliefs
and instructing them in the doctrine which those beliefs comprise." Id. at 617. Although the
Christian Jew Foundation conducted no worship services, was nondenominational, and was not
a church in the ordinary understanding of that term, it was exempt from the tax.
347. Accord California v. Grace Brethren Church, No. CV 79-93 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 1981)
(unpublished opinion, reproduced at United States Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix 74a-76a),
remanded on jurisdictional grounds, 457 U.S. 393 (1982). The analysis of a FUTA exemption
is much like the strict scrutiny test of the equal protection clause, see Larson v. Valente, 456
U.S. 228, 247 (1982), in which only a compelling governmental interest can save the discriminatory
classification. Accordingly, cases such as Young Life v. Division of Employment and Training,
- Colo. - , 650 P.2d 515 (1982), are plainly wrong and should be reversed. The Young
Life court held that the exemption of traditional churches from taxation and no exemption of
a nondenominational, evangelical youth ministry which was pervasively religious in purpose and
[Vol. 41:347
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE LIMITS
If the FUTA is applied to all bodies that are pervasively religious, without
organizational distinctions, the tax still would violate the principle of separa-
tion of church and state. The federal district court in California v. Grace
Brethren Church3" held that the imposition of the unemployment tax to
Category III schools violated the nonentanglement requirement in two respects.
First, the benefit eligibility investigation and hearing process involved the state
in the resolution of religious issues in circumstances where the school had
discharged an employee for misconduct or good cause." 9 Second, the applica-
practice, did not unconstitutionally prefer or advance some religious bodies over those with more
unorthodox structures. The issue was handled in Young Life Campaign v. Patino, 122 Cal. App.
3d 559, 176 Cal. Rptr. 23 (1981) (broad construction of word "church" in tax statute to include
parachurch organization, thus avoiding First Amendment entanglements).
348. California v. Grace Brethren Church, No. CV 79-93 MRP (S.D. Cal. Apr. 6, 1981)
(unpublished opinion reproduced at United States Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix A),
remanded on jurisdictional grounds, 457 U.S. 393 (1982).
349. Id. at Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix 88a. The brief on behalf of Grace Brethren
Church summarizes the testimony of the government witnesses disclosing a hopelessly entangling
situation during the administration eligibility process initiated by a discharged employee filing
a claim for benefits:
(a) The state claims [the] determination agency entertains and passes upon con-
flicting claims as to whether the employee of a religious body was discharged because
of violation of that body's articles of faith.
(b) The religious body which is the employer is made to bear the burden of proof
that (a) the particular doctrine was part of an agreement between itself and the discharged
employeee and (b) that the employee breached that agreement.
(c) Where the religious body discharges the employee due to its judgment that the
employee has shown a decline in religious fervor, the state agent must declare this not
to be misconduct unless it has caused harm to the religious body, and the state is the
judge of whether "harm" has in fact taken place.
(d) The agent of the state must become familiar with religious doctrine in order to
be able to determine not merely whether there has occurred a violation of an express
rule of the religious body, but also to determine the issue of whether there has occurred
a violation of an implied rule of that body.
(e) Within the state's jurisdiction to determine religious reasons for discharge is also
jurisdiction to weigh and determine moral reasons for discharge.
(f) Whether or not an employee of a religious body, who was discharged on account
of incompetence, was incompetent to communicate the doctrine of the religious body
is a matter to be determined by the state, and if this incompetence was not willful,
it would not be construed as misconduct.
(g) The state determines whether the religious body need have given express warning
to its employee, and whether that warning was reasonable or needed.
(h) The state determines whether a particular rule of the religious body is an im-
portant one.
(i) The state makes "a determination of the effect [of the employee's conduct] on the
religion or the church".
tj) The state may determine whether a religious body is a church, and whether a par-
ticular employee of that body is a minister.
(k) Where a religious body and its discharged employee dispute the reasonableness of
the rule of the religious body which that body claims the employee violated, the state
will determine the issue of reasonableness.
(1) In the case wherein there appears to have been a misunderstanding over whether
a doctrinal point had been agreed upon by the religious body and its employee, the
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tion of the state unemployment insurance code to religious schools involved
sustained and detailed relationships between government and the schools,
30
contrary to the Supreme Court's warning against recurring audits, surveillance,
and inspections. 35 The compensation tax, therefore, is the paradigm of a pro-
hibitive church-state relation that is both qualitatively intense and indeter-
minately enduring.
Although the FUTA and its intrusive administration surely exceeds that
point of having "the mere potential""' 2 for excessive entanglement, another
labor-related statute affecting religious employers may not (at least on its face)
cross the line between permissible and prohibitive entanglement. In Victory
Baptist Temple v. Industrial Commission of Ohio,35 3 a state appellate court
upheld the application of a worker's compensation statute that covered
state must find in favor of the employee.
(m) Where the religious body and its employee disagree upon a point of doctrine,
"that situation would lend itself to a decision in favor of the employee".
Brief for Grace Brethren Church et al., Nos. 81-31, 81-228, 81-455 at 7-8 (references to transcript
omitted).
350. Grace Brethren, supra note 347, at Jurisdictional Statement and Appendix 89a. The
California Unemployment Insurance Code, if applied to religious schools, would authorize the
California Employment Development Department to:
(a) make investigations to determine whether a religious school, or employee thereof,
is covered by the Code. See Section 1953 and Hill v. Brisbane, 66 Cal. App. 2d 15,
151 P.2d 518 (1944);
(b) issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and the production of
books, papers, correspondence, memoranda and other records of religious institutions
(Section 1953);
(c) make an assessment, including a penalty of 1007, upon a religious school which
fails to make returns, and to do so on the basis of an estimate arrived at according
to whatever information may be in the Department's hands (Section 1126);
(d) assess a penalty of 250 on administrators of religious schools who, as a matter of
religious conscience, willfully fail to comply with the requirement to file returns (Sec-
tion 1128);
(e) obtain imposition of a lien on all religious property for failure to pay contributions
(Section 1703);
(t) charge administrators or others who are responsible for religious affairs with per-
sonal liability for amounts of contributions due (Section 1735);
(g) obtain a summary judgment against a religious school for failure to pay contribu-
tions (Section 1815); and
(h) bring legal actions, in the courts of California or the United States, against
religious schools and administrators to collect the amount of any delinquent employer
or worker contributions, together with penalties and interest (Section 1852).
Brief for Grace Brethren Church, et aL, Nos. 81-31, 81-228, 81-455 at 19-20.
351. See supra text accompanying notes 219-39 (Supreme Court's parochial aid cases). See
also Surinach v. Pesquera de Busquets, 604 F.2d 73 (1st Cir. 1979) (nonentanglement required
invalidation of actions of Puerto Rico Department of Consumer Affairs in subpoenaing documents
of parochial schools to investigate inflationary trends in private education).
352. Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 371-72 (1975); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
619-20 (1971); Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1126 (7th Cir. 1977), aff'd,
440 U.S. 490, 502 (1979).
353. 2 Ohio App. 3d 418, 442 N.E.2d 819, cert. denied, 103 S.Ct. 568 (1982).
[Vol. 41:347
ESTABLISHMENT CLA USE LIMITS
employees of a church and its school. 35 4 In a worker's compensation claim,
the issues typically disputed are the existence of an injury or its severity, whether
the mishap occurred while in the scope of employment, and whether the
claimant was an employee or independent contractor. The nature of these issues
is less entangling in comparison to the unemployment compensation claim of
an employee terminated for cause. 3" For example, the nature of an injury
is wholly a medical question to be assessed by an impartial physician. It is
hard to imagine a case where religious concerns could be drawn into the mat-
ter. A civil court determining issues of fact and law is not unlike the well-
accepted circumstance where a church is sued in common-law tort for injuries
it is alleged to have caused. In the Ohio statute, however, there are some
features which call for careful attention in administration lest the separation
principle be violated. For example, the statute empowers an administrative
agency to command a religious organization to submit its payroll reports
315 6
a matter which could lead to involuntary and unnecessarily probing audits
of church finances. 57 Further, should a church refuse to comply with the
agency's demands, the state may commence enforcement proceedings.3 5 For-
tunately, these proceedings would be conducted under the auspices of the courts
which are more attuned to First Amendment concerns.
35 9
354. Id. at 420, 442 N.E.2d at 821. The church raised only free exercise objections to the
workmen's compensation law, maintaining that it was contrary to their religious beliefs to pay
to the state money that had been contributed by church members solely for religious purposes.
As might be expected, even if the court had found that the conviction was sincerely held, it would
have been of no avail. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982). Since the church did not
argue the establishment clause doctrine of separation and nonentanglement, one can only speculate
on how the court would have ruled on that defense.
355. See supra note 349.
356. Omo REv. CODE ANN. §§ 4121.15, 4123.23, 4123.37 (1980).
357. Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 659-60 (1980) (permitted state audit
of parochial schools voluntarily participating in a program involving reimbursement for purchase
of secular textbooks). In Regan, any audit would have been discrete and confined to the volun-
tary program. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 201-202 (1973) (permitting one-time audit).
358. Omo Rav. CODE ANN. § 4123.37 (1980). An employer may opt to self-insure but then
must comply with additional disclosure requirements. OHio Rav. CODE ANN. §§ 4123.35, 4123.416
(1980).
359. The Ohio Workmen's Compensation Act is much like the Social Security Act Amend-
ments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, which requires all nonprofit organizations, including churches
and other religious bodies, to participate in the federal social security program. Prior law made
participation the option of the religious organization. In extreme cases, these programs can lead
to church-state entanglement. See, e.g., Calvary Baptist Church v. United States, Civ. No. S-82-193
MLS (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1982) (unpublished opinion denying TRO). In Calvary Baptist, the
IRS was about to execute on a levy against church bank accounts and enforce a lien against
the church real estate to recover some $16,000 in back social security taxes. Id. Foreclosure ac-
tions of this sort are entanglements warned against in Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674
(1970). See also Myer, The Church Plan Under Recent Pension Legislation, 27 CATH. LAw. 185
(1982); Tracy, Church Plans, 60 TAXEs 33 (1982). Both Myer and Tracy concern the applicability
of the Employees Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. (1976) to religious
organizations.
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With increasing frequency, nondiscrimination laws involving the
handicapped3 60 and litigation concerning employment discrimination on the
basis of out-of-wedlock pregnancy, 361 religion 362 and sexual preference 36 3 affect
religious organizations. The courts are divided on whether the First Amend-
ment permits suits against churches by disgruntled employees on a theory of
breach of employment contract.3 64 The most frequent litigation, however, con-
cerns allegations of sex discrimination brought under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964365 and the Equal Pay Act of 1963.366
In EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary,3 67 the Equal
360. See Grosch, Church-Related Schools and the Section 504 Mandate of Nondiscrimina-
tion in Employment on the Basis of Handicap, 31 DE PAUL L. REv. 69 (1981).
361. For cases concerning women terminated for becoming pregnant out-of-wedlock, com-
pare Harvey v. YWCA, 533 F.Supp. 949 (W.D. N.C. 1982) (upholding dismissal of staff person
who was role model for young girls) with Dolter v. Wahlert High School, 483 F.Supp. 266 (N.D.
Iowa 1980) (prohibiting dismissal of teacher at parochial school).
362. See Feldstein v. Christian Science Monitor, 555 F.Supp. 974 (D. Mass. 1983) (upholding
that publication of newspaper is religious activity, therefore, limiting applicants to members of
controlling church permitted); Larson v. Kirkham, 499 F.Supp. 960 (D. Utah 1980), aff'd, 32
Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33,827 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 104 S.Ct. 157 (1983) (Mormon
business college may dismiss teacher because she is no longer active in church); Seman v. Chris-
tian Corps, Inc., Civ. Act. No. 3-82-505 (D. Minn. July 13, 1983) (unpublished opinion) (religious
vocational school for missionaries may discriminate in hiring on religious basis). Cf. Fike v. United
Methodist Children's Home, 547 F.Supp. 286 (E.D. Va. 1982), affd on other grounds, 709 F.2d
284 (4th Cir. 1983) (children's home that had abandoned its religious purpose could not discriminate
on basis of religion).
363. See Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., No. 89-5863 (D.C. Super. 1983) (Roman
Catholic university need not recognize homosexual student organization notwithstanding ban against
such discrimination in District of Columbia); Walker v. First Orthodox Presbyterian Church of
San Francisco, 23 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 31,006, 22 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 762 (Cal.
Super. Apr. 3, 1980) (church may dismiss homosexual for religious reasons notwithstanding city
ordinance prohibiting discrimination).
364. Compare Kaufman v. Sheehan, 707 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1983) (suit by parish priest rais-
ing questions concerning his employment status and church discipline not cognizable in civil court
for First Amendment reasons) with Gipe v. Worldwide Church of God, No. AP-3260 (Cal. Super.
Orange Ct. June 22, 1982) (unpublished opinion), writ denied, Civ. No. 29210 (Cal. App. 4th
Div. Aug. 26, 1982), appeal denied, No. 29210 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Oct. 21, 1982), cert. denied, 103
S.Ct. 1772 (1983) (courts may apply neutral-principles-of-law to contract action for severance
pay by former minister discharged for doctrinal reasons) and Reardon v. Lemoyne, 122 N.H.
1042, 454 A.2d 428 (1982) (courts may apply neutral-principles-of-law to contract action by nuns
employed as parochial teachers discharged by church officials).
365. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to -17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See generally Note, Recent
Developments: Freedom of Religion As a Defense to Employment Discrimination Charges Under
Title VII, 5 AM. J. TRIAL ADvoc. 154 (1982); Note, E.E.O.C. v. Mississippi College: The Ap-
plicability of Title VII to Sectarian Schools, 33 BAYLOR L. Rv. 380 (1981); Note, The Boun-
daries of a Church's First Amendment Rights as an Employer, 31 CAsa W. Rrs. L. R-v. 363 (1981).
366. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976) (amending Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938); 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201 et seq. (1976 & Supp. V 1981). See Russell v. Belmont College, 30 Fair EmpI. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 1111 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), 554 F. Supp. 667 (D. Md. 1982) (holding act does not violate
First Amendment when applied to Baptist college insofar as it pertains to charge by lay female
faculty member); Ritter v. Mount St. Mary's College, 495 F.Supp. 724 (D. Md. 1980).
367. 485 F.Supp. 255 (N.D. Tex. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 651 F.2d 277 (5th
Cir 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 905 (1982). See Wood, A Baptist Seminary Resists the Equal
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Employment Opportunity Commission brought suit to compel a seminary to
file a Higher Education Staff Information Report (form EEO-6). 363 The federal
district court refused to order filing of the EEO-6 because of the substantially
religious purpose and nature of the seminary. 369 Reversing in part, the circuit
court held that the seminary need only comply with the EEO-6 filing require-
ment as to nonministerial support staff, thus exempting faculty and
administration. 
70
The principle of independent, voluntaristic religious organizations calls
for the application of two considerations applied by the district and circuit
courts. First, as to organizations which are "pervasively religious,' ' 37 1 the
religious body should be entirely exempt from equal employment legislation,
372
because any regulation by the EEOC 373 necessarily would affect the core
religious functions of worship and the teaching and propagation of religious
beliefs. 7 The district court in Southwestern Baptist, therefore, was correct
in affording an institution-wide exemption to what all parties admitted was
a pervasively religious school.3 7 The pervasively religious test permits exemp-
tions for parochial schools, but not hospitals, 37 6 nursing homes, 377 and many
Employment Opportunity Commission, GovRMENT INTERVENTION iN RauGious ArFrAs 97 (Kelley
ed. 1982).
368. The EEO-6 form requires all institutions of higher education, public and private, to
file annually with the EEOC the information on percentage of employees by ethnic group and
sex, categorized by position, tenure status and salary. 40 Fed. Reg. 25,189 (1975).
369. 485 F.Supp. at 263.
370. 651 F.2d at 283-85.
371. See supra note 209 ("pervasively religious" defined by Supreme Court in context of
aid to religious schools).
372. R. NEu-Aus, supra note 138, at 126. Organizations which are pervasively religious should
not treat this exemption as license to discriminate. Out of self-discipline and respect for people,
one would expect these religious organizations to have in mind fairness and the welfare of their
employees. Moreover, discrimination would generally not be in their self-interest for public rela-
tions purposes.
373. Title VII empowers the EEOC with substantial rule making, investigatory, and ad-
judicatory powers which could involve church-state entanglements of significant intensity and
long duration. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
374. Recall the indivisable nature of a "pervasively religious" institution, which, for exam-
ple, prohibits the government from funding or aiding capital improvements to parochial schools
because it has the effect of advancing religious inculation. See supra text accompanying note 209.
375. 485 F.Supp. at 258-59. The findings of fact by the district court include: (a) enrollment
was not open to the public in general or to Baptists, but is limited to persons who have exper-
ienced a "divine call" into the ministry; (b) the religious environment of the seminary was calculated
to be part of the program of shaping the attitudes of students; (c) daily chapel was mandatory
for students and employees; (d) religious discipline and mores extended into personal life; (e)
membership in the Baptist church was required for faculty employment; (f) recruitment of new
faculty and administrators was viewed as a divinely guided "spiritual quest"; and (g) even sup-
port staff were encouraged and expected to consider their work as a religious calling, and no
amount of job competence by staff could override a deficiency in attitude inconsistent with the
ideals and responsibilities of the seminary. Id.
376. Cf. supra note 224 (cases cited).
377. Cf. supra note 323 (cases cited).
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church-related colleges 37 8 operated by religious entities that provide secular
services to the general public without regard to religious affiliation.
The circuit court applied a test which focused on the ministerial nature
of particular jobs and would be appropriate where the organization concerned
is not pervasively religious. At religiously-affiliated hospitals, nursing homes,
and colleges there are many employees that are not selected on religious criteria
and, therefore, are not significantly involved in matters central to the organiza-
tion's distinctively religious character.37 9 Accordingly, the circuit court's
approach based upon the job responsibilities of particular employees would
have been consistent with nonentanglement requirements only if the school
had not been pervasively religious, which is certainly not the case with a
seminary. Courts must also exercise care that ministerial employees are not
defined too narrowly. Employees other than ordained clergy may be ministerial.
Instead, the proper inquiry is whether the employee is selected on the basis
of religious criteria; specifically, does the employee have duties materially
related to the teaching or propagation of religious faith? If so, then that par-
ticular position should be exempt from EEOC regulation, even in an organiza-
tion that is not pervasively religious.
3
11
B. Regulation of Religious Social Welfare Agencies
As noted earlier, perhaps the largest expansion of activities by churches
and other religious bodies has been into social welfare endeavors. 81 Some
of these organizations are tightly integrated into a church or synagogue, while
others exist as lay religious corporations or parachurch groups with clearly
378. Cf. supra notes 225-39 (cases cited). Of course, some colleges will be able to show
that they are "pervasively religious". See, e.g., New Jersey Bd. of Higher Educ. v. Board of
Directors of Shelton College, 90 N.J. 470, 448 A. 2d 988, 989-90 (1982) (description of Shelton
College).
379. See Comment, Government Noninvolvement With Religious Institutions, 59 TEx. L.
REv. 921, 962 (1981).
380. Since the seminary was "pervasively religious" the circuit court's test also causes the
courts to become entangled in religious classifications of who is a "minister" and who is not
at the seminary, an engagement the Supreme Court has warned against. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 216-18, 243-44.
Other Title VII cases of interest are EEOC v. Pacific Press Pub. Ass'n, 676 F.2d 1272 (9th Cir.
1982) (upholding EEOC investigation of nonprofit publishing house affiliated with Seventh Day
Adventist Church based on sex discrimination charge by employee in staff support position);
EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981)
(holding that EEOC could subpoena records of Baptist college based on sex discrimination com-
plaint filed by female who sought faculty appointment in psychology department); McClure v.
Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 896 (1972) (holding that First
Amendment precludes application of Title VII to sex discrimination charge brought by female
minister); Shenandoah Bible Church v. EEOC, Civ. Act. No. 82-31-M (N.D. W.Va. Feb. 10,
1983) (unpublished opinion), appeal docketed, No. 83-1368 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that church-
related school was exempt from EEOC subpoena served as result of sex discrimination complaint
filed by teachers). See generally Parmenter, EEOC Jurisdiction Over Churches: How Far Does
It Go?, 28 Loy. L. Ray. 332 (1982).
381. See supra text accompanying notes 133-38.
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identifiable religious purposes but no affiliation or institutional ties to a par-
ticular denomination.38 2 The federal government has not imposed regulations
concerning the activities of private social welfare agencies except when
government-funded programs are involved.383 The more vexing litigation,
therefore, has involved state and local governments. The principle cases
challenge comprehensive licensing and regulatory schemes directed at children's
homes and orphanages, child-care and day-care programs, and foster home
and adoption placement agencies.
38 4
A poignant example of state regulation interfering with the distinctive
religious purpose of a social ministry is found in Scott v. Family Ministries.38
In Scott, a California-based foster and adoptive home placement agency, Family
Ministries, lost the right to place children exclusively with families of the same
religious faith. California law required all adoptive home agencies to be
licensed. The court declared that the state licensing scheme over private adop-
tive agencies made the actions of corporations such as Family Ministries "state
action in the context of the establishment clause."' 38 6 The court reasoned that
if the state must be neutral in matters of religion, so must private agencies
licensed by the state, even religious agencies! 8" The implications are crip-
pling. Family Ministries exists for the very purpose of discriminating in favor
of a particular religious persuasion, as do other adoptive agencies sponsored
by other faiths.
388
382. It is helpful to group ministries into one of the following classifications: (1) children's
homes and orphanages; (2) child-care, day-care, and preshool programs; (3) foster home and
adoption-placement agencies; (4) charities, such as storehouses for food and used household goods,
and places for temporary meals and lodging; (5) alcohol and drup treatment programs; (6) counseling
and chaplaincy services; (7) youth recreational programs, camps, and retreat centers; (8) mater-
nity shelters for expectant unwed mothers; (9) hospitals and medical clinics; (10) prision ministries
and halfway houses for criminals; (11) nursing and invalid homes for the elderly; and (12) centers
for the handicapped, retarded, or mentally ill.
383. Where federal monies are concerned there are restrictions of the use of the funds.
Government-church involvement, therefore, would cease if the ministry declined the funding.
See Pickrell & Horwich, supra note 21 (recent article that focuses on federal funding and con-
comitant regulation of religious activities in social services).
Although regulated by the state and receiving federal funds, the right of Roman Catholic
hospitals to refuse patients who requested abortions and sterilization operations has been upheld.
Taylor v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976);
Chrisman v. Sisters of St. Joseph of Peace, 506 F.2d 308 (9th Cir. 1974).
384. The discussion in this subpart is condensed from a more extensive article found at Esbeck,
State Regulation of Social Services Ministries of Religious Organizations, 16 VAL. U.L. REv.
1 (1981).
385. 65 Cal.App. 3d 492, 135 Cal. Rptr. 430 (1976).
386. Id. at 506, 135 Cal. Rptr. at 438.
387. Analytically, Scott is poorly reasoned because it confuses "state action" for purpose
of the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause, which incorporates the establishment clause
and makes it applicable to the states (see supra note 110), with impermissible state sponsorship
of religion or non-neutrality for purposes of the establishment clause.
388. P. BERGER & R. NEuHAus, supra note 24, at 31. Berger and Neuhaus have pointed
out three "cruel and dehumanizing consequences" of the Scott policy: the natural parent is denied
the ability to control in what religion the child is raised, the religious motivation for the ministry
and its workers is undercut severly, and the child may be deprived of any religious training. Id.
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If other courts follow the rationale of Scott and apply Scott to state-licensed
or certified social welfare ministries of religious bodies, then the religious
activities of these organizations will be hopelessly frustrated. A ministry could
not discriminate on a religious basis in choosing the people it wants to help.
Moreover, religious propagation and counseling in accord with its beliefs and
tenets would be prohibited altogether under this court's debilitating notion
of "neutrality."
A federal district court in Tabernacle Baptist Church v. Conrad389 and
a state supreme court in Kansas v. Heart Ministries, Inc. 390 reached opposite
conclusions concerning comprehensive state regulatory schemes affecting
religious children's homes. The suit in Tabernacle Baptist was brought by a
church which operated a children's home seeking declaratory and injunctive
relief against the agency administering the state mandatory licensing law. 39'
After finding that the religious atmosphere and training in the home was an
integral part of its program, 392 the federal court nullified the act and im-
plementing regulations as applied to religious homes. In doing so, the federal
judge pointed the way to a more tightly-drawn statutory scheme to pass muster
under the establishment clause, a plan which would satisfy the state's interest
in the health and safety of the children 393 without entangling itself with the
home's religious beliefs, program or practices. 394 Thus, the federal court in
Tabernacle Baptist would permit a well-defined licensing scheme consonant
with the state's legitimate interest that the children be properly cared for, while
not permitting those regulatory entanglements that had the potential to
389. Civ. No. 79-149 (D. S.C. Oct. 27, 28, 1980) (unpublished opinion).
390. 227 Kan. 244, 607 P.2d 1102, appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 802 (1980).
391. Civ. No. 79-149, slip. op. at 5 (D. S.C. Oct. 27, 1980).
392. Id. at 6. In Tabernacle Baptist, the Tabernacle Baptist Church was found to be an
unincorporated religious association which, as part of its ministry, operated a home for neglected
and disadvantaged children. An integral part of the home's program was that the children received
fundamentalist Christian training and discipline. Id.
393. Id. at 4. In Tabernacle Baptist, the home did not object to 'compliance with the local
fire and health regulations or to periodic inspection of the facility by the state regulatory depart-
ment. Id.
394. Id. at 5-6. In Tabernacle Baptist, the court stated:
Although of the opinion that the application of a licensing provision setting forth cer-
tain well-defined health and safety standards and containing a proviso prohibiting the
licensing authority from interfering with the Home's religious beliefs or practices would
be within the State's power the licensing scheme under consideration is not so
limited. ...
[The regulations are] replete with broadly phrased provisions giving [the department]
virtually unlimited discretion in assessing compliance with its mandates. For example,
if the [departmental] representative assigned to visit the Home was to determine that
its program of care was not sufficiently "well rounded," or that "appropriate com-
munity activities" had not been made available, a license could be denied, despite the
fact that what the [departmental] representative considered a well rounded program
of care of appropriate community activities would fly in the fact of the [church's] religious
beliefs.
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In Heart Ministries, the state regulations concerning residential children's
homes mixed the legitimate health, safety and sanitation concerns of govern-
ment with the more troublesome area of program and personnel. For exam-
ple, the regulations required that the governing board represent a variety of
community interests and that the staff satisfy qualifications specified by the
state regulatory agency. 396 The Kansas Supreme Court upheld the comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme as within the state's police power. Unfortunately, the
home did not argue the establishment clause defenses3"9 available to a children's
home with a profile which was apparently pervasively religious. 39
As with other areas of church-state separation, state regulatory agencies
like those in Tabernacle Baptist and Heart Ministries have not always
demonstrated the sensitivity requisite to achieve the balance sought in the
separation principle of independent, voluntaristic churches. The states can and
should be less intrusive into religious affairs and still satisfy their proper func-
tion of ensuring health, fire, safety, and sanitation safeguards. 399 As two keen
social critics have stated, the all-encompassing embrace by state bureaucrats,
who are presumptuous about knowing "what's best" in program content, '
395. Id. at 2. In Tabernacle Baptist, the church was not able to point to any actual con-
straints on the religious activities of the home at the time of suit because the home had never
been licensed and had only recently been pressured by the state into compliance. Id. Nevertherless,
the court was correct in issuing the injunction on the basis that there was a "substantial risk"
of entanglements without an injunction. See supra notes 230, 233, 235.
396. 227 Kan. at 248-49, 607 P.2d at 1106. Quite properly, any ministry would want its
board of directors to be of one mind on its religious purpose, thus rendering impossible fulfill-
ment of a duty to represent a variety of the community's interests.
397. Id. at 251-52, 607 P.2d at 1107-108.
398. Id. at 245-50, 607 P.2d at 1104-107. In Heart Ministries, there were religious restric-
tions of staff selection, enforced obedience to religious dogma, required attendance at worship
services, and required religious or doctrinal study. Further, the children's home was an integral
part of the religious mission of the sponsors, and religious evangelization was a primary purpose
of the home. Id.
399. Fortunately, several states recently have enacted special statutes, striking the balance
more in harmony with the establishment clause. See ALA. CODE § 38-7-3 (Supp. 1981) (registra-
tion of religious preschool programs); 1983 Ark. Acts 245, 331 (registration of religious child-
care facilities); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2212.09 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) (religious day-care
centers exempt from licensing); ItD. CODE ANN. § 12-3-2-12.7 (Bums 1981) (registration of religious
day nurseries); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 46:14104 (West Supp. 1981) (registration of child-welfare
agencies receiving no public funds); Miss. CODE ANN. § 43-15-9 (1981) (religious orphan's homes,
child-caring agencies and children's home societies exempt from licensing); Mo. REv. STAT. §
210.516(5) (1983) (religious foster homes, residential care facilities and child placement agencies
exempt from licensing); 1983 N.C. Sess. Laws 283 (ratified May 9, 1983) (registration of religious
day-care centers); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 2-7-2700, 20-7-2900 to 20-7-2990 (Law Co-op Supp. 1981)
(registration of religious day-care centers and group day-care homes); VA. CODE § 63.1-196.3
(1980) (registration of religious child-care centers).
400. William Bently Ball, an active litigator, noted the strands of arrogance and condescen-
sion among some social service professionals toward the struggle with the state for breathing
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has a tendency to squeeze out of society values derived from the various
religious traditions which comprise a pluralistic America.4 1' They conclude
that without the balance of separation, "the result is that the state has an
unchallenged monopoly on the generation and maintenance of values. Needless
to say, we would find this a very unhappy condition indeed.
' 4 2
C. Private Law Actions for Religious Fraud & Other Torts
Unlike those conflicts involving federal and state regulation of the activities
of religious organizations, the only governmental involvement in tort actions
is through the civil courts. 4 3 Nonetheless, the line of cases concerning
noninterference in intrafaith disputes starting with Watson v. Jones
40 4
demonstrates that in many circumstances, even the involvement of the civil
courts in resolving a dispute can violate a church's independence. Lawsuits
against religious associations for tortious conduct that raise concerns of church-
state separation fall into four categories: (1) acts of church discipline alleged
to have injured a member or cleric;40 5 (2) the application of matrimonial canon
space. Ball, Between Persons and the State, 4 CHRISTIAN LEGAL SCI. Q. 5 (Iss. 1 1983).
When I speak of the governmental "attack" on mediating structures existing in the
health, educational, and charitable fields, I do not mean to suggest that state authorities
manifest a conscious design to single out and penalize or obliterate these structures.
The governmental endeavors usually originate in a totally innocent presumption of total
governmental competency. Hostility usually sets in only when the assumption of superior-
ity is questioned.
Such questioning is depicted as a demonstration of both ignorance and disobedience.
It is also seen as a threat to the industry-the industry of regulating (the same industry
being the source of the income, security, perquisites, and social rank of the govern-
ment administrator). In addition there are, of course, some mendacious public ser-
vants, nor should it be denied that there are movements within government that delib-
erately push for ideological goals suppressive of the freedom that mediating structures
support. Obviously it is a mixed picture.
Id.
401. P. BERGER & R. NEUtAus, supra note 24, at 28.
In the public policy areas most relevant to this discussion-health, social welfare,
education, and so on-the historical development of programs, ideas, and institutions
is inseparable from the church. In some parts of the country, notably in the older
cities of the Northeast, the great bulk of social welfare services function under religious
auspices .... [Tihe religious character of these service agencies is being fast eroded.
Where government agencies are not directly taking over areas previously serviced by
religious institutions, such institutions are being turned into quasi-governmental agen-
cies through the powers of funding, certification, licensing, and the like. The loss of
religious and cultural distinctiveness is abetted also by the dynamics of professionaliza-
tion within the religious institutions and by the failure of the churches either to support
their agencies or to insist that public policy respect their distinctiveness.
Id.
402. Id. at 31.
403. Private law actions against religious organizations for breach of contract are also in-
creasing. See, e.g., supra note 364 (cases cited).
404. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 254-63).
405. See Chavis v. Rowe, 93 N.J. 103, 459 A.2d 674 (1983) (discussed in text); Guinn v.
Church of Christ of Collinsville, Okla., No. CT-81-929 (Tulsa, Okla. Dist. Ct. Jan. 7, 1983)
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law alleged to have caused injury to a nonmember; 411 (3) clergy counselling
or spiritual guidance alleged to have caused injury to the counsellee or a related
third party;4 7 and (4) suits against alleged "mind control" sects by an ex-
member for fraud, emotional distress, or other injury.
4 8
The Supreme Court's decision in Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
(unpublished order) (state trial court refused to dismiss action by church member for invasion
of privacy suit arising out of church disciplinary proceeding), appeal denied, No. 59,623 (Okla.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 1983) (unpublished order), cert. denied sub nom. Church of Christ of Col-
linsville v. Graham, 104 S.Ct. 85 (1983), on remand, No. CT-81-929 (Tulsa, Okla. Dist. Ct. Mar.
15, 1984) ($390,000 actual and punitive damages awarded), appeal docketed, No. 62,154 (Okla.
Sup. Ct. Apr. 16, 1984); Sinai Temple v. Superior Court of California for the County of Los
Angeles (Smotrich, real party in interest), Civ. No. 64348 (Cal. App. 2d Mar. 12, 1982) (un-
published opinion), stay denied, Civ. No. 64348 (Cal. Sup. Ct. May 20, 1983) (unpublished opin-
ion), cert. denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 4, 1982) (No. 82-96) (discovery permitted into
synagogue's termination decision of rabbi in suit by former member of congregation).
406. See Korening v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 82-295 (Wis. Ct. App. Dist. 1 Nov.
16, 1982) (unpublished opinion), appeal denied, 110 Wis. 2d 749, 331 N.W.2d 391 (1983), cert.
denied, 51 U.S.L.W. 3857 (U.S. May 31, 1983) (No. 82-1717) (court refused jurisdiction over
suit for emotional distress resulting when Roman Catholic Church annulled plaintiff's prior Lutheran
marriage to Ex-husband); cf. Avitzur v. Avitzur, 58 N.Y.2d 108, 446 N.E.2d 136 (1983), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 76 (1983) (court applies neutral-principles-of-law approach to enforcement
of Jewish marriage contract, thus requiring ex-husband to appear before rabbinical tribunal to
be divorced according to ecclesiastical law).
407. See Washington v. Hill, No. 80-423 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1982) (unpublished opin-
ion) (discussed in text); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, No. NCC 18668 B
(Cal. Super. Ct. Los Angeles Cty. Oct. 2, 1981) (unpublished opinion) (dismissing clergy malpractice
suit by parents of suicide victim who had been obtaining counselling from church staff); Ander-
son v. Diocese of Diluth, No. 159581 (D. Ct. St. Louis Cty., Minn.,filed Mar. 30, 1983) (reported
in NAT'L L. J. 3, (May 16, 1983)) (suit against Roman Catholic diocese for injury resulting from
homosexual assault on minor; church officials allegedly failed to act on information obtained
by priest during confessional); see generally Funston, Made Out of Whole Cloth? A Constitu-
tional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept, 19 CAL. W.L. REv. 507 (1983); Hotz, Dioce-
sian Liability for Negligence of a Priest, 26 CAxH. LAw. 228 (1981); Bergman, Is the Cloth Unrevel-
ing? A First Look at Clergy Malpractice, 9 SA. FERN. V.L. REV. 47 (1981); Ericsson, Clergyman
Malpractice: Ramifications of a New Theory, 16 VAL. U.L. REv. 163 (1981).
408. See Christofferson v. Church of Scientology of Portland, 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d
577 (1982), appeal dismissed, 293 Or. 456, 650 P2d 928 (1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1196
(1983), 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983); Van Schaick v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 535 F. Supp.
1125 (D. Mass. 1982); Molko v. Holy Spirit Ass'n for the Unification of World Christianity,
No. 769-529 (Cal. Super. Ct. San Fransisco Cty. Oct. 20, 1983) (summary judgement in favor
of church in suit by two ex-members on claims of fraud, false imprisonment, intentional inflic-
tion of emotional harm, and restitution of gift); George v. Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness,
No. 27-75-65 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 1983), 4 Civ. 30863 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 23, 1983) (reported
in NAT'L L.J. 6 (June 6, 1983)) (suit by ex-Krishna member alleging civil conspiracy to hide her
from parents); see generally Heins, "Other People's Faiths:" The Scientology Litigation and the
Justiciability of Religious Fraud, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153 (1981).
In related cases in which the church is not a party, young people who have joined new religious
movements have sued their parents and others who have taken drastic action to "deprogram"
them. See, e.g., Ward v. Connor, 657 F.2d 45 (4th Cir. 1981); cert. deniedsub. nom. Mandelkorn
v. Ward, 455 U.S. 907 (1982); Peterson v. Sorlien, 299 N.W.2d 123 (Minn. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 1031 (1981). In order to abate these suits against "deprogrammers", one individual
has in turn sued a church for malicious prosecution and abuse of process. Alexander v. Unifica-
tion Church of Am., 634 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Milivojevich4 19 clearly controls tortious suits that arise out of incidents of church
discipline and clergy counselling. For example, in Chavis v. Rowe ,410 a deacon
of a Baptist church was removed from his post apparently because he had
fallen into disfavor with the pastor. The deacon and his wife sued for injunc-
tive relief and damages maintaining that the removal process had not been
in accord with established procedures. Although the court denied an injunc-
tion, a jury trial produced a verdict totalling 8,000 dollars for the plaintiffs.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the trial court should not have
taken jurisdiction of the case because the inherent nature of the church
disciplinary dispute required an impermissible excursion into matters of doc-
trine and church polity. ' I Unlike a dispute concerning control of church real
estate, where a neutral-principles-of-law approach is possible, a neutral-
principles rule is never an option in quarrels over matters of doctrine and
polity."1 2 The principle of independent, voluntaristic churches requires resort
to the Watson rule of judicial deference to the decision of the highest
ecclesiastical authority." 3
In Washington v. Hill,414 the plaintiff brought suit against a pastor whose
preaching allegedly caused an alienation of affection between husband and
wife. Since neutrality requires that "[t]he law knows no heresy," ' 5 injury
said to be attributable to religious teaching cannot be regarded as an actionable
tort or breach of duty short of "some substantial threat to public safety, peace
or order." 4 6 The complaint in Washington was brought against the Reverend
Hill, minister of the church the plaintiff's wife attended. Hill's teachings were
alleged to have resulted in the breakup of the marriage. Ironically, the trial
court entertained the action which resulted in a jury verdict for Hill." 7 For
reasons of separation of church and state, the action should have been dismissed
when first initiated.
41 8
409. 426 U.S. 696 (1976) (discussed infra text accompanying notes 280-91).
410. 93 N.J. 103, -, 459 A.2d 674, 675 (1983).
411. Id. at _ , 459 A.2d at 678.
412. Maryland & Virginia Eldership v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 369
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[Gleneral principles of property law may not be relied upon
if their application requires civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues.")
413. Id. at 368-69.
414. No. 80-423 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1981) (unreported decision).
415. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 728 (1872).
416. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (citing as examples, Cleveland v. Unites
States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946) (criminal prosecution of Morman for transporting a woman across
state lines for polygamous practices); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (criminal pro-
secution for violation of child-labor laws); Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (criminal
prosecution for refusal to obtain smallpox vaccination); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145
(1878) (criminal prosecution of a Mormon for polygamy)). The Sherbert Court stated:
It is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some colorable state
interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive constitutional area, "[o]nly the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitations."
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (regula-
tion of labor union activities struck down in face of free speech and assembly challenge). The
regulatory means utilized by the state must by the least restrictive to achieve its goals. Sherbert
v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407.
417. Washington v. Hill, No. CA 80-423, slip. op. at 1 (Ark. Ct. App. Mar. 4, 1981).
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The difficulty of honoring the integrity of religious groups and at the same
time recognizing the socially distructive consequences to other values such as
parent-child relationships, is posed by the rash of recent tort litigation involving
new religious movements."" Some of these emerging groups are said to have
intertwined religious teaching with wholly secular and fraudulent ideas. More-
over, it is often young people who have been affected, and their parents have
aligned themselves in opposition to the religious sect. Christofferson v. Church
of Scientology4 20 and Van Schaick v. Church .f Scientology42' are two
examples.
Of course, religious organizations are not immune from criminal
prosecution 2 2 nor are they exempt from civil suits where acts such as false
imprisonment have caused personal injury. 23 The claims of religious fraud
and intentional infliction of emotional distress allegedly caused by the purveying
of false religious doctrine are more problematic. In United States v. Ballard,424
the Supreme Court held that the judicial system could never place the burden
on a party to prove the truth or falsity of religious beliefs. 23 The elements
418. A suit similar to Washington presently is pending in Waites v. Watchtower Bible and
Tract Soc'y of Pennsylvania, No. CV 80-24401 (Mo. Cir. Ct., Jackson Cty., filed Nov. 6, 1980)
(suit by husband for alienation of affection against national church, local congregation, and cer-
tain church members).
419. See generally Robbins & Anthony, Cults, Brainwashing and Counter-Subversion, 446
THE ANNALS 78 (1979).
420. 57 Or. App. 203, 644 P.2d 577 (1982), appeal dismissed, 293 Or. 456, 650 P.2d 928
(1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 1196 (1983), 103 S. Ct. 1234 (1983).
421. 535 F.Supp. 1125 (D. Mass. 1982).
422. See, e.g., United States v. Heldt, 668 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub
nom. Hubbard v. United States, 456 U.S. 926 (1982) (alleged criminal violations of theft of
Department of Justice Documents); cf. Founding Church of Scientology v. United States, 409
F.2d 1146 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969) (attempted condemnation of religious
artifact and literature for false and misleading labeling pursuant to Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act).
423. See, e.g., George v. International Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness, No. 27-75-65 (Super.
Ct., Orange Cty., Cal.) (reported in NAT'L L. J. 6 (June 6, 1983)) (civil suit alleging "brain-
washing and false imprisonment").
424. 322 U.S. 78 (1944).
425. 322 U.S. at 86-87. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Ballard, sounded a ringing
tribute to freedom of thought:
Freedom of thought, which includes freedom of religious belief, is basic in a society
of free men. Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624. It embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and of death and of the hereafter which are rank heresy to
followers of the orthodox faiths. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men
may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the proof of their religious
doctrines or beliefs. Religious experiences which are as real as life to some may be
incomprehensible to others. Yet the fact that they may be beyond the ken of mortals
does not mean that they can be made suspect before the law. Many take their gospel
from the New Testament. But it would hardly be supposed that they could be tried
before a jury charged with the duty of determining whether those teachings contained
false representations. The miracles of the New Testament, the Divinity of Christ, life
after death, the power of prayer are deep in the religious convictions of many. If one
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of a claim for fraud include proof that a defendant knowlingly made a state-
ment which was false. Proof of these two elements (that it was false and that
the person knew it was false when made) run counter to Ballard when the
statements said to be false relate to religious belief. The plaintiffs in both
Christofferson and Van Schaick sought to circumvent the holding in Ballard
by sifting out the secular representations from the religious and founding their
claim of fraud on only the secular."26 The First Amendment problem soon
catches up with this distinction, however, because many of the representa-
tions involved cannot easily be catagorized as religious or secular. Common
sense, of course, dictates that certain representations are clearly secular or
clearly religious. 4" Thus, not every promise by a religious organization is im-
mune from legal process. As to those representations that are quasi-religious,
however, attempts to adhere to the Ballard rule have resulted in two approaches.
In one approach, a determination is made initially by the finder of fact, who
sorts out and dismisses those representations stemming from religious belief
and tries the rest. In the second approach, the court refuses to engage in such
delicate probing because either the inquiry is impossible or so fraught with
the likelihood of error that more harm than good will result.
The court in Christofferson chose the first approach entailing the necessary
divination to segment the secular promises from the sacred. Moreover, the
court compounded the First Amendment problems by permitting this fact-
finding to be done by a jury.42 The separation of church and state clearly
indicates the second approach. When a representation is arguably religious,
the matter is not actionable in fraud for First Amendment reasons.4 29 This
accords with the Supreme Court's repeated warnings to avoid engaging in the
classification of religious conduct. 430 Necessarily, this means that certain wrongs
could be sent to jail because a jury in a hostile environment found those teachings
false, little indeed would be left of religious freedom. The Fathers of the Constitution
were not unaware of the varied and extreme views of religious sects, of the violence
of disagreement among them, and of the lack of any one religious creed on which
all men would agree. They fashioned a charter of government which envisaged the
widest possible toleration of conflicting views. Man's relation to his God was made
no concern of the state. He was granted the right to worship as he pleased and to
answer to no man for the verity of his religious views. The religious views espoused
by respondents might seem incredible, if not preposterous, to most people. But if those
doctrines are subject to trial before a jury charged with finding their truth or falsity,
then the same can be done with the religious beliefs of any sect. When the triers of
fact undertake that task, they enter a forbidden domain.
Id.
426. Christofferson, 57 Or. App. at __ , 644 P.2d at 597-600; Van Schaick, 535 F.Supp.
at 1141.
427. Christofferson, 57 Or. App. at 644 P.2d at 597 n. 22.
428. 57 Or. App. - , 644 P.2d at 599-605. In Christofferson, the court treated the
First Amendment as an affirmative defense, thus placing the burden of producing evidence con-
cerning the religious nature of each representation alleged to be wrongful on the church. Id.
at _ ; 644 P.2d at 605.
429. See L. TmaE, supra note 7, at 828. Cf. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715
(1981) (only religious claims which are "bizarre" are without protection under the First Amendment).
430. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n. 6, 272 n. 11 (1981).
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will go without a remedy, but with the high purpose of not doing even greater
harm to constitutional freedoms.
4 31
VI. CONCLUSION
Given these two complex realities, church and state, a continuous dialoge
must proceed to make the adjustments in their interrelationship to meet chang-
ing situations. The dialectic is often disharmonious and proceeds with denials
and affirmations, charges and recriminations, reconstructions and compromises.
Neither church nor state will come to a resting place that will not provoke
a new rejoinder. Yet it is possible to discern some order in this multiplicity,
to stop the dialogue, as it were, at certain formative points in history, and
to say this is what we as a society have chosen. For America, this formative
period came as the states slowly shifted from mere religious toleration to separa-
tion, with its unitary concept of independent, voluntaristic churches in a secular
state.
Initially, it must appear perplexing, devout believers making common-
cause with the exponents of a secularized society, together urging separation
of the church from state. But as must now be apparent, both groups' motives
for doing so were widely divergent: the rationalists wanting to prevent over-
reaching by the church into affairs of state and the devotees desiring to pro-
tect the integrity and vitality of their religious community. Moreover, this
alliance which brought separation from theory into political reality has its limits.
For example, those who today would defend the free church are most insis-
tent that a separated church is not a silent church. They are adamant that
the full rights of speech and press are held by religious bodies, as others enjoy
these rights, and that this expression may either affirm or criticize the state.
Free expression does not transgress the separation principle.
As with any attempt to relate the abstract to specific policy, the general
431. The words of Justice Jackson, on the side taken by the First Amendment concerning
this Hobson's choice, cannot be improved upon:
The chief wrong which false prophets do to their following is not financial. The collec-
tions aggregate a tempting total, but individual payments are not ruinous. I doubt if
the vigilance of the law is equal to making money stick by over-credulous people. But
the real harm is on the mental and spiritual plane. There are those who hunger and
thirst after higher values which they feel wanting in their humdrum lives. They live
in mental confusion or moral anarchy and seek vaguely for truth and beauty and moral
support. When they are deluded and then disillusioned, cynicism and confusion follow.
The wrong of these things, as I see it, is not in the money the victims part with half
so much as in the mental and spiritual poison they get. But that is precisely the thing
the Constitution put beyond the reach of the prosecutor, for the price of freedom of
religion or of speech or of the press is that we must put up with, and even pay for,
a good deal of rubbish.
Prosecutions of this character easily could degenerate into religious persecution. I do
not doubt that religious leaders may be convicted of fraud for making false representa-
tions on matters other than faith or experience, as for example if one represents that
funds are being used to construct a church when in fact they are being used for per-
sonal purposes. But this is not this case, which reaches into wholly dangerous ground.
United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 94-95 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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theory of independent, voluntaristic churches is not a bright line test
mechanically yielding answers to particular problems such as those with the
NLRB, the EEOC, and new religious movements. These are the proverbial
"hard cases", which after all is where litigation congregates. In these instances,
the line between independence and servitude for religious organizations is
blurred and indistinct. Moreover, one wrong decision will not send the chur-
ches reeling. It is only when church-state entanglements are permitted to mount
and multiply through neglect or misunderstanding or ignorance that the free
church is threatened.
To prevent this attrition, this article has urged that the concepts of nonen-
tanglement and noninterference in intrafaith disputes, be unified and shouldered
to the task of permitting government only a minimal role in the affairs of
religious entities. The unlimited nature of governmental actions and the many
types of religious bodies make formulation difficult. The three factors which
go into the Supreme Court's nonentanglement test are the place to begin. Im-
portantly, governmental involvement should be prohibited when there is a
measurable risk that worship, the religious teaching and propagation of the
beliefs of the religious association, or the moral discipline of its members would
be inhibited. This protection would embrace the educational and social welfare
ministries of a given religion insofar as the ministry is engaged in essential
religious functions of the faith. Governmental action also should be prohibited
when there is a measurable risk that control over the organizational polity,
the organization's own allocation of its financial resources, or the administra-
tion and discipline of personnel selected on the basis of religious criteria would
be compromised.
There is danger in overconfident assertions concerning subtle and com-
plicated matters, especially concerning as ancient a problem as church-state
relations. So it is with the suggestion in this article to adhere to a separation
of church and state which is historically true, where the religious organization
is safeguarded to the same degree as the state against interference by the other.
One observation can safely be made. The oft-lamented tensions between govern-
ment and the religious communities are not all bad. Rather, the presence of
tension is symptomatic of something healthy. Each "power" is sharpening
and offsetting'the other. For those who would defend the free church, this
tension is evidence that the churches are neither so worldly as to be in-
distinguishable from the aims of state nor so withdrawn from the world as
to be irrelevant to it.
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